Group relations at crowd events

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

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Date of Defense: 10 June 2010
Acknowledgements

Thank God!! And thanks to Jacobs University for giving me the opportunity to do this thesis. I am very grateful for the support I got from my supervisor Professor Boehnke during all those years in planning, writing and finishing this work. It was just the right mixture of professional and scientific guidance, interpersonal advice and encouragement. Thank you very much for that!

Many thanks go to Professor Schreier for her advices regarding data analysis and for valuable tips concerning my presentation to the proposal committee (that was very helpful!).

I am much obliged to Professor Feltes who hosted me as a visiting researcher at his department during the time of this work and gave me the opportunity to engage in several projects (though this has certainly prolonged the duration of this thesis, the professional gain outweighs this without a doubt).

This work would never have been conducted without Dr. Clifford Stott, Senior Lecturer from Liverpool University. He trusted to employ me as a postgraduate but complete newcomer to crowd research (but believed in my social and football-fan competences) to be a research assistant and member of the Portugal research team. This experience and the knowledge I gained was priceless and it has influenced me strongly, muito obrigada!

Likewise I am grateful to Professor Adang from the Police Academy of the Netherlands, who I am working for now. I have gained a lot from your knowledge, discussions we had and the work that I was and that I am doing for the Police Academy. Dank je wel, ik heb heel veel geleerd van jou! (And I hope that I was able to give evidence that a football fan can actually do professional crowd research).

These jobs have taken me to many places (crowd events, conferences and seminars) throughout Europe and I was given the opportunity to conduct the research necessary for this thesis. In addition it was the further experiences and contacts with citizens, fans, police officers, and scientists which have provided me with further insight and gave me new ideas – all this has in a way contributed to this work.

Finally I want to give thanks to my friends and family for their love, friendship and support. In relation to John 21, 25 I’d like to add that if every one of them were written down, I suppose that even the whole world would not have room for the books that would be written.

This thesis is for Mika.

Martina Schreiber
Declaration:

I herewith declare that this thesis is my own work and that I have used only the sources listed. Part of this thesis consists of papers submitted to scientific journals.

Paper 1 ‘Celebrating with the Dutch - Policing German risk fans at Euro 2004 in Portugal’ has been submitted to Police Science and Research where it is currently under review.

Paper 2 ‘Fiction, facts and a summer’s fairy tale – Mixed messages at the World Cup 2006’ has been submitted to Policing & Society and has been accepted for publication.

Paper 3 ‘The Poles are coming! Fan behaviour and police tactics around the World Cup match Germany vs. Poland’ has been submitted to Sport in Society and has been accepted for publication.

Paper 4 ‘A time to make friends with Germany – Peaceful relations at football games’ has been submitted to the Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise Journal where it is currently under review.

Martina Schreiber
Bremen, 10 March 2010
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About this thesis
Crowds fascinate, they draw attention and ever so often crowds make it to the news - for good or for bad reasons. Crowds made the walls of Jericho fall (though some believe it was an earthquake) and the wall of Berlin. Crowds can be raving violent and disarmingly peaceful. It was a raging mob that turned down the aristocracy in Paris. Conversely, Gandhi’s non-violent Salt march moved the world and shook the British Empire. Crowds can unite in comfort and grief like the mourners of Princess Diana or in joyful celebrations as the World Cup visitors on the streets of Germany. Despite their multiple facets, crowds yet have a rather negative reputation as something impulsive and unpredictable if not dangerous. This is not least reflected in the language of some police forces that use ‘crowd control’ as a synonym for public order policing. Crowds can be frightening and ever so often it seems that – out of the blue – a quiet gathering turns into a riot. It may have been this controversy and apparent intangibility of crowds that encouraged and instigated crowd research, and likewise instigated the present work on crowd events. More precisely, the present work is about the character and the effect of group relations at crowd events. In doing so it focuses on a specific interactional approach to crowd behaviour that was developed in the tradition of social identity theory: the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour, ESIM (Reicher, 1996a, 2002; Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 1999; Stott & Reicher, 1998). Within recent years the model has gained increasing support for both the explanation of conflict and the absence of violence at crowd events. Outcomes of this research have had a high impact on practical policing, in particular with regard to the policing of football games. The approach served as a background for the preparation for the EURO 2004 in Portugal and issues of the approach have meanwhile been integrated in the ‘EU Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation’¹ (EU, 2006). However, the existing literature focused exclusively upon the policing and psychological reactions of England and Scotland fans. Consequently, there was no empirical analysis of the cross cultural dimensions to the dynamics outlined within ESIM. More specifically there is a lack of evidence concerning the psychology, group processes and intergroup relationships with regard to groups from other nations. This absence within the literature is made more acute given the extent to which the ESIM is currently informing updates to international guidelines for international police cooperation and pan-

¹ The recommendations e.g. highlight the ‘great practical importance to know and assess the social identities of the various (sub) groups of supporters, their values and standards, aims and goals, their sense of what is right and proper, their stereotypes and expectations of other groups, their history of interaction with these groups and anything (dates, places, objects forms of action) that has particular significance.” (EU, 2006, p. 19).
European police training with respect to football matches with an international dimension. The present thesis was designed to fill this gap. It presents four studies of crowd behaviour and group interaction at different tournaments in Europe: The first study presents an analysis of German fan psychology at the European Championships 2004 in Portugal. The second paper examines the relations between police tactics and the psychology of different groups that attended the World Cup 2006 in Germany. The third paper focuses on group relations between German and Polish fans and between fans and the police at the game of Germany versus Poland, also during the 2006 World Cup. Finally one study examines German fan identity in relation to different contexts and follows the German fan category through three different tournaments: the European Championships in Portugal 2004, the World Cup 2006 in Germany and the 2008 European Championships in Austria and Switzerland. The outcomes of this research and its relation to the ESI-model are discussed in the respective paper and will be summarised in a later part of the dissertation. The current text is designed to bring together the individual reports and to outline aspects of this research that exceed the structure of a scientific journal. With regard to the object of research, a focus is put on the specific methods in which crowd research can be - and has been - carried out.

In order to place the model in the wider context of this research field, firstly a broad overview of the basic theories of crowd behaviour is presented and it is described how crowd research affected ways of public order policing. This is followed by an outline of contemporaneous crowd research methods. From there the research that was carried out around this thesis will be presented. Four separate studies had been submitted, which are included in this text. Each paper is preceded by a comment that presents aspects of the studies which seemed relevant for this thesis but have not been considered in the respective paper. Finally the relation of the research to the ESI model will be discussed.

Theories of crowd behaviour

The idea of a group mind

Early theories of crowd behaviour go back to the end of the 19th century when the idea of a ‘Group Mind’ was prevalent in explanations of crowd behaviour. However, these accounts drew a rather negative picture of the crowd. Group mind theorists regard crowd behaviour as something apart from normality, suggesting that in the crowd situation participants would be subjected to a form of ‘contagion’ and suggestion from which a ‘group mind’ derives that determines uniform behaviour and the subsequent involvement in criminal acts of crowd members is a natural consequence of the group mind (Sighele, 1891). The French sociologist
Gustave Le Bon similarly suggested that a transformation takes place in a crowd that deprives reasonable individuals of their common senses, so that they degrade to a barbaric evolutionary level. In crowds people would ‘feel more powerful, less observed and less responsible, and therefore their negative impulses get free play’ (Le Bon, 1952, p.30, quoted in van de Sande, 2009). The group mind approach has for years been very popular explanation for crowd behaviour and has inspired dictators and demagogues such as Hitler, Goebbels and Mussolini (Reicher 2002). Although the assumptions of a ‘group mind’ have meanwhile been widely rejected, ideas of this approach still exist in contemporary textbooks and are prevalent within police forces (e.g. Schweingruber & Wohlstein, 2005; Drury, Stott & Farsides, 2003).

**Individualistic theories**

Floyd Allport, the older brother of the famous Gordon Allport, rejected the idea of a group mind. He explained the specific crowd situation as facilitating and intensifying emotional attitudes of individuals. But these would not be generated within the crowd situation, Allport claims that ‘the individual in the crowd behaves just as he would have alone, only more so’ (Allport, 1924, p. 295). According to Allport, crowd behaviour is subject to the accumulation of persons with similar traits and therefore crowd disorder would result from a coming together of people with similar traits or criminal, violent or anti-social personalities. This 'individualistic' account can also be found in contemporary approaches to crowd behaviour. Some researchers, for instance, attribute collective disorder to the convergence of individuals with certain personality traits or dispositions, e.g. abnormal arousal needs which are satisfied through violent activities (Kerr, 1994) while others focus upon the sociological determinants of class-based macro social structures (Dunning, Murphy & Williams, 1988).

**Deindividuation**

Deindividuation theories suggest that in the crowd people are subjected to a process of deindividuation that reduces self-evaluation and observation (Zimbardo, 1969) or self awareness (Diener, 1980; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). As a result, the individual’s self-control and normative regulation of behaviour is limited, causing anti-normative and disinhibited behaviour. The theory borrows from Le Bon (1895) in that a negative impact of crowds is assumed that diminishes individual traits. This is not replaced by a ‘group mind’, but the loss of individuality is seen to result in a total loss of control. However, there is only little or inconsistent evidence for the validity of the theory. In a meta-analysis of 60 tests of deindividuation theory, Postmes and Spears (1998) found no sufficient support for this concept. Reicher, Spears and Postmes (1995), on the other hand, developed a deindividuation
model that is based on selfcategorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). It suggests that in a group or crowd social identity becomes salient which also implies the salience of norms that relate to this identity. Deindividuation in this respect means the replacement of individual identity by social identity so that people do not behave according to their personal identity but with regard to the norms of the respective social identity.

**Emergent norm theory**

Turner and Killian’s (1987) emergent norm theory has been a cornerstone in the approach to crowd behaviour as it proposed the rationality of group processes and contrasts the idea that crowd behaviour is irrational or governed by a ‘group mind’. Crowd behaviour is seen as governed by collective norms which emerge during the crowd situation. Although, the crowd situation is something distinct from ‘normal’ social situations. In the crowd people undergo a form of ‘crisis’ in which traditional norms for action no longer apply. Within this uncertainty and ambivalence people search for meaning and cues in order to define or create a new normative structure. Turner and Killian describe this phase as a process of ‘milling’ during which people engage with other crowd participants, looking for clues and ‘keynotes’ that may provide normative guidance for social action. Also, crowds are not seen as homogenous, they are characterized ‘by differential expression, with some people expressing what they are feeling while others do not’ (1987, p. 26, quoted in Reicher, 2002). Persons that are more distinct in their behaviour may then provide a model for new collective norms that emerge within that situation. With the idea of certain persons differing from others the theory has been criticised as being nothing more than distinct version of Allport’s individualistic approach, explaining crowd behaviour ‘tied to the personality of a dominant few’ (Reicher, 2001, p. 304). Further objections concern the question why some follow the crowd behaviour while others don’t or how large group unity can be achieved in a short period of time (Sethi, 2009; Reicher, 2002). However, despite its criticisms, the theory has provided a major step away from the irrationalist view of crowds and initiated further research activities on normative and interactional processes of and within crowds. Turner’s (1964) notion of ‘the illusion of unanimity’ within the crowd, for example instigated the work of McPhail and colleagues (e.g. McPhail, 1969, 1972; McPhail & Pickens, 1975; Schweingruber & McPhail, 1999; see also the chapter on crowd research in this text). With its emphasis on group norms as guides for action in a crowd situation the model can also be regarded as a forerunner of the social identity approach to crowd behaviour. Aspects of emergent norm theory are also
incorporated in the model that was developed by the German psychologist Schmalzl and serves to explain escalation and deescalation processes in protest situations:

**An escalation-deescalation model of citizen - police interaction**

Schmalzl’s (1996) model describes four ascending steps towards escalation and four descending steps towards deescalation. The first step towards escalation is a refusal of communication and a mutual confrontational attitude. Uniform appearance and open display of force (e.g., unique dark clothing, skin heads, safety shoes on the protesters side and high profile riot gear, protective equipment, water cannons on the police’s side) are used as symbols of power. Incomprehension or a lack of understanding constitutes the second step. This may be based on contradictory ideological beliefs and attitudes that may differ in such a way that confrontation is inherent in the situation as such. Disturbed communication further results in biased perception and a lack of differentiation. The use of protective equipment by the police can be seen as a provocation, while it was just meant to be protection. In such a phase it is more and more difficult for the police to make a realistic judgement on transgressions (e.g. sit-ins) and to understand the meaning and risk of different forms of protest. The third stage of escalation comprises symbolic and factual actions and tactics of provocation. Once conflict escalates, the perception tightens. The other group becomes the opponent and the parties develop tactics in order to win the confrontation. However, the police are legally restricted, as opposed to creative, legally ambiguous ways that can be used by the protesters. The development of new interactive norms provides a basis for open aggression that may also concern more ‘liberal’ parts of the crowd. Feelings of moral justification and collective power on the one side but of unfair treatment on the other lets the group develop into a cohesive unit in which conformity of group and opinion builds up and solidarity between the participants heightens. Emotional contagion may take place as a result of attribution of physical reactions, which facilitates a new appraisal of the situation and the development of new norms regarding the attitude towards violence. The police may react by enhancing the use of force. Protesters refrain from addressing their actual objectives and turn to confront the police. There is a normative pressure to use violence. Scenarios like this burden further encounters between protesters and police with a mortgage.

Structural factors can account for the speed and strength of the course of escalation: The location, infrastructural conditions or the symbolism of a site in terms of its historical or political meaning can influence the participants’ perception and behaviour. Also barricades, confronting deployment and the spatial closeness to the opponent of the demonstration have a
catalysing effect on the escalation of the event. The _power relations_ between the groups, such as the relation between the amount of officers deployed and the number of demonstrators can influence the course of the event. Bystanders or _passive audience_ are sometimes used by violent elements in order to hide and to attack opponents and/or the police. _Media_ play an important and an active role in the course of an event. While the mere presence of a camera has an impact on the actual behaviour on the ground, media coverage that highlights certain aspects can have an impact on further events. _Weather_ conditions can have an impact on crowd behaviour, as sunny weather facilitates protest, while it ebbs off when temperature lowers (Baron & Ransberger, 1978).

_Differentiation_ is the first step toward _de-escalation_. Schmalzl suggest that there should be an awareness of one’s own motives and objectives, as only self-perception accounts for an unbiased perception of the other party, whose goals and intentions should be studied. Consequently, policing should be carried out differentiated and consistent and therefore be reliable and comprehensible for the other party. He argues that the more police behaviour becomes ritualised, the more reliable and the more ‘immune’ the police will become against uncontrolled and pointless action. A further step is to establish _contact_ and to engage in _negotiations_ with the other party. These actions can lead to a redefinition of interactive norms; in case of consisting tensions and conflict, normative pressure toward co-operation may be mediated by a third party, such as scientists, politicians or media with the aim to establish deals and agreements. The creation of contact subsequently facilitates a further process of _communication_ between the parties in which also rituals of behaviour may develop. Idealistically, actions are discussed prior to the event, regular meetings between the parties take place and arrangements are made. However, communication also concerns internal and external PR work in order to inform colleagues and participants as well as the public. If a stage of _co-operation_ is reached, the relations between the parties are characterised by continuing contact, agreements and joint actions.

_The flashpoints model of public disorder_

The ‘flashpoints model’ (Waddington, Jones & Critcher, 1989) provides a framework of interdependent variables in order to analyse and to explain the circumstances in which public disorder is likely or may fail to occur. The analysis of a public order event comprises seven different levels (c.f. Waddington 2007): On a _structural level_ conflict is related to an evident opposition of the state against specific societal grievances and ‘where police operations are perceived as unreasonably repressive’. On a _political/ideological level_ it is suggested that the
discrimination by official institutions may result in marginalisation and allow uncompromising attitudes of police officers towards such groups. The cultural level refers to the behavioural norms and systems of thoughts that both protesters and the police are holding with regard to their ‘rights’ and the ‘rules’. Compatible prescriptions of actions are suggested to reinforce potential confrontation. The contextual level refers to active communication processes between protesters and the police that may impinge on tension, resentment and mistrust between these groups, for example rumours, warnings or threats. ‘The situational level deals with the specific spatial and social determinants of order and disorder’ (p. 3) and includes factors as location and the management of space. The interactional level eventually deals with the direct relations between the groups. The model has been applied to the analysis of different public order events in Europe, Australia, North and South America and Asia (e.g. Baker, 1991; Lo Shiu-hing, 2006; cited in Waddington, 2007). However, the approach has been subjected to substantial criticisms. Otten, Boin, and van der Torre (2001) for example note that the model fails to provide any ‘thorough treatment of the phase of mobilisation and (self) organisation of crowds and police’. P.A.J. Waddington criticises that there is no direct connection between a ‘flashpoint’ and the riot, as some riots commence in the absence of an identifiable flashpoint while others flare up long after the precipitating incident has first occurred’ (Waddington, 2007, p. 52). David Waddington has acknowledged the validity of certain objections but he sees the need in the model to allow for variations in the nature of incidents or events and for delays between the trigger and the start of the conflict. Furthermore he suggests that there may be several flashpoints, which may ignite in different intensities (Waddington, 2007).

The initiation of violence

This model has only recently been presented (Adang, in press/a), though research on which this is based has already been published in Dutch (Adang, 1990; 1991; 1998) and in German (Schreiber & Adang, 2008). Adang systematically observed more than 200 public order events in the Netherlands between May 1986 and September 1989, of which 137 (60 football matches and 77 protests) were put to further analysis. The research focused on short term and directly observable processes concerning the initiation and escalation of violence during a crowd event; not so much underlying psychological dispositions or attitudes of group members. In both contexts similar patterns emerged: The actual violent acts were only committed by a very small proportion of the persons present even when the situation was

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2 The methodological approach is described in more detail in the chapter on crowd research.
highly escalated, while the majority either engaged in verbal support, gesturing or running or did not get involved at all, also, it was shown that both violent fans and protesters regularly took measures of disguise in order to make it more difficult to be recognised. The observed violence rather concerned the throwing of missiles and aggressive acts against objects than direct physical confrontation of persons that could fight back. The targets of violent acts did not seem to be random but associated with the specific aspects of the event. Furthermore the study revealed that in approximately half of the violent incidents a direct trigger for the start of violence was not obvious.

More generally, the findings suggest that people in collective settings do not behave more or less uniformly than in other social situations, nor do they more likely use violence than outside crowds nor do they show a higher tendency to perform so-called ‘irrational behaviour’. Concluding from these results, Adang suggests two types for the initiation of violence: On the one hand there is violence that can be ascribed to a clearly identifiable cause, such as frictions between people, for example when a person spills his beer or there are crushes at the entrance. On the other hand Adang identified a form of spontaneous violence that was mostly committed by young males and is directed at rival groups, such as other young males or the police. These observations go along with Daly and Wilson’s (1985) ‘young male syndrome’, the tendency of young males to actively seek and engage in risky behaviour.

The further escalation of violence is connected with two aspects: Firstly with cognitive bounded rationality processes of decision making and cost-benefit analyses. The observational data revealed that individuals seemed to avoid unnecessary risks or tried to reduce risk. They rather operated in groups or fled from situations they seemed unable to win. On the other hand, violence was observed more often when people disguised themselves so that they would not be accountable for their actions. Secondly, violence was higher the more antagonistic the relationships between different groups were and the more an ‘us versus them’ situation developed. Police measures can have an effect on this; in particular collective interventions can lead to more explicit ingroup-versus-outgroup behaviour and to more individuals behaving violently. In this respect Adang relates to changes of social identity that may occur as a result of intergroup interaction, as it is proposed by the ESIM. However, he distances himself from Stott and Reicher’s (1998, p. 509+510) claim that ‘crowd conflict characteristically arises when official agencies such as the police or the army intervene against unofficial mass action’.
The elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour

Social psychological explanations for crowd behaviour and identity change in crowds have been formulated by the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour, ESIM (Reicher, 1996a, 1996b, 2002; Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 1999; Stott & Reicher, 1998). The model was developed from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and selfcategorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Social identity is the central concept of the model and it is seen as the key to understanding crowd behaviour. Social identity theory assumes that a person’s self concept consists of personal and social identity. Personal identity is defined by an individual’s unique characteristics, while social identity refers to a persons’ understanding as a member of a social group. Social identities are multiple. A person can be a football fan, a mother, an anti-globalist and/or a Muslim and each of these identities or categories brings along a set of norms of values that determine what behaviour is appropriate and what is not.

Or, as Tajfel (1972; p. 298) put it, social identity is a ‘guide to action’. Selfcategorisation refers to the process in which we define ourselves in terms of such category membership (if we understand ourselves as a football fan or a mother) taking over norms and have a certain understanding of what is appropriate as a member of that category. Therefore, group behaviour is seen as different from the behaviour as an individual, but other than ‘losing one’s mind’ or being governed by a group mind, it is assumed that people shift to a behaviour that relates to the normative structure of their relevant category. ‘So, crowd members do not simply ask “what is appropriate in this context?” but “what is appropriate for us as members of this category in this context?”’ (Reicher, 2002, p. 195). In contrast to a general suggestibility of crowd participants (Le Bon, 1895), the ESIM suggests that only those can be influential that comply with the category norms and who are most similar to the category prototype. Or, who differentiate most from the out-group.

Different field studies provided support for this approach. Reicher (1984) presented a systematic analysis of the ‘St. Pauls riots’ in 1980 that had developed from a police raid on a cafe in Bristol. His findings revealed that there were patterns and clear limits to crowd action: Attacks were geographically limited and only directed at police or financial institutions. Crowd participants described themselves and others in terms of ingroup and outgroup membership and there was a match between crowd action (destroying symbols of luxury) and the self-definition of the crowd members (belonging to an oppressed and exploited group). These findings suggest that crowd actions - although they may be destructive - are rather meaningful reflections of social identities than irrational or uncontrolled behaviour. Field
studies from different contexts provided further support for the assumption that crowd members act in terms of social identity (for example Reicher, 1996a for student demonstrations; Stott & Reicher, 1998 for football events; Drury & Reicher, 1999 for political demonstrations; or Drury & Reicher, 2005 for environmental protests). However, the studies also revealed that crowd events can lead to a change of identity, in the sense that the engagement in crowd action led to new confidence in resisting outgroup action. Group members ‘expressed a new sense of pride in themselves and a new sense of their potential’ (Reicher, 2002, p. 196). These results point to the question if, as the findings suggest, crowd action is determined by social identity, how can crowd action then instigate social change (i.e. change social identity)? This ‘dilemma’ was solved by considering crowd events as intergroup encounters in which the participating groups (e.g. a crowd and the police) constitute the relevant context for each other, so that intergroup interaction can indeed lead to processes of recategorisation and social change. This makes it possible that while collective action and crowd behaviour is driven by social identity, this identity can fundamentally change by the way in which the intergroup relationships are affected. These dynamics became clearer in Stott and Drury’s (2000) analysis of an incident during the ‘Anti-Poll-Tax Riot’ in London. Demonstrators that saw themselves as legitimate non-violent protesters engaged in a sit down protest because they were hindered by the police to follow a specific demonstration route. The police though understood this behaviour as posing a threat to public order and intervened against the group using indiscriminate coercive force. In the course of this incident the demonstrators redefined the attitudes that they held of the police so that conflict and resistance was now understood as legitimate behaviour. This resistance again confirmed the view of the police that the crowd was uniformly hostile and led to an escalation of violence on both sides. The above cited studies similarly revealed that identity change occurs as a result of asymmetric group relations, when out-group action (in many cases this is the police) is perceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate, leading to a redefinition of the initially uninvolved crowd members’ relationship with the police. People felt empowered to sustain their position and to confront the police, so that conflict and resistance were eventually seen as legitimate group behaviour and persons actively seeking conflict were regarded as ‘prototypical’ in-group members (Stott & Drury, 2000).

While the ESIM was initially concerned with identity changes toward collective conflict there is now increasing support for the models’ utility in accounting for the absence of collective ‘violence’ and the development of peaceful norms (Stott, Adang, Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2007, 2008; Schreiber & Adang, in press; Schreiber & Stott, 2009) at crowd
events, as well. It is suggested that a specifically welcoming context together with a particular form of public order policing facilitated fans with peaceful intentions and in doing so prevented—during situations of conflict—a negative shift of social identity among the majority of fans. Rather, it was shown that a supra-ordinate ‘fan identity’ developed that was defined by peaceful encounters between fan groups and marginalised those who acted against these norms, this being anybody behaving violently, for example. Recently, Neville and Reicher (2009) presented a study on the relationships between connectedness, emotional intensity, and future participation in different social contexts. Their findings revealed significant correlations between connectedness (in a sense that others are a source of support and warmth) and emotional intensity and suggest that emotional intensity may have a mediating role between the strength of social identity and the likelihood of future participation.

**Crowd research and public order policing**

From the ESIM emerge implications for public order policing. If crowd events are intergroup encounters and one of the participants is the police, and if the groups influence each other, then the police have a major role within this scenario and the way in which the police act must have a huge impact on the behaviour of the crowd. Scholars of public order policing similarly supported the view that crowd behaviour is seen to result from ongoing interaction processes between the participating groups (e.g. Kritzler, 1977; McPhail, 1991; Reicher, 1996a; Adang, 1998; della Porta & Reiter, 1998). This approach brought about increased research interest on the role of the police and more specifically on the impact of police strategies and tactics on crowd behaviour. There is agreement that there has been a change from ‘escalated force to negotiated management’ (for example McPhail, Schweingruber & McCarthy, 1998 for the United States; Schmalzl, 1996 for [Western] Germany; Baker, 2007 for Australia; Waddington, 2007 for the UK). Such changes in public order policing seem to reflect the increased consideration of an effect of policing and the interactive nature and mutual impact of groups within the police forces. McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy (1998) for example, differentiate trends of public order policing that have developed over time. A style of ‘escalated force’ that was characterised by a negative view of the protesters, little or no communication and escalating use of force. It is contrasted from ‘negotiated management’, applied in the 80ies and 90ies, where the use of force was seen as a sign of police failure and

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3 The policing style is referred to as ‘low profile policing’. This approach is described in more detail in the subsequent chapter.
only used as a last resort. With an emphasis on cooperation, the policing incorporated negotiations between police and group leaders about the boundaries of acceptable protest. Though common in many countries in the 60s, the use of the ‘escalated force’ approach had been increasingly criticised for its use and instigation of violence and many countries have undergone a change of public order policing toward more flexible styles. This trend however is also seen as related with an increasing use of paramilitary policing tactics in order to maintain public order (c.f. Björk & Peterson, 2006; Vitale, 2005). Similarly, Noakes and Gillham (2006) observed that police differentiated ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protesters and tactics were used in order to contain the ‘bad’ ones, an approach they labelled ‘strategic incapacitation’ and Della Porta and Reiter (2006) note that coercive tactics were far more frequently used, however merely targeted at ‘transgressive’ protesters. Noakes and Gillham (2006) saw these developments connected with a change in protest, with protesters no longer following the co-operative ‘agreements’ and becoming less predictable. Police in the US characterized the demonstrations that targeted the WTO as ‘the start of a new genre of protests’ (p. 98). Considerations about the role and impact of different tactics stirred up a long running debate about the pro and cons of paramilitary tactics between Jefferson and Waddington in the UK (Waddington, 1987, 1993, 1994; Jefferson, 1987, 1990, 1993) and have instigated comprehensive research activities on protest policing for example on the adaptation of different styles in Denmark and Sweden (c.f. Peterson, 2006; Björk & Peterson 2006; Wahlström, 2007, Wahlstöm & Oskarsson 2006).

Questions on the effects of different policing strategies on crowd behaviour have further been endorsed by research on the policing of football crowds. Adang and Cuvelier (2001) presented a systematic analysis of the impact of different policing strategies on the behaviour of football crowds at one tournament. During the Euro 2000 two different policing styles had been applied. The ‘low profile’ approach was characterised by a broad and flexible tactical concept that provides for quick escalation and de-escalation, high visibility of the officers and an emphasis on communication. It suggests the open deployment of small surveillance units in regular uniforms, easily approachable and actively contacting fans. In doing so, the officers should also set behavioural limits and intervene if these limits were exceeded. If necessary there would be support from decentralised intervention units which were kept away from the street scene for as long as possible. In cities that applied a ‘high profile’ approach there were three times as many officers visible. They were deployed in larger groups, talked a lot with each other and did not actively approach fans. Also more riot police and vehicles where openly present. The findings suggest a connection between
incidents, risk and the style of policing. While it may be suggested that a high police profile would best prevent violent incident, it turned out that most incidents were incurred at games that had been assessed as posing low risk but that were policed with a high-profile strategy. In other words, where there was an imbalance between the risk and the policing strategy. This goes along with the assumption of the ESIM that an asymmetry of group relations bears the conditions for conflict. However, this also suggests that symmetric or legitimate group relations would prevent such a change. Adang and Cuvelier’s findings thus indicate that balance between police strategy, risk and fan behaviour can better be approached by the ‘low profile’ approach as it allows flexible adjustment of police behaviour to the risk that is present. Bearing upon this, Stott and Adang (2009) examined crowd interaction involving English football supporters at 35 away matches with an international dimension. With regard to police practice, the understanding of risk as a dynamic element played a crucial role for the relationship of the groups. Legitimate group relations were created when policing was ‘balanced’, i.e. oriented along the actual risk in a given situation, as opposed to a static view where risk was pre-categorised. This implied the need for dynamic risk assessment during a crowd event, which then allows for targeted and timely interventions. Their research suggests that legitimate relations facilitated English fans with peaceful intentions and led to selfpolicing, avoidance of conflict and the marginalisation of those who acted against the group norms. The findings led to recommendations for police practice in general (Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004) and have influenced the security policy of the Portuguese security police, PSP, for the UEFA European Championships in Portugal 2004.

Researching crowd events

While, as indicated before, major changes in the world are often associated with crowd action, crowd research plays a more subordinate role in social psychology. Scientific contributions on collective behaviour are rather found within criminological or sociological frameworks. Reasons for this are rooted in the object of investigation itself. Classical experimental research on crowds is hardly feasible and crowd research has to draw upon methods that are less suitable to enhance the discipline’s reputation and respectability within the scientific world, as high-impact journals rather recognise studies based on clear quantifiable data (Fernuniversität Hagen, 2009; Bar-Tal, 2004). ‘Social psychologists who are interested in the social psychological aspects of real life problems have to go to other fields and disciplines in order to publish or even make an academic career’ (Bar-Tal, 2004, p. 680). Bar-Tal criticised that the emphasis on experimentation results in an artificiality of studied social phenomena, as
a manipulated context does not reflect the complex situation of reality that may influence human behaviour and narrows down the range of investigated issues. Often, more attention would be paid on the operationalisation of variables than on the research problems studied. Reicher (1996b) equally criticises the shift toward experimental designs and he refers to Moscovici (1972) claiming that ‘psychology is afflicted by a fetishistic attachment to the one method of laboratory experimentation, seeing it as the sole mark of true science’ and as a ‘discipline which often seems to prioritize the tools of enquiry over the jobs they are meant to do.’ (p. 319). Bar-Tal yet proclaims the necessity of observing real-life situations in order to understand the behaviour of individuals and collectives. While, as we saw in the previous chapter, crowd theories go back to the 19th century and a lot has been written and published about crowds, his declaration is not unreasonable as it took until the 1970ies for scholars to step out of the ivory tower and actually study the object of research. The kinds of methods used in crowd research will be subject of the following section.

**Questionnaires and interviews**

Post hoc data collection, such as questionnaires or interviews with participants and witnesses may be carried out in order to understand and reconstruct what happened during an event and to be used as a means for data triangulation. In particular for the study of crowd violence post hoc data collection may be useful as the development of disorder in a natural setting is difficult to predict (Vider, 2004). The vivid sometimes conflictual course of a crowd event makes it difficult to gather appropriate data and may even put the researcher in danger. On the other hand it can be possible that participants are engaged in the happenings so that comprehensive interviews are difficult. Such interviews or questionnaires can be designed using usual social scientific methods. In recent years there is also an increasing use of internet surveys. During and after the Euro 2004 fans were able to fill in questionnaires or provide qualitative descriptions of their experiences during the tournament on the internet (Stott et al, 2007; Stott & Adang, 2004). Similarly the police of Hannover used an internet site to ask football fans about their impression on the policing during home games of Hannover 96 (Schütte & Grube, 2008).

**Newspaper data analysis**

A great deal of crowd research relies on the analysis of media, such as newspaper and electronic reports. The disadvantages of this method refer to the fact that it may contain lopsided views and descriptions. McCarthy, McPhail and Smith (1996, reported in Schweingruber & McPhail, 1999) compared characteristics of protest events in demonstration
permits of police records with the characteristics of the events that were reported in the media. Their findings show that only 10 percent of the 2000 registered events were actually reported and most of the demonstrations have a participation of less than 25 persons, while the likelihood of media coverage was connected with the size of the event. Similarly, Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule (2004) suggest a selection bias of the media coverage of crowd events with regard to a specific type of event, while the ‘hard facts’ are seen to be reported accurately. Taking such ‘dangers’ into account, media analyses may provide important supplementary data and serve as a source for triangulation for the study of collective behaviour. Media analyses may have further value in order to understand or explain the broader societal background in which an event is located and the – possible – impact of media coverage on group relations. Drury argues that negative discourses were used to discredit crowd events and they may serve as a justification that ‘it is legitimate and even necessary to suppress it with the full force of the state’ (Drury, 2002, p. 42). Conversely, Retzlaff (2008) provides an analysis of a overwhelmingly positive media coverage during the World Cup 2006 in Germany with regard to the construction of concept of collective German patriotism. The issue of media influence is also discussed in the empirical papers (Paper 2, 3, 4) of this thesis.

**Interviews and field observations on-site**

On-site or ‘real-time’ research activities comprise interviews with participants and observations (E.g. Aveni, 1977; Lin, 1975; Berk, 1972; 1974; Lofland, 1985; Lofland and Fink, 1982; Wright 1985, quoted in Schweingruber & McPhail, 1999). Seidler, Meyer and Gillivray (1976) developed a set of techniques for data gathering among stationary crowds. The authors divided the crowd into sectors and applied teams of interviewers to collect data on participants’ attitudes and other ‘nonvisible characteristics’ (p.507). Drury and Stott (2001) advocate the use of direct, on-the-spot observational strategies for the research of crowd events. They argue that crowd events are characteristically intergroup encounters, in which there is a mutual influence of the participating parties. Therefore, in order to understand crowd psychology (i.e. behaviour and perception of the participants), it is necessary to study the interaction between these groups. As the very nature of the crowd makes it a particularly difficult object of research, participant observation is seen as the ‘supreme opportunistic data-gathering framework, being by its nature flexibly adaptive to possible changes in its research topic and setting and open to the unexpected’ (p. 50). In practical terms, Drury and Stott suggest that the researcher joins with one group, basically becoming an ingroup member and
thereby opposing the outgroup. Instead of attempting to avoid bias – which is seen as the inherent danger in participant observation, it is suggested to deliberately take sides. Advantages are seen in three aspects: Firstly, ingroup members will far more likely be open for interviews and talk about their views and perceptions of a specific situation and their relations to outgroup members and they are more willing to share internal documents and knowledge. However, taking sides may also mean constrained if not impossible access to the outgroup. Secondly, the quality of data is improved. Within the process of ‘going native’, the researcher adopts the behaviours and perspectives of those that he or she wants to study. It is suggested that ‘objective and truthful findings are more rather than less likely as the researcher becomes involved directly with people in daily life’ (p. 53+54). The final point concerns the data analysis and the question if it is possible to maintain a distance to accounts of in-group participants within a framework of partisan research. Given that the ethnographic approach encompasses a form of qualitative analysis, the analytical process is likely to be biased with respect to the ingroup’s views. However, Drury and Stott’s reasoning implies that this view of the researcher would quasi reflect what the in-group member would like to see told. Such partisan participant observation has been conducted in different studies on crowd behaviour, for example within a crowd at the so called ‘Poll Tax riot’ (Stott & Drury, 1999, 2000) an anti road occupation (Drury, 1996; Drury & Reicher, 2000).

**Structured observations**

Although crowd research activities are to a great deal based on ethnography, some methods have been developed for systematically observing and recording collective action, that transfer the happenings during a crowd event into quantifiable data and thus allow for a statistical comparison of different events. The probably most elaborated approaches of structured observations are those by Schweingruber and McPhail (1999) and Adang (in press/a).

Schweingruber and McPhail (1999) aimed to design a method that records the extent and variation of crowd behaviour, is flexible enough to be used for different types of gatherings and research questions, and is easy to use so that observers can easily be instructed. In doing so they are making use of a method of ’space and time sampling’. The development of the method went along with a conceptual understanding of crowds. Instigated by Ralph Turner’s (1964) notion of the diversity of crowds, McPhail searched for a way to identify and record such different phenomena inside a crowd. McPhail and colleagues created a taxonomy of elementary forms of social and collective behaviours that was based on
observations of several hundred gatherings for example political, social or religious (McPhail & Pickens, 1975). The actual data recording is carried out by multiple observers, most of which are undergraduate students that are distributed among the crowd. Prior to the actual event the observers are given written documentation and a training session that includes information on the specific event and the procedures involved in this method. The group training for observations at the ‘March of Life’ in 1995, for example included: ‘(1) a brief lecture on temporary gatherings, the history of observing them, and the purpose of the project; (2) a brief history of the March for Life; (3) an illustrated overview of the elementary forms and coding procedures; (4) practice using the coding forms; and (5) practice estimating the number of actors and density of gatherings’ (p. 475). During the event the observers fill in a code sheet, recording what is being done (collective action can be allocated to 40 different forms) and by whom. Here, six categories are provided: demonstrators, onlookers/passersby, police, media, counterdemonstrators and others, for example researchers observing the crowd behaviour. The method has been used in the US at the ‘National Organization for Women’s Rally for Women’s Lives’ and at the ‘1997 Promise Keepers’ “Stand in the Gap” Sacred Assembly’.

The methodology provided by Adang (in press/a; see also Adang 1990; 1991; 1998 for an earlier presentation of the method and the findings in Dutch) was initially developed to gain insight into the way in which violence in collective situations starts and escalates. As violence involves at least an actor and a target, Adang argues that violent behaviour cannot be understood without considering the interaction between these two parties. This focus on interaction can be seen as the main difference of this approach to that of Schweingruber and McPhail (1999). Variables were drawn from preliminary analyses of a number of real-life situations and video material as well as a literature review on crowd events. They further had to be easily observable so that they could also be determined by the participants themselves and they had to bear an impact on the situation, for example: the number of people involved, the distance between those involved or the relationship between behaviour and directly preceding events. These were used as independent variables, which could then be measured against ‘violence’ as dependent variable. The method was initially carried out by a single observer (Adang, in press/aa). In connection with a comprehensive evaluation of the policing of the European Championships 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands, this method was for the first time applied using teams of multiple observers (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001) and it has subsequently been used in research activities at the Euro 2004 in Portugal (Stott & Adang, 2004a; Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, 2008), the World Cup 2006 in Germany
(Schreiber & Adang, 2010) and the Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland (Brown, 2009). Similar to the procedure of Schweingruber and McPhail, the observers receive a comprehensive training, including lectures on the theoretical background, the observation protocol, observation techniques and observation exercises. The observations at football games cover the time in which most of the fans were present at the venue and in the city centre, generally starting several hours before kick-off and were finished some hours after the game. The observers were instructed to choose areas where large groups of fans gather, for example at the central station, at squares in the city centre and around the stadia. Every fifteen minutes a sample is taken on the number and kind of persons (e.g. fans, police), interaction between fan groups and fans and the police, incidents and interventions. Police intervention is defined as dispersal, stopping or arrests and it is noted if police had made use of force. Observers also take notes on their impressions and observations that they made in-between sample time.

The systematic observations allow to relate different variables to the number of incidents and to compare results of different events. In particular, Schweingruber and McPhail’s method makes it possible to demonstrate the variation in the proportion of crowd participants in the different forms of collective action over space and time, also in comparison with TV accounts. Adang’s approach has – among other analyses – been used to show how different styles of policing relate to the overall number of incidents.

**Alternative developments of crowd research**

**Impacts of technical development on crowd observations**

New technological developments and the increased use of internet facilities provide a wide range of data collection around crowd events aside of any planned scientific research design. The use of mobile phones for videotaping during the G20 demonstration in London, early 2009 provided the evidence for unprovoked and illegitimate police use of force and has led to a comprehensive investigation (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009) and it was also mobile phone video footage that crowd participants posted on YouTube that made it possible to inform the world on the happenings when Iran citizens demonstrated against the 2009 elections.

Levine (2009; Economist, 2009) took advantage of the multiple display of the CCTV camera surveillance system in Britain to explore the factors that make the presence of bystanders successful or unsuccessful. The group had gained permission to use the video footage of incidents at public spaces in the night-time-economy that had been recorded within
one year (between January 2008 and February 2008) in British towns and cities. In doing so they were able to study group behaviour in a natural setting that could previously not be tested for either practical or ethical reasons. The videos had no sound and the persons could not be recognised. Incidents were chosen with regard to certain criteria, such as length of the incident and group size. A coding scheme was developed that covered the themes of status (e.g. victim or offender), behaviour (escalating, deescalating), orientation (direction of an action), group size and gender. The results suggest that groups spontaneously try to regulate the behaviour of ingroup members and that the prevention of violence increases with group size.

Citizens/fans’ observations of police action
Members of civil rights movements criticise that reports about crowd events are often based on declarations and press releases from police sources. It is argued that such reports would distort and misinterpret the actual happenings and serve as a base for restrictions of liberal human rights and justifications thereof. The systematic observation of demonstrations by citizens groups is designed to counter these ‘lopsided’ views. In Germany such observations are carried out since the protests against the nuclear plant in Brokdorf 1981 (Steven, 2001). Similar processes can be observed in the context of football: As a reaction to what they felt as illegitimate police conduct some groups of football fans have undertaken own measures for evaluating an event. Some fan groups have organised observation teams consisting of football fans and lawyers (Erangés, 2007). The observation activities are not announced and will only be published successive to the respective game. The groups are using field observational methods carried out contemporaneously. Observations focus on the behaviour of mainly police forces but also on other security staff with football fans. The observation groups are requested to focus on questions such as: Has the policing been reasonable and proportional in all aspects? Was the behaviour respectful, did the officers introduce themselves, were fans informally addressed on a first name basis. Did officers act socially sensibly with regard to youngsters? Were there any unreasonable harassments observable? The reports are published on the internet.

Peer review teams
An alternative form of evaluating crowd events has lately gained increased interest. The basic idea of this approach is to bring together public order scientists and police practitioners in the observation of an event. Another main feature refers to the ‘peer aspect’: Evaluation of a crowd events is not carried out by some ivory tower inhabitants far detached from real life (as
some police practitioners may see academics), but by colleagues from other forces that are dealing with similar problems in their own work. A further important pillar is the voluntary character of a peer review as it will only take place on request of a police force or the respective police commander (Adang & Brown, 2008; Schreiber & Adang, 2009). The concept has been developed initially in the Netherlands by the use of experienced police officers to observe aspects of public order policing in 1993 (Adang & Brown, 2008).

From 2005 to 2008 a pilot study involving 13 evaluations was carried out on request of the EU Police Cooperation Working Party. The peer reviews are now part of EU training program for police commanders. When a peer review is requested, the hosting force is asked to name of number of evaluation points. It is these points that the subsequent evaluation plan is then designed around. A team of about 5 police commanders is composed and is accompanied by academic staff. A peer review takes three days. On Day 1 the team arrives at the site, familiarises with the infrastructure, makes first contacts with the police forces and other parties that are relevant with regard to the respective event (e.g. private security services, citizens’ organisation). On the basis of the evaluation points the team then agrees on an evaluation plan. On Day 2, the day of the event the team conducts interviews and carries out contemporaneous observations prior, during and after the event. Day 3 is used for writing up the first draft of the evaluation report, when team members discuss their observations in relation to the respective evaluation points. The report will be worked out by the academic member of the team and send to the members for a final check up before it is delivered to the requesting force.

The value of this method has different aspects. An important factor lies in the confidentiality of the evaluation and the final report will be the ownership of the requesting force. The results from peer reviews have been published but only in an anonymised way (Adang & Brown, 2008). With the report the requesting force receives a comprehensive reflection of their work from some independent experts ‘holding up a mirror’ (Adang & Brown, 2008, p.199). The reviewers themselves gained concrete new ideas from their observations and during the discussions with their colleagues. They also valued the fact that they were able to look at a police operation from the outside. The cooperation of practitioners and scientists helps to break up barriers and to gain more understanding. Many reviewers experienced it was difficult to first observe, and then make conclusions: ‘You need training in order to do that. You also see your commanders in a different way’ (p. 200). Up to date theses evaluations have been carried out mainly in the context of football. Some forces have begun to introduce national peer reviews, some are planning to use peer reviews for the evaluation of
the policing of demonstrations. In Argentina concerns of human rights organisations about police behaviour have led to the development of joint peer reviews consisting of representatives of the Argentinean government, the Argentinean federal police forces and members of Argentinean human rights organisations CELS (centro de studios socials y legales) and APDH (asociación permanente de derechos humanos). The evaluations are carried out under supervision of the Police Academy of the Netherlands (Adang, in press/b).
The present research

As it was outlined in an earlier section of this thesis there is large agreement amongst crowd scientists on the interactive character of a crowd event. Along with other models the ESIM draws on interaction, more specifically it suggest that in order to understand the dynamics of a crowd event it is necessary to consider the relations and ongoing interactions between those groups that are present at a specific event. The ESIM has been developed from - and was validated by a substantial number of studies of crowd events in violent and non-violent situations. Summarising its basic assumptions the ESIM explains both the escalation and the avoidance of collective conflict as a result of ongoing social relations. Firstly, it proposes that identity change toward conflict occurs when out-group (police) action is perceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate, leading to a redefinition of initially uninvolved crowd members’ relationship with the police. People felt empowered to sustain their position and to confront the police, so that conflict and resistance were eventually seen as legitimate group behaviour and persons actively seeking conflict are regarded as ‘prototypical’ in-group members (Stott & Drury, 2000). Secondly, the ESIM explains the establishment and maintenance of non-violent norms as a result of legitimate group relations between crowd members and the police, avoiding an identity shift towards conflict. It is proposed that legitimate group relations are connected with self policing, marginalisation of violent crowd participants, and lack of support for attempts of provocation. Such relations are seen to be established when policing is carried out in line with the ‘friendly and firm low profile approach’. This approach has meanwhile been integrated in practical policing and into guidelines for the policing of football matches with an international dimension within the EU.

Despite this obvious practical relevance, the scientific analyses on crowd dynamics based on the ESIM have only focused on British (in particular, English and Scottish) crowds so that there were only few theoretical and empirical analyses of how such dynamics apply to crowds from other cultural backgrounds. Given this gap in the existing research, this thesis seeks to examine if the propositions of the ESIM – and its implications for public order policing – also hold amongst groups from Germany and Poland.

Methodical and methodological considerations

The methods and analytical strategies of this thesis are determined by the assumptions of the model, so that the respective parties involved and their mutual interaction had to be
considered; (these are described in more detail in the respective papers). Furthermore, the research activities were sought to be carried out contemporaneously because the direct observation of - and the participation in a crowd event allows to focus on aspects that are relevant with regard to the theoretical model and it provides for the flexibility that is necessary within such a dynamic framework. This approach further makes it possible to collect data on reactions and comments of persons that are immediately involved in or subjected by the event; in doing so it is possible to document how perceptions and behaviour relate to a (possibly) changing context. Like Bar-Tal (2004) has pointed at the difficulties that are imminent in doing research around real life events, similar methodological issues concern this thesis. At a real-life event it is not possible to systematically manipulate conditions and the complexity of this ‘object of investigation’ does not allow to apply a classic form of operationalisation of concepts into measurable variables which can then be subjected to testing and would allow a falsification of the model. The aim of this thesis is therefore not to provide a test of hypotheses. It rather seeks to provide an explorative study and it aims to contribute to the body of research that has up to now been carried out around the ESIM. While, in a rigorous positivistic sense, this does not serve as a method of gaining new scientific insight, this research seeks to present additional material in order enhance plausibility of this model. The results can further serve as a hypothesis generating procedure and a base for further research which may be broken down into testable studies.

Research questions and empirical studies

Drawing on the lack of cross cultural research among ESIM studies, the research of this thesis focuses on the following research question:

Do the propositions of the ESIM – and its implications for public order policing – also hold amongst groups coming from other cultural backgrounds than the UK, specifically Germans and Poles?

This main research question was broken into different sub-questions, each of which is presented within an individual research paper. Paper 1 presents an incident involving German fans during the European Championships 2004. While Stott and colleagues (2007, 2008) had provided analyses involving England fans this paper seeks to answer the question:

Were the processes that the ESIM proposes are responsible for the absence of widespread disorder among England fans also evident among German fans attending the same tournament?
Paper 2 builds upon the previous research. Studies (including Paper 1) which explain the shift away from violence mainly refer to the policing that was carried out around the Euro 2004. It may be argued, however, that the success of Euro 2004 was singular, merely applying to that one event or the specific groups that were present in Portugal during the tournament. Research was therefore carried out at Germany 2006, focusing on the following questions:

Do the relations and the effects that the ESIM suggests also apply in different contexts that may be formed by national or cultural features or by the understandings and philosophies of the police forces?

How do police tactics and deployments relate to the relations between different fan groups and between fans and the police?

Paper 3 presents a case study involving Polish and German fans at the same day. Specifically, the study examines the relation between the policing strategy and tactics and the behaviour and perception of Poland and Germany fans in contexts of risk and non-risk.

As prior to the 2006 tournament a substantial number of papers and other media had described Poland fans in a rather negative way, the paper further sought to answer the question:

Was the negative image that was portrayed of the Poland fans before the tournament justified and did this have an impact on the relations between the fan groups and the fans and the police?

Paper 4 explores German fan identity at three different tournaments: at the Euro 2004, the WC 2006 and the Euro 2008. In contrast to previous ESIM research, which describes social change as a result of conflictual group relations, this study examined social change within a peaceful context. It examines the effects and dynamics of symmetric group relations and in doing so to provide an explanation of why German fans in 2006 (and subsequently in 2008) were empowered to live out their national identity and positive emotions but not so in 2004?

The actual research activities are presented as single paper publications in scientific journals. The papers are integrated in the following section. Each paper is preceded by a foreword of the author. It reports on personal impressions and experiences that occurred during the research process and it highlights aspects of the research that seem relevant to this thesis but are not or only briefly mentioned in the actual research paper.
Foreword Paper 1

This study was conducted as part of a research and evaluation program on the police tactics and fan behaviour at the Euro 2004 in Portugal. Funding by the ESRC had enabled a comprehensive research design using a variety of methods; most of which were carried out contemporaneously and data triangulation would then provide a rather comprehensive picture of the goings on. Within this program it was also possible to have one researcher – this being the present author – solely focussing on the group of German fans. The idea was to expand the groups being studied in the context of the ESIM and having been assessed a ‘risk group’, the Germans displayed an ideal object of research. The research activities were eagerly anticipated because the senior researchers had already been involved in the preparation for the security concept of the Portuguese security police (Stott & Pearson, 2007). A ‘low profile’ policing approach was what the authorities had planned to apply (PSP, 2003) and it was the aim of the research program to evaluate if and how this was put into practise and how this affected the group relation between the fans and the fans and the police. Much of the data that came out of this program has meanwhile been published elsewhere; however, the focus group is English (see Reicher et al., 2007; Stott et al., 2007, 2008; Stott & Pearson 2007, Stott & Adang, 2004). The ‘Portugal paper’ here now reports on the role of the German fans within these relations. In line with the other research activities the data collection should be carried out contemporaneously; using an ethnographic approach was seen as the most flexible and fruitful way to provide for a broad body of data. This could then be triangulated with the data that was collected by other observers of the research team. The idea was for me to be with the fans to listen, speak and observe. As it is the case with ethnographic research, access to and a kind of acceptance by the group being studied is vital. I believe that more than 25 years of being a football fan myself, has provided the necessary authenticity to get this access on the field, in this case in the fan zones, cafes, stadium, camping sites. However, I also made my role as a researcher explicit to the fans during the conversations and observations so that I was not completely ‘going native’. Personal contacts with the German fan project also helped to get access to some more internal information for example when some were arrested. However, being interested in crowd-police interaction the research also concerned the role, perception and behaviour of the police. A delegation of German police spotters was present in Portugal, liaising with Portuguese colleagues with a focus on the German risk supporters. Again, it was personal contacts that were made with the German home office and the German national football information point that facilitated
access to these bodies during the tournament. Like with the fan group, acceptance and trust are vital to get access. So it was for example possible for me to make informal conversations around the gatherings of fans and to conduct semi-structured interviews with members of the German police delegation.

The ethnographic approach also helped in actually ‘detecting’ the right and appropriate data. Vider (2004, p. 141) suggests that ‘most crowd behavior can only be observed and studied post hoc. After all, we cannot usually predict when a riot will occur.’ Also in Portugal it was unclear when a riot would occur. Considering Adang’s (in press/a) analysis of the initiation of violence the issue can be narrowed down to a) risk games, where we would probably find people who were simply out for trouble and b) to be where there were enough people around so that there was a likelihood that frictions would occur. Still, it was the conversation and the close contact with the fans from which it turned out that – besides of what was officially announced as meeting points for fans – the ‘Ribeira’-square was actually the place to be. And this was in fact the place where the incident happened that this paper reports on. The incident indeed occurred around the most high risk game of the tournament (Germany versus the Netherlands); there had been tensions and expectations beforehand and there had been provocations that initiated violence. In a way this was all well after the textbook. But, as it is outlined in the paper, low profile policing tactics of close surveillance, quick and targeted interventions and clear escalative and deescalative deployment prevented the situation from further escalation. In other words, the policing style of the Portuguese Security Police (PSP) avoided the build-up of an antagonistic ‘us versus them’ situation. Five people were detained that night, but as no further German fans got arrested in the remaining part of the tournament (though some did for ticket touting), this was indeed the biggest incident. Ironically, this conflict did not occur on matchday but on the night before. So while we were prepared for multiple comprehensive data collection, the structured observations could not be used for this study, as they focused on the actual match day where there was no incident.

With regard to the ESI-model of crowd behaviour, this study has different implications: Firstly it adds to the ESIM research in general because it focused on other than British fans. Secondly, it supports the model by providing support that similar processes were at place with German fans as they were with England fans in Portugal. As incidents involving England fans occurred in Lisbon but the Germans were in Porto, there may be an effect of the specific policing in one city. However, the broader data analysis suggests that the low profile
approach was applied in all host cities with an exception of Coimbra (Stott & Adang, 2004). Thirdly, the study adds to the wider research as it suggests that legitimate group relations help to create conditions for peaceful behaviour and facilitate the marginalisation of ‘hooligan’ elements. Finally, the study promotes the positive effect of combining research and practise, as it had been the close collaboration between police authorities and scientists that provided the base for the strategic approach that was carried out at the tournament, which has up to now been the most peaceful that has been carried out in Europe within the last 30 years.
Celebrating with the Dutch - Policing German risk fans at Euro 2004 in Portugal

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This paper provides an analysis of the social psychological processes among German football fans during the 2004 European Championships in Portugal in relation to the policing that was carried out by the Portuguese Security Police. Data was collected drawing on qualitative observational methods. The analysis focuses on a violent incident between German and Dutch fans prior to the game between the Netherlands and Germany in Porto. Findings suggest a connection between low profile policing and the support of non-violent group norms among the wider crowd and the disempowerment and marginalisation of confrontational groups.

Keywords: public order management, football, crowd policing, police-citizen interaction

Looking back at the Euro 2004 in Portugal, a German newspaper reported about outstanding peaceful behaviour and friendly encounters between fan groups that had taken place there. The article concluded with a description about a group of German fans that peacefully and unhindered raised their banner amidst a Dutch crowd (Klemm 2004). Though not in line with the principle that ‘only bad news is good news’, this occasion seemed worth reporting, specifically as the relationship between Dutch and German fans – and players – had for years been characterised by rivalry if not hostility. After the Dutch trauma in 1974 and the German trauma in 19884 a peak was reached when a Dutch and a German player were sent off for spitting and arguing at the World Cup in 1990 in Italy. While the situation has somewhat calmed since and public disorder at Netherlands-Germany fixtures is more connected with

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* Germany beat the Netherlands at the 1974 WC finals in Germany; The Netherlands beat Germany at the Euro1988 in Germany and subsequently won the tournament. This occasion instigated a week long celebration in the Netherlands and brought up what is now known as the ‘Orange Feeling’ (het oranje gevoel).
club games, the game between the two countries at the Euro 2004 was eagerly anticipated. German police forces set bans to prevent known troublemakers from travelling and the Portuguese authorities assessed this game as the one posing the highest risk of the tournament. However, it turned out very peaceful with multiple friendly encounters between the groups and hardly any incident. Given the history of violent incidents and the classification of the fixture as high risk questions arise regarding why it was that no major incident of collective disorder occurred?

Crowd behaviour and public order policing

Whilst some classic theorists described crowds as inherently criminal because of the convergence of those predisposed to crime (Sighele, 1891; Allport, 1924) others portrayed them as dangerous because they reverted cultivated individuals to a barbaric level of primitive drive (e.g. Le Bon, 1895). Despite such qualitative difference, the common feature of these explanations was a focus on the crowd itself and its inherent and universal pathology. This de-contextualised and reified view of the crowd put forward by classic theory has been supplanted within social psychology by a model that emphasises the contextual determination of crowd action, particularly in terms of the dynamics of intergroup interaction. Rather than a mere focus on the crowd, crowd behaviour is seen to result from ongoing interaction processes between the participating groups (e.g. Kritzler, 1977; McPhail, 1991; Reicher, 1996; Adang, 1998; della Porta & Reiter, 1998). This view involves an increased focus on the strategies and tactics of the police impact on crowd behaviour.

Scholars of protest research broadly distinguish public order policing styles into ‘escalated force’ versus ‘negotiated management’ (McPhail, Schweingruber & McCarthy, 1998). The first characterised by a negative view of the protesters, little or no communication and an escalating use of force. This style is contrasted from ‘negotiated management’, which puts an emphasis on cooperation and negotiations between police and group leaders and where the use of force is seen as a sign of police failure and only used as a last resort. Though common in many countries in the 60s, the use of the ‘escalated force’ approach had been increasingly criticised for its use and instigation of violence and many countries have undergone a change of public order policing toward more flexible styles. This trend however is also seen to be related with an increasing use of paramilitary policing tactics in order to maintain public order (c.f. Björk & Peterson, 2006; Vitale, 2005). Similarly, Noakes & Gillham (2006) observed that police differentiated ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protesters and tactics were used in order to contain the ‘bad’ ones, an approach they labelled ‘strategic
incapacitation’ and Della Porta & Reiter (2006) note that coercive tactics were far more frequently used, however merely targeted at ‘transgressive’ protesters. Considerations about the role and impact of different tactics stirred up a long running debate about the pro and cons of paramilitary tactics between Jefferson and Waddington in the UK (Waddington, 1987, 1993, 1994; Jefferson, 1987, 1990, 1993) and have instigated comprehensive research activities on protest policing for example on the adaptation of different styles in Denmark and Sweden (c.f. Peterson, 2006; Björk & Peterson 2006; Wahlström, 2007, Wahlstöm & Oskarsson 2006).

The ‘friendly but firm’ low profile approach
Questions on the effects of different policing strategies on crowd behaviour have further been endorsed by research on the policing of football crowds. In their evaluation of the European Championships 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands, Adang and Cuvelier (2001) presented an analysis of different policing styles and their impact on fan-behaviour within the same event. In the run up to the tournament the two countries had agreed on a friendly and firm tactical concept that was basically preventive and pro-active and based on a combination of police expertise and public order research (Adang, 1998). It comprised the open deployment of small surveillance units in regular uniforms, easily approachable and actively contacting fans. In doing so, the officers should also set behavioural limits and intervene if these limits were exceeded. If necessary there would be support from decentralised intervention units which were kept away from the street scene for as long as possible. Contrary to the initial agreements, Adang and Cuvelier found that two different styles of policing were applied, approximately corresponding to those of ‘escalated force’ and ‘negotiated management’ identified by McPhail et al. (1998). According to data collected from a series of structured observations Adang and Cuvelier (2001) proposed that a ‘friendly and firm’ or ‘low profile’ concept was successfully carried out in only five of the host cities, while a more ‘high profile’ style was recorded in three cities. In the cities that used a high profile approach, there were three times as many officers visible. They were deployed in larger groups, talked a lot with each other and did not actively approach fans. Also more riot police and vehicles where openly present. Policing in low profile cities was more carried out according to the tactical concept and the behavioural profile that was initially agreed on. Relating the different styles of policing to the number of violent incidents, the highest number of incidents was measured at games that had been assessed as posing low risk but that were policed with a high-profile strategy. Adang and Cuvelier’s findings indicate a connection between police strategy, risk
and fan behaviour that can better be approached by the flexible ‘low profile’ approach, while suggesting a negative impact of a high profile policing. However, they only show that a certain style is working, not why.

A social psychological model

The Elaborated Social Identity Model of Crowds (ESIM) (e.g. Reicher 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998) provides an account of the psychological processes that govern the dynamics within a crowd event. The ESIM puts an emphasis on the interactive character of a crowd situation and the mutual influence of the participating groups. It assumes that people define themselves as members of the category that is salient in a given situation and will conform to its beliefs and standards. Following from this it is suggested that people do not lose their mind in a crowd but rather shift from individual behaviour to a behaviour that relates to the norms and values of the respective category and in which only those will be influential that are consonant with the category ‘prototype’ (Reicher, 1987). Like social identity theory, ESIM draws on the notion of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), regarding social identity as a model of self that is embedded in these social relations and defined by group members in terms of perceptions of legitimacy and power. More specifically, social identity is defined as the perception of the legitimacy of the shared position within such social contexts along with the collective actions that are possible and legitimate given such a position (Reicher, 1996; Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000). As ESIM suggest the participating groups form the respective context for each other, crowd participants’ social identity can fundamentally change because of the way in which the intergroup relationships are affected during a crowd event. It follows from this that changes in the form and content of a social category lead to changes in the category ‘prototype’ and therefore to changes on who or what behaviours can become influential (Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, 2007). Studies among different crowds, such as protesters, demonstrators and football crowds (e.g. Reicher 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher 1998; Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005) describe conditions that account for the development of collective conflict. Where police used indiscriminate force against crowds this could lead to circumstances where crowd participants began to unite psychologically and define their relationship with the police as illegitimate. The perception of illegitimate police action led to a situation in which people in the crowd felt empowered to confront the police, that they were justified in doing so and that persons actively seeking conflict were regarded as ‘prototypical’ in-group members (Stott & Drury, 2000).
While negative crowd-police relations are often connected with ‘overreacting’ police and unprovoked police use of force, conflict and negative relations with the police were also found in situations when crowd members felt insufficiently protected in a situation that they perceived as dangerous (Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001), findings that go along with the observations of Spiegel (1969), who sees escalation connected to both over- and under-activity of police forces. Bearing upon this, Stott and Adang (2003; 2009) examined crowd interaction involving English football supporters at 35 away matches with an international dimension. Their research suggests that legitimate relations facilitated English fans with peaceful intentions and led to selfpolicing, avoidance of conflict and the marginalisation of those who acted against the group norms. With regard to police practice, the understanding of risk as a dynamic element played a crucial role for the relationship of the groups. Legitimate relations were created when policing was ‘balanced’, i.e. oriented along the actual risk in a given situation, as opposed to a static view where risk was pre-categorised. This implied the need for dynamic risk assessment during a crowd event, which then allows for targeted and timely interventions. Their findings led to recommendations for police practice in general (c.f. Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004) and have influenced the security policy of the Portuguese security police, PSP, for the UEFA European Championships in Portugal 2004.

**The European Championships 2004 in Portugal**

Similar to the concept for Euro 2000, the Portuguese security police, PSP, stated that their policing profile for the European Championships 2004 was low profile, ‘firmly established in the community, and one in which the police officer is seen more as someone acting in a peaceful, festive context, avoiding any particular demonstration of a ‘high profile’ presence … However, the Police must make it clear that they have resources for more forceful intervention at their disposal and that they are prepared to use them against anyone engaging in aggressive or violent conduct.’ (PSP, 2003, p.3). This concerned in particular the tactical depth of deployment, in which four levels of response provided for targeted and adjustable interventions. In ‘normal’ situations this would concern the deployment of small teams of two to four officers. Their presence was aimed to transmit a feeling of security, their specific tasks involved pro-active communication, surveillance and the resolution of small incidents. In case of escalating risk, they would be supported by further intervention units that were placed out of sight.

A comprehensive analysis of the policing and fan behaviour at the Euro 2004 confirmed this approach and found ‘considerable evidence of a ‘low-profile’ policy
orientation in match cities’ (Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, 2008). It was evident how
the PSP policing provided a context in which self policing among England fans was
facilitated or how differentiated police interventions prevented the escalation of violence
(Stott et al., 2007; Stott & Pearson, 2007). A quantitative survey of England fans’ perceptions
of group relations in PSP areas further revealed that England fans saw their relationship with
other fans and also with the police as positive. What’s more, pre- and post measures show an
effect of policing, as prior to the tournament a strong identification as an England fan implied
dissimilarity to police, while after the tournament it was associated with similarity to the
police (Stott et al, 2008). The psychological ‘success’ of this approach goes along with
official arrest numbers, as only one England fan was arrested for football related disorder in a
match city (IFC 2004). It must be considered, however that this form of policing was only
applied in PSP areas, while the national Gendarmerie (GNR), Portugal's other police force,
developed its own security policy, which was characterised by lesser tactical depth, no pro-
active activities and a lesser emphasis on communication.5

The need for this study
The existing literature provides substantial evidence that the low profile approach avoids the
social and psychological processes necessary for widespread disorder. Particularly the
findings around the Euro 2004 on its facilitation of self-regulation among the fan group and
the marginalisation of anti-social behaviour have had a high impact on practical policing, so
that issues of the approach have meanwhile been integrated in the EU Handbook with
recommendations for international police cooperation6 (EU, 2006). However, the existing
literature focuses exclusively upon the policing and psychological reactions of England and
Scotland fans. Consequently, there is as yet no empirical analysis of the cross cultural
dimensions to the dynamics outlined within ESIM. More specifically there is a lack of
evidence concerning the psychology, group processes and intergroup relationships involving
and surrounding high-risk categories from other nations attending football matches and

5 Stott et al. (2007) describe how in risk situations between England fans and the police, GNR intervened rather
indiscriminately, affecting also uninvolved fans. The perception of the inappropriateness of police action,
subsequently led to an increasing sense of the perceived appropriateness among England fans to confront
the police. Identity content among these England fans was subsequently defined by the appropriateness of conflict
and the support or acceptance of ‘disorder’ against the police. While the context that was provided by the PSP
facilitated shifts away from violence, the GNR’s high profile strategy created an intergroup context that
reinforced the escalation of conflict.

6 The recommendations e.g. highlight the “great practical importance to know and assess the social identities of
the various (sub) groups of supporters, their values and standards, aims and goals, their sense of what is right and
proper, their stereotypes and expectations of other groups, their history of interaction with these groups and
anything (dates, places, objects forms of action) that has particular significance.” (EU 2006:19).
tournaments with an international dimension. This absence within the literature is made more acute given the extent to which the ESIM is currently informing updates to international guidelines for international police cooperation and pan-European police training with respect to football matches with an international dimension.

During the European Championships in Portugal German fans where the only group other than England fans that were categorised as ‘high risk’. Moreover, the fixture between Germany and the Netherlands during the opening rounds of the tournament was classified by the organising authorities to be the one posing the highest level of risk to public order. None the less the event passed without any major disturbances. Consequently, this study will explore the policing of German fans’ and its relationship to their collective psychology and behaviour during Euro 2004. The subsequent analysis will examine if the processes that the ESIM proposes are responsible for the absence of widespread disorder among England fans were also evident among German fans attending the same tournament.

Method
The data presented in this paper was collected as part of a wider research project of which a number of analyses from this broader project have already been published elsewhere (see Reicher et al., 2007; Stott et al., 2007, 2008; Stott & Pearson 2007, Stott & Adang, 2004). It is the intention of the present paper to add to this literature by providing an account of the broad dimensions of German fans collective behaviour and police deployment surrounding events involving German fans. This account will then be combined with an analysis of police perceptions regarding their deployments and a phenomenological analysis of German fans’ accounts of their experiences. Data was gathered using a variety of techniques.

Semi-structured observations and interviews.
Semi-structured observations were carried out for the duration of the tournament by the current authors. This data was obtained while the observers participated in gatherings and events where large numbers of German fans were involved. Observations were concerned with recording the course of events, the observers’ qualitative impressions of fan behaviour, fan group interactions, fan-police interaction and police deployment. The first author, who is German, was also embedded among German fans during the tournament, conducting semi-structured observation and interviews. Her data collection was carried out around two games Germany played in Porto and one in Lisbon. Her observations in Porto started on June 13. She went to places where great numbers of German fans gathered. In Porto this included the fan zone Praça D. João I, Praça Lisboa, the Ribeira, side street cafes and restaurants in the city.
centre and a camping site. She attended the game against the Netherlands on June 15 and against Latvia on June 19 and visited public screenings at fan zones. Together with German fans she travelled to Lisbon by train where she resumed her observations on June 21. Again, data collection was concentrated on the location where German fans gathered. In Lisbon these included several squares in the city centre: Praça Rossio, Praça da Figueira (here was also the location of the German fans embassy in Lisbon), several cafes and restaurants in the surrounding area, the fan zone at the Park of Nations and the Docas, a strip of bars and restaurants at the harbour. On June 23 she attended the game of Germany against the Czech Republic. Though Germany did not proceed to the second round of the tournament, many fans stayed in the area which allowed for further data collection until the final game of Portugal against Greece on June 30 in Lisbon. While she was embedded with fans, she made informal contacts and revealed her status and aims as a researcher. In doing so she was able to speak with the fans about the specific research issues but also to refer to themes that arose in a specific situation. The interviews followed a German version of the interview schedule that had been used for the analysis of England fans’ psychology at Euro 2004, focussing on the fans’ ingroup content, outgroup relations (with other fan groups, the police and locals) and their attitude towards violent behaviour (see: Stott et al., 2007). Informed consent was obtained and interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed. 173 interviews with German fans were carried out in total during the tournament, 31 of which on the day this paper reports about (June 14, 2004). As the fan groups had mingled, the recorded conversations also involved 12 fans from The Netherlands, 13 from England and 4 from Croatia. The interviews with German fans displayed in this paper were translated by the first author all other interviews were conducted in English. Unstructured interviews were also held with members of the German fans’ embassy, members of FARE (football against racism in Europe) and the Dutch and the Czech fans embassies. These interview data were also cross referenced with media reports, such as newspaper and internet articles.

*Interviews with police commanders*

A series of semi-structured interviews were also conducted by the authors with a variety of police Commanders. These including the Deputy Commander of Porto, the Commander of the Corpo de Intervenção (Northern Portugal), Commander of the Central District for Porto, the senior Commander and the deputy Commander of the plain-clothes police unit in Porto (the NIP) and the Head of the German police delegation in Portugal and members of the police delegation of the Netherlands. The interviews focused on general strategies and tactics that
had been applied in Porto during the tournament and considered specific incidents that occurred in Porto with respect to the management of events surrounding the fixture between Netherlands and Portugal. Interviews with police commanders were carried out either at Police Headquarters in Porto or in the field during and after the events that are outlined in the behavioural account.

**Analytical strategy**

The analytic strategy in this paper follows that of previous research that is based on the ESIM (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott et al., 2001, Stott et al., 2007). The analysis comprises three sections: an account of the collective behaviour and policing of German fans, an analysis of police accounts and a phenomenological analysis of German football fans’ accounts. The behavioural account provides a chronological description of incidents, police deployment and behavioural norms among crowds of German fans based primarily upon the semi-structured observational data but which also draws form the interview data from fans and police, photographs and video footage. In particular, the account focuses on those aspects of the events that will be put to further analysis in the subsequent sections. Data were triangulated and where only one source provides data related to an event, the source is identified (Stott et al., 2007; Drury & Reicher, 2000). Police and fans accounts were analysed using the principles of thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Kellehear, 1993) and interpretative phenomenological analysis (Reid, Flowers & Larkin, 2005; Smith & Osborn, 2004), looking for a form of pattern recognition within the data and to explore the meanings that participants assign to their experiences. The interviews were transcribed and read several times. This process was informed by the theoretical approach and the understandings and perceptions of the specific groups: For the police interviews, the analysis focused on police understandings of their role, their strategy and tactics used to police German fans and how these relate to those aspects of fan behaviour identified as relevant within the behavioural account. The fan data analysis aimed to explore the developing content of fans’ social identity and the relationship of this content to the surrounding social context. Again, following the theoretical approach, the analysis focused on the fans perception of the event and attitudes toward out-groups, the views of ingroup behaviour and intergroup relations and any further points of interest and emerging issues that seemed to be relevant. The right-hand margin was used to annotate these themes. These notes were organised and sorted into categories and subcategories. From this a coding scheme was developed and again applied to the interviews. Codes were assigned to the transcripts. Segments were grouped under each code before they
were related to issues from the interactional context, as it was described in the behavioural account. For each theme a verbatim extract from the interviews is presented that best illustrates the analytical point.

**Results**

*Behavioural account*

The majority of the German fans followed the team during the group phase where they played the Netherlands and Latvia in Porto and the Czech Republic in Lisbon. 18 German fans had been arrested during this phase, six for public order disturbances and 12 for illegal ticket selling. 225 persons were arrested during the groups phase overall in Portugal, 67 of which for public order offences (Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 2004). The fixture between the Netherlands and Germany was initially drawn to take place in the city of Aveiro. However, given the perceived risks to public order posed by this fixture a decision was taken by the Organising committee to move the game to Porto for organisational and safety reasons (c.f. Harris, 2003). The match was scheduled for 15 June 2004 and many German fans had begun to arrive in Porto some days prior to the game. However, the first significant mass gathering of fans began on June 14. By mid afternoon large numbers of Dutch and German fans had gathered in the pubs, cafes and on the squares of the city centre of Porto. Small numbers of fans from other nations were also present in the city, such as Greeks, English, Danes and Swedes.

The Porto city authorities had assigned official zones to the two fan groups, each set up with a stage and a big video screen. Large numbers of German fans gathered on the square Dom João I. while Dutch fans tended to gather at the Lisboa square, approximately 2 kilometres away. However, fans were not strictly segregated and mixed at these locations and elsewhere in the city centre. According to information from the Dutch and the German police delegations, about 300 German and 60 Dutch hooligans were also present in Portugal.

The strategic approach adopted for the tournament by the PSP was oriented toward the facilitation of lawful and carnival behaviour among fans. Central to this was a desire to avoid the use of indiscriminate force against crowds as a whole in circumstances where only a minority within the crowd were causing problems. The use of force policy for the PSP explicitly stated:

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7 This compares, for example to 1219 persons arrested due to criminal offences and 1838 preventive arrests during the World Cup 2006 in the state of Northrhine-Westphalia only (Wolf, 2006), where 16 games were played.
The intervention/reaction must be “informed”, so as to avoid intervention directed at crowds or at all citizens who happen to be present in a given location and it must be targeted only at those individuals who have brought about the incident.’ (PSP, 2003, p.3)

To achieve this approach the PSP developed a four stage use of force model that began tactically with officers in standard uniform and culminated in the deployment of the Corpo de Intervenção in full protective equipment. The idea is that officers in normal uniform would work in pairs facilitating lawful behaviours and monitoring the crowd for any emergent problems. If minor problems were identified they would have the capability for low level intervention. If this was not sufficient these police could call upon larger squads who could deploy with or without helmets and batons depending upon the level of risk. If the situation was still not resolved the Corpo could be deployed. Supporting this were teams of plain clothes officers working in small groups of approximately five officers. These teams would be embedded in crowds monitoring for and reacting to risks.

However, visible to the fans – and to our observation group were small teams of officers in standard uniforms that patrolled throughout the city centre, in particular in the areas where crowds of fans had gathered. Units from the Corpo de Intervenção were present but according to police commanders were kept deliberately out of sight of gathering crowds. Not all officers from these units were completely invisible. Some took up foot patrols but did so without any of their protective equipment.

Despite the official fan zones, the ‘Ribeira’, a square at the banks of the river Douro is traditionally very popular among visiting football fans. Consequently, on the evening of the 14th the Ribeira was crowded with fans. We observed about 1000 people gathering in the Ribeira between 22:30 hrs and midnight. The majority of these were Dutch but approximately 20% were German fans and another 10% were a mixed group from England, France, Italy, Denmark, Spain and local Portuguese. In the centre of the Ribeira was a Dutch brass band, playing well known and traditional party songs. The area was densely crowded so groups were in close proximity and many positive interactions between the groups and between individuals were observed.

Around 22:45 hrs about 10 PSP officers in standard uniforms patrolled the Ribeira; additionally there was team of plain-clothes officers embedded within the crowd. At around this time a confrontation between a small group of Dutch and German fans took place amidst the crowd. Approximately five German fans had begun to provoke Dutch fans. According to police accounts a group of plain clothed officers noticed the problem and intervened to verbally instruct the German fans to stop but the German fans then began to physically
confront these officers. The five Germans were immediately arrested and removed them from
the scene. At around 23:30 hrs, amidst this largely Dutch crowd, a group of approximately
eight Germans at the river end of the square began singing racist and anti-Dutch chants (e.g.
‘Holländer Hurensöhne’\(^8\) or ‘Zick-zack-Zigeunerpack’\(^9\)). According to a representative from
FARE the group included at least two Neo-Nazis known to their organisation. This behaviour
went on for at least 30 minutes and tensions began to emerge among Dutch supporters
gathered nearby. According to our semi structured observations at around 23.50 hrs, six
officers in standard uniform were observed approaching this group, and otherwise showing
increased presence in this area of the square. Shortly afterwards, the chanting faded and the
officers withdrew. Our observations record that throughout these incidents the Dutch brass
band continued to play and positive interactions continued elsewhere in the Square. The band
played music that was familiar to all the fans like ‘yellow submarine’ or Dutch and German
carnival songs. Most of the time people danced and sang, our data records that a German and
a Dutch fan swapped their shirts, at one point a larger group of German fans engaged in a play
called ‘Humpa’, where the whole group sits down and suddenly jumps up and down singing
‘humpa humpa tataraa’, a game where the German fans are making fun of themselves. During
the whole night we observed no further incidents.

The positive fan behaviour continued on the following match-day where prior to the
game thousands of Dutch supporters gathered in the Lisboa Square. Information was obtained
by the Dutch police delegation that there was an intention of Dutch fans to march to the
stadium some five kilometres away, rather than use public transport. Rather than prevent this,
Portuguese police made the decision to facilitate the march. From a member of our research
team, it was reported to us that around 6 p.m. a crowd of approximately six thousand Dutch
fans moved off en masse behind the Dutch band with the intention of marching to the
stadium. The police profile remained very low and no riot police or vehicles were observed in
the vicinity. As the crowd proceeded through the streets traffic police managed the roadways.
Local Portuguese came onto the streets, balconies and windows to applaud the Dutch fans. At
the front and ahead of the march were teams of Dutch and German police officers. As the
march proceeded at times small groups of German fans came onto the streets and some
shouted hostility at the Dutch fans. Those that did were approached by the German and Dutch
police and required to move. The march eventually arrived at the stadium without incident.

\(^8\) Dutch sons of a bitch.
\(^9\) Zigeuner = Gypsies.
The actual game was a 1:1 draw. Following the match the two fan groups again mixed and celebrated at the Ribeira.

Taken together, the data indicates that an approach was taken to safety and security for this fixture that allowed for peaceful encounters between fans from Germany and the Netherlands and was facilitated by the low profile policing of the PSP. Though the game had been categorised as ‘high risk’, policing was oriented toward the actual behaviour of fans. Officers in normal uniforms and plain-clothes officers patrolled the sites. However it was evident that they were ready for and engaged in relatively rapid, differentiated interventions in situations where risks to public order began to emerge. The behaviour of fans that was broadly in line with lawful behaviour was facilitated and where ‘problematic’ fans were present their attempts of provocations and violent action were controlled.

Policing approach
With regard to the Netherlands Germany fixture the visiting police made reference to concerns about the presence of German hooligans in Portugal.

‘The potential of our problematic fans are here. They are in the country.’
Head of German police delegation, Porto, 17 June 2004

The acknowledged presence of these problem fans did not lead the host police to move toward the deployment of riot units. Instead reflecting the overall police strategy the police referred to their commitment to interaction, communication and targeted interventions. An approach made possible due to the deployment of plain clothes officers in close proximity to the crowds.

‘… in the major places where the people gather, people party, we have always the units.’
Head of NIP in Porto, Porto, 2 July 2004

This close proximity allowed the officers to monitor for emergent risks within the crowd and if they did so to intervene directly against this threat rather than against the crowd as a whole. A Deputy Commander of the NIP at that time pointed out the general approach of their work which was then applied in Oporto on June 14.

‘Our first mission is to look for those situations, but we also act depending on the level of crime or violence or depending on the situation itself … we work undercover, yes, we are spotting. We are looking for the situations, through the fans, always looking for something. To prevent that things happen. When we think that things are going to happen, we act.’
Deputy Commander of NIP, Porto, 2 July 2004

According to the Police Commanders this approach to the policing of the tournament was applied in Porto on the evening of the 14th June. The Head of the NIP in the city provided an account of his involvement in the incidents at the Ribeira. His account suggests
that because they were embedded within the crowd they rapidly became aware of the verbal provocations from the group of Germans. He described how his officers then were able to react quickly to the emerging problem. He describes how the group then confronted the police leading to their arrest.

‘The Germans …started some word and so on and when the police tried to, our guys, tried to react and put a little bit calm, they react against us. And it was against us. Against the police. And they threw a chair and they tried to be a little bit more arrogant and we didn’t allow them and we arrested the five.’
Head of NIP in Porto, Porto, 2 July 2004

In line with the stated security concept of providing a festive atmosphere, the PSP commander saw his policing aimed to protect and to facilitate the Dutch celebrations. When after the first arrests another group of German fans engaged in provocations, he describes that NIP officers cordoned them off from the main crowd. Due to their civilian clothing this movement had not been noticed, though an increased presence of officers in standard uniform had been evident. However, the police assumed that those fans were well aware of the increasing presence of officers. The account further shows that the police closely monitored the fan behaviour and adjusted their actions according to dynamics of the risk that came from this group. This did not only concern the escalation but also the de-escalation of risk behaviour. In this regard the PSP commander also noticed this group of -initially- provoking German fans refraining from this negative behaviour while remaining in the crowd.

‘… we had to divide the Germans and the Dutch with ourselves. Few persons… and they know we were not fans and that we were Portuguese and probably police …We started to move ourselves in between because the Dutch wanted to have a party, a big party and we saw that ten Germans were not in the mood and then what we saw was they’re less and the noise was so loud from the Dutch that they started drinking and enjoying themselves. And they forget that.’
Head of the NIP in Porto, 2 July 2004

The head of the German police delegation confirmed the presence of a number of German hooligans, apart from those persons that had participated in the provocations. He supposed that they deliberately withdrew and separated from the celebrating majority.

‘Well there were a couple from which we assumed that they really wanted to cause trouble, who had really liked to, but due to the orange masses they said: „Let’s make sure that we are not seen on TV so that in the end people at home see us celebrating with the Dutch!” They quickly disappeared from the square and went to a quiet corner…. Under no circumstances they wanted to be linked to the folk that was celebrating there.’
Head of German police delegation, Porto, 17 June 2004

Fan psychology
Many German fans described their concrete relations with the Dutch fans in Porto as legitimate. With regard to the historically more negative relations between the two countries,
Germany fans had actually anticipated high-profile policing and seemed rather surprised of the PSP’s low-profile deployment that they found in Portugal.

‘G48: Especially because there are, say, there are many Dutch, many Germans here, the rivalry had always been particularly big, therefore I had expected much more police. Whereas, so far everything is absolutely peaceful.’
   Interview German fan, Porto city centre, 14 June 2004

But related to the actual friendly situation that they experienced in Porto, the PSP approach was seen to be appropriate and was differentiated from more high profile styles they had experienced at other venues.

‘G35: … it is very friendly, the police is very much holding back, I think, not overwhelmingly present, for example where it was really bad was in France or Belgium. They [the PSP] don’t show this dominant appearance. They are standing there, but somehow unobtrusively in the corner.’
   Interview Germany fan, Porto City Centre, 14 June 2004

Some Germany fans reported the presence of ‘hooligans’ and expected disorder at the Netherlands match.

‘G56: … just a minor little thing and it will go off. That is the problem, I think …’
G57: Some people I met in Porto only came because of that.
MS: Because of the match.
G57: Yes, yes and because of the trouble. ¹⁰
MS: What do you reckon? Do you think it will go off tomorrow?
G57: Yes, Not in the stadium. Afterwards here in Porto maybe, in small groups.’
   Interview Germany fans, Porto city centre, 14 June 2004

Fans had the view that what would unite them was their national identity. If conflict with the Dutch fans occurred it would also involve ordinary fans expressing their solidarity with one another, in terms of a historically embedded conflict between nations, i.e. violent others were not differentiated from the category.

‘G59: I think if really something happens there will be many who will join in, who are usually not like that.
MS: Why is that?
G59: Just to support the own people. Because everybody is prepared against the Dutch.
MS: And that refers to the opponent?
G59: They still talk about the war. Van Nistelrooy said in the paper today that we still have to work something out from 60 years ago. Why does he say that?
G58: Yes, but that was in the tabloid.
G59: So? But the Dutch are like that. They are all like that. … They just hate us more than we hate them.’
   Interview Germany fans, Porto city centre, 14 June 2004

These expectations were put to a test when conflict indeed arose at the Ribeira. German fans who had observed the arrest noticed the differentiated way of PSP policing and described the intervention against the violent fans as quick and targeted. This action is distinguished

¹⁰ The German term that was used here is ‘Auseinandersetzung’. In the context of football it implies fights between fans or fans and the police.
from undifferentiated policing that fans had experienced with other police forces, particularly those within their own nation.

‘G60: ... I just saw, well the Germans [police] are really mad, they just bang into it no matter if it is you or him or me who is standing beside it. Here they [the Portuguese officers] have observed precisely, many plain clothes, watched: who is it? And whoosh, arm on the back, into the car, off they go. All was clear. In Germany you’re finished because it is taken out on all of you, that is the problem.’
Interview Germany fan, Porto Ribeira, 14 June 2004

It is also evident that subsequent to the experience of legitimacy in policing, category boundaries were redefined in terms of violent versus non violent behaviour rather than as before in terms of nationality. These processes occurred amongst both sets of fans: instead of joining in the fight and confronting the Dutch, as it had been expected, German fans that had witnessed the incident described those involved as differentiated from a broader categorisation defined in terms of partying.

‘G66: ... there was this bunch of idiots, three, four Germans who were throwing beer glasses and things.
MS: So you regard people who do stuff like that as idiots?
G66: Yes, of course.
MS: Not everybody thinks like that, some think that that is really great ...
G66: Actually I do not care at all if somebody is a Croat or English or whatever. We are here to have a party – for three weeks.’
Interview Germany fan, Porto Ribeira, 14 June 2004

‘MS: What do you think about the way that the police reacted? Was that appropriate?
H2: Very good, yes, it is appropriate, they were very fast and it was good, yeah. They immediately took one down and carried him away. This time it was a German, it could also have been a Dutch guy, that doesn’t matter he is gone and we should think of this as a big party. And this is nice. Loud music and this is good...’
Interview Netherlands fan, Porto Ribeira, 14 June 2004

Fans we spoke to some days after this incident described how further attempts of provocation from German fans had not become influential and that German fans differentiated from their behaviour.

‘MS: What happened to this group of people who engaged in singing these more aggressive songs?
G91: They dissolved in the end ... this was a bit, I think, well I did not join in their chanting, for me this is, not everybody joined in there, maybe five guys started to sing “Scheiss Holland” many did not like this a lot.’

Even fans that were interviewed later in the tournament referred to the positive context that they perceived during their stay in Portugal and linked this specifically to a sense of unity between fans from different nations.

G91: ‘It really is so peaceful! Well, you always see some rivalry of course but ... Well I was down there in Porto at the harbour, where really: There were English together with Italians, Swedes, Danes, Portuguese, Germans, Latvians, all together, there was a mega party, absolutely peaceful! All united by football and keen on having a big football feast. And this is what the hosts definitely
achieved: To make a football party for the fans! Not overdoing security, or putting merchandise upfront but organising a football feast for the fans who came down here. Respect Portugal, really!”
Interview Germany fan, Lisbon, city centre, 23 June 2004

Discussion
The aim of this paper was to provide an analysis of German fans’ psychology in order to explore if the social psychological processes underpinning dynamics among England fans during Euro 2004 in Portugal (e.g. Stott et al. 2007, 2008) were also evident among the group of German fans. The analysis suggests that the policing was carried out low profile, in line with the stated security concept of the Portuguese police. A discrepancy between German fans expectations of negative group relations (based on historically rooted rivalry) and actual positive intergroup relations that they experienced in Portugal was evident. From this two sets of fan identity seemed to emerge: a form of national identity was expected to be salient in a confrontational context, where violent others were not differentiated from the category. A second form of ‘fan identity’ materialised in which category boundaries were not defined by nation but by non-violence and good relations with fans from other nations. The analysis suggests that the low profile policing contributed to this positive context. In situations of low risk fans saw the unobtrusive behaviour of police officers related to the overall positive atmosphere. However, the impact of the policing on the festive atmosphere was even more evident during a conflict situation at the Ribeira. Low profile policing tactics allowed for a quick and targeted arrest of confrontational fans and prevented further escalation. The perception of this legitimate policing facilitated the shift toward an identity where category boundaries were defined in terms of non-violent behaviour rather in terms of nationality. Given this identity, further attempts of provocation from a group of Germans were disempowered as their confrontational aims did not match this identity’s prototypicality. As a consequence of the positive intergroup relations between Germans and Dutch, German ‘hooligans’ were either seen to merge with the peaceful crowd or to marginalise.

These findings have a great deal of correspondence with the processes that occurred among England fans that attended the tournament in Portugal (Stott et al. 2007, 2008). Research among both sets of fan groups suggests that the absence of large scale disorder can be associated with the style of policing. While the experience of legitimate policing instigated processes of self-policing among England fans, this was not evident at the incident at the Ribeira. However, in both cases a connection was evident between low profile policing and the support of non-violent group norms among the wider crowd and the disempowerment and marginalisation of confrontational groups. The present study therefore provides support for the ESIM research on the absence of violence at crowd events. Suggestions can be made that
the processes the model proposes are not limited to a single cultural group but also apply to
groups from other countries, as it was shown here with respect to German fans. It must be
noted though that the current study is not conclusive. There is need for further research in
order to sustain the possibility that ESIM dynamics are cross cultural. Processes found here
could for example have been limited to the specific context of Euro 2004 at which both
England and Germany fans reacted in similar ways. Additional research is therefore suggested
on German (and other) fan groups in different policing contexts.

**Implications for policing and research**
The positive atmosphere of the Euro 2004 has been praised (e.g. Deutsche Welle, 2004;
Klemm, 2004) and considering the small arrest numbers, it can be regarded the most peaceful
major football tournament in Europe in the last 30 years. In line with previous research (Stott &
Adang, 2005; Stott et al., 2007, 2008; Stott & Pearson, 2007) this success can be attributed
in large part to the low profile approach that was adopted by the Portuguese Security Police.
The PSP has effectively managed crowd dynamics and the fan accounts reveal the positive
social psychological outcomes. A main feature here was the fact that police officers (both
plain cloths and visible police) were embedded in the crowd, enabling them to monitor for
and react to risk that was critical. As indicated before, the issues of the approach have
meanwhile been integrated in practical policing and the current paper likewise supports the
application of the low profile approach as a powerful tool of managing crowd events. A
further factor for the success of Euro 2004 can be seen in the effective cooperation between
research and police practice: Though the security policy for this tournament was informed by
scientific research, the recommended policing model was not derived from the ivory tower
but from good practises that were already applied by police forces throughout Europe (Stott &
Adang, 2003, 2009). So while comprehensive policing tactics and procedures are available,
research is able to provide answers to why and under which circumstances they can be used
most effectively. ESIM’s notion of interaction, for example, was resembled in the security
concept for the tournament in the way the PSP understood their role within the Euro 2004
scenario, i.e. as providing for security while contributing to the festive atmosphere. This
became evident when the commander explained the police intervention at the Ribeira: the
background for his work was seen in the facilitation and protection of ‘the Dutch party’. It
may be concluded that not only the application of appropriate tactics but also the
understanding of the underlying philosophy are essential for successful public order
management.
Acknowledgements
This research report was made possible by grants from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-000-23-0617) and from the U. K. Home Office. Data collection was made possible through the long-term co-operation of the U. K. Home Office, especially David Bohannon and Martin Goodhay; the Portuguese Public Security Police, especially José Leitão, Paulo Pereira, José Neto, Luís Simões, and João Pires; the British Consulate in Portugal, especially Gary Fisher and Glynne Evans; the Euro2004 Organising Committee, especially Paulo Gomes and Luís Trindade Santos; the German police delegation for Euro2004, especially Andreas Morbach, the German fan embassy, particularly Thomas Schneider and Michael Gabriel. The Dutch police delegation, especially Henk Groenenvelt, the Dutch fan embassy, especially Ilya Jongeneel. Thanks should also be extended to Klaus Boehnke from Jacobs University Bremen and Otto Adang from the Police Academy of the Netherlands, for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. Otto Adang was also co-supervisor of the broader research project and provided some additional observations. And finally we would like to give our thanks to all the anonymous fans that attended Euro2004 and contributed greatly to this research.

References


Foreword Paper 2

The results from the Portugal research had been a huge support for the low profile approach but then that was only one single event. There were voices that had called the Portuguese lucky, or Portugal being a holiday country where people are in a good mood and do not engage in violence (while one may ask how the riots in Italy ’98 then came about?) or it was the banning orders that explained the small numbers of incidents and arrests? (But wasn’t there confirmation for the presence of some hundred ‘hooligans’?) The World Cup 2006 in Germany was therefore a unique opportunity to continue the research and to see how, if, under which circumstances low profile policing works or what effect other approaches may have on fan behaviour. In contrast to Portugal it was not obvious what kind of policing approach was intended by the German police. The authorities had published an official document where providing for safety and security was presented as the main police task and it was stated that there would be a focus on potential hooligans but it did not seem that the police saw themselves as part of the festivities. Questions arose on how the police in Germany would understand their role, what their strategy and tactics were and how this would relate to fan behaviour. Thanks to cooperation between the Police Academy of the Netherlands and the Ruhr-University Bochum it was possible to set up a similar methodological framework as it had been applied in Portugal. Again it was possible to pursue a variety of research methods, including structured observations and ethnographical methods so that different tournaments could be compared. However, it was unfeasible to cover all host cities of the country. For practical and organisational reasons the main observations focused on the three host cities of North-Rhine Westphalia. In order to provide for a comprehensive picture of the tournament it was sought to observe both high-risk and low-risk games. At each game there were at least four observers present gathering structured observational data. They were also instructed to make qualitative notes of their personal impressions and on everything they found remarkable – of course in relation to the underlying theoretical approach. Having been encouraged by the openness of fans in Portugal, observers were also asked to conduct interviews about their perceptions of group relations. Approximately half of the observers were police officers themselves (with a range from ‘sergeant’ to ‘chief super intendant’). This turned out as helpful with regard to access because fellow officers on duty seemed more willing to talk to a colleague than to a psychologist interested in group relations. On the other hand those ‘researcher officers’ reported to us that the observations had been something like an ‘eye-opener’ as it gave them an impression on how specific kinds of policing can appear in the
view of the citizens and it made them see their own work from another perspective.

Composing the observation groups it was aimed to mix police officers with persons from a ‘civil’ background (there were doctors, lawyers, social scientists) because it was assumed that people with different backgrounds would also focus on different aspects so that there was a maximum of issues covered.

In this ‘World Cup’ paper results from the different methods are presented. The structured observations provided quantitative data on police deployment and group interaction, so that it was possible to make statements on the officers’ outfit, the officer/citizen ratio or the frequencies of interaction between fans and police. This could be related to the incidents, serving as the ‘dependent variable’ and comparisons could be made with data from other tournaments where the same methodology had been applied. Also, as outlined in the paper, there was the question of how the findings would compare with the picture that the media had painted of this tournament.

A higher number of incidents in Germany served as a first hint that something must have been different to Portugal. The mere comparison of other variables, however, turned out to be misleading and in some cases they had to be complemented by the qualitative descriptions to provide a full picture: Higher numbers in police-fan interaction in Germany – compared to Portugal – for example, could not be put down to a specifically pro-active style of the Northrhine-Westphalian police but the qualitative data revealed that fans massively sought contact with the (passive) officers. In order to better understand these differences it was necessary to dig deeper. In the paper single incidents are outlined, each of which contained the potential for conflict, using the semi-structured field notes and interviews.

Although the aim of this thesis is to present data on non-British fans, two of the incidents described nevertheless involved England fans. This once again reflects the difficulty of observing real-life situations as group composition cannot be manipulated. The actually biggest incident of the tournament occurred around the game of Germany versus Poland and was fully analysed in a separate study (this is described in the subsequent paper). Most other incidents we observed however involved England fans.

This paper also addresses the media coverage and in particular the very positive picture that portrays the World Cup in terms of positive and cheerful fan behaviour. In general the data confirms this behaviour but during the data collection also a number of negative encounters and incidents were recorded and it was remarkable how little of this was reported on, though it should be noted that incidents had not been disguised. All numbers were freely available in police reports and press releases, also serving as a source of data triangulation in
During informal talks a number of police officers uttered similar surprise of the little media coverage of violent incidents, as they knew indeed that the World Cup had not only been a fairy tale.

In methodological respect this paper provides evidence that quantifiable data can be obtained during contemporaneous data collection and it provides valuable measures of tactics and interaction. It even suggests that this should be carried out regularly as in doing so the comparison of strategies can be facilitated. It further promotes the application of mixed methods in conducting crowd research as the study shows that none of the methods applied on its own would have provided such a comprehensive picture. With regard to the theoretical aspect the results suggest that legitimate group relations and positive fan behaviour were at place in Germany 2006 when policing was carried out targeted, differentiated and in relation to the situational context and the actual risk and when tolerance limits were communicated and acted upon, but we observed problems, when these conditions were not met.
Fiction, facts and a summer’s fairy tale - Mixed messages at the World Cup 2006

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The FIFA World Championships 2006 in Germany have been praised for their positive atmosphere and described as a ‘fairy tale’. Yet, more than 9000 persons were arrested. This paper presents an analysis of police tactics and deployments and its relation to the frequency of incidents and the group relations between fans and between fans and police. The data collection was carried out within three host cities in North Rhine Westphalia in relation to ten games of the tournament, drawing on a combination of structured and qualitative observational methods. The outcomes are mixed. Group relations were mostly positive, indicated by positive interaction between fan groups, however, frequency of incidents and arrests suggest that the tournament was not as peaceful as the media coverage may have implied. Deeper analyses suggest that legitimate group relations and positive fan behaviour were associated with differentiated policing, carried out in relation to the situational context and the actual risk present.

Keywords: public order management, football, crowd policing, police-citizen interaction

‘A Summer's Fairytale’ is the title of a documentary movie following Germany’s football team through the 2006 world championships. The phrase furthermore described the happenings offside the pitch on the fan miles, in the public viewing zones and the city centres. It summarised the national and international euphoria in Germany, the fan parties and gatherings, the peaceful atmosphere that had characterised this tournament and that was praised by fans, officials and - not least - by the media in Germany and all over the world. This overwhelmingly positive picture displayed during and after the tournament forms a sharp contrast with the considerably negative and pessimistic pre-tournament coverage that ranged from fears of cancelling the WC because of the bird flu (Spiegel online, 2006) and insufficient

stadium safety (Focus online, 2006) to acts of racism and ‘no-go-areas’ in Eastern Germany (Gerhäusser, 2006) and the threat of national and international hooligans or ‘troublemakers’ (Wehner, 2006; Urban, 2006). This raises the question of what happened that turned the World Cup into such a fairy tale and ‘Germany in one of the happiest collective frames of mind since the end of the War’ (Bernstein, 2006). A generational change as the base for a relaxed German patriotism (Mayer, 2006) may have facilitated good hosting. Die Welt, a German paper, similarly noted that the ‘joy in feeling as a nation and passing this joy on as hospitality to foreign visitors is the sign of a successful therapy.’ (2006, cited in Bernstein, 2006). But was the World Cup really the fairy tale it is made out to be? BBC-Panorama in their undercover documentation about policing and anti-social behaviour of fans and hooligans pointed to a more shady side of the tournament (BBC, 2006). Also, it is less well known that about 9000 persons were arrested during Germany 2006 (Mathies, 2006) - numbers that were hardly communicated in the media. Only two incidents had gained some attention: A conflict between German fans and police in Dortmund and a clash between England and German fans in Nuremberg, resulting in more than 400 and 300 arrests, respectively (Schreiber & Adang, 2010). What really happened during the World Cup? While the media play a huge role in shaping opinions we yet assume - following Sepp Herberger’s famous quote - that ‘the truth is on the pitch’, or rather: in the field. In describing what happened during the World Cup we resorted to traditional observational research methods that were combined with structured observations, a method that was initially developed for observations during the 2000 European Championships in Belgium and the Netherlands (Adang & Cuvelier 2001) and used during the European Championships in Portugal as well (Stott, Adang, Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2007, 2008). This method makes it possible to gather comprehensive observational data about fan behaviour, police behaviour, group interaction, police deployment and tactics and to relate these numbers to the amount of violent incidents that occurred during the observations. While many factors can account for the success of a crowd event, the question if it was peaceful in the end is still the major issue. Establishing safety and security at a crowd event is both cost and staff-intensive. A peaceful event on the other hand, can serve as a perpetual system in which the positive dynamics spread and also affect initially uninvolved persons. With safety and security being the ‘sine qua non’ the number of violent incidents can hence be seen as an important indicator or measure of the success of a crowd event. On the other hand not only preventing incidents but providing a platform for positive encounters is also becoming an issue for public order.
policing, thus indicating a qualitative change from riot control to public order and crowd management (Adang, 2005).

**Crowd behaviour**

The ideas and conceptions of those who handle, manage or police crowds are of great significance. It is their understanding and their explanation of crowd behaviour that determines how a crowd is dealt with and which strategy and tactics would be applied at a concrete event. Classic theorists consider crowd behaviour as mindless or irrational, determined by instinct (Trotter, 1916; McDougall, 1908) or suggestion (Le Bon, 1895/1995). Assumptions of the anonymity of participants and views of crowds as one entity (Moscovici, 1985) have up to date influenced perceptions of crowds and are still present in modern textbooks (Schweingruber & Wohlstein, 2005). This is particularly surprising because these views have increasingly been criticised and are currently regarded as myths (Schweingruber & Wohlstein, 2005). Rather than being anonymous parts of a single entity, it was found that crowd members have a tendency to assemble and remain in small social units of friends or acquaintances during a crowd event (Aveni, 1977; McPhail & Wohlstein, 1983; Neal, 1994). Further it was shown that crowds are neither mad nor irrational but that most crowd events are peaceful (e.g. Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975; McPhail, 1991; Adang, 1998) or that in dangerous situations it was even found that people tried to help each other (Johnson, 1987) and acted as ‘models of civility and cooperation’ (Clarke, 2002, p.21). Violence, however, occurs infrequently, neither predictable by the system nor by individual characteristics (McPhail & Wohlstein, 1983) and the mere fact that individuals become part of a crowd does not increase the likelihood that they will get violent (Adang, 1998). Still, crowd conflict is an important issue not least because of its broad public attention and an escalated crowd conflict can indeed leave substantial destruction and may only be fought by massive use of force. It is therefore all the more important to consider the dynamics that can evolve in a crowd situation so that measures can be taken timely and targeted. From a causal perspective, two types of violent initiatives can be distinguished in collective settings (Adang, 1998): On the one hand conflict can result from ‘frictions’ between participants, due to obscure situations, dissensions or misunderstandings between individuals or groups and lead to a spontaneous, reactive form of violence. Another type of violence is caused by groups of young males (in the context of football usually referred to as ‘hooligans’) deliberately looking for confrontations with rival groups, without the need for a situational trigger. For the escalation of collective violence, i.e. the involvement of an increasing number of individuals, the existence of ‘us versus them’
distinctions is crucial. Based on these findings, a ‘friendly but firm’ low profile approach was initially developed for the policing at Euro 2000 (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). The ‘elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour’ (ESIM; e.g. Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998) explains how group interactions and group relations affect the escalation process. It proposes that group norms can alter as a result of the interaction with the other group. This particularly applies to situations of conflict, where a change of social identity was found when crowd members perceived out-group behaviour as indiscriminate and undifferentiated. I.e. crowd members felt treated unjust and unfair so that acceptance of conflict and challenging the police became acceptable also for those who initially held peaceful aims and attitudes. While negative crowd-police relations are often connected with ‘overreacting’ police and unprovoked police use of force, conflict and negative relations with the police were also found when crowd members felt insufficiently protected in a situation that they perceived as dangerous (Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001). Rather than recommending a particular kind of strategy for all situations, outcomes of this research therefore suggest a ‘balanced’ approach that considers the actual risk (Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004). Dependent on the situation a whole range of tactics from both approaches can therefore be applicable.

**The friendly but firm low profile approach**

The friendly but firm low profile approach turned out to fit very well with suggestions coming out of the ESI-model. The friendly but firm low profile is characterised by a broad and flexible tactical concept that provides for quick escalation and de-escalation, high visibility of the officers and an emphasis on communication. It is suggested that police officers are deployed in small units who are easily approachable and who themselves pro-actively get in contact with citizens and fans. In so doing they are able to set a framework for behaviour, for example by facilitating legal aims and communicating behavioural limits, acting friendly but firm. In case of increasing risk, the officers should then be supported by additional intervention units, possibly placed in side streets that can quickly be deployed and removed when the situation calms. Differentiated interventions are vital for legitimate group relations. Communication and the explanation of interventions are particularly important during increased risk, as this can enhance an understanding among the ‘legal’ citizens and fans who may not be officially targeted but often get affected by an intervention, one or the other way. Psychologically this strategy prohibits a shift of social identity toward conflict and can lead to the marginalisation of anti-normative persons and may facilitate co-operation and identification with the police (Stott et al., 2008). The work of the officers on the ground has a
further, more internal effect: Being deployed within the crowds, they are able to detect developments and dynamics at a very early stage. This information can then be fed back into the information chain and serve as additional intelligence, thus supporting information-led interventions.

**Conclusions from policing EURO2004**

Major empirical evidence for the ‘low profile’ approach was found at the European Championships 2004 in Portugal. The security concept of the Portuguese Security Police, PSP, was geared to this approach and went along with broad tactical measures that allowed interventions to be carried in accordance to the risk that was present in a particular situation. The PSP particularly highlighted the need to promote the festive nature of the event, in which the police officer was seen as someone ‘acting in a peaceful, festive context’. However, it was also seen that ‘the police must make it clear that they have resources for more forceful intervention at their disposal and that they are prepared to use them against anyone engaging in aggressive or violent conduct.’ (PSP, 2003, pp. 2+3). An evaluation of the policing during the tournament shows that the PSP indeed followed the low profile approach (Stott et al., 2008). Stott and Adang (2004) showed that the frequency of incidents during Euro 2004 was very low compared to Euro 2000. Also, arrest figures were low, with 261 of which 87 were arrests for football related disorder during the whole tournament (COT, 2005). An analysis of fan – police interaction explains the psychological effect of the approach, suggesting that the friendly but firm low profile strategy facilitated positive group relations and supported the development of a common football fan identity (i.e. to celebrate and to have a good time) which also included groups that had been pre-categorised as risk-fans (Stott et al., 2007, Stott & Schreiber, 2005). In several situations of conflict acts of self-policing were found and the marginalisation of persons who did not behave in accordance with this identity. Also police action against such persons was clearly supported by fans or even demanded and in a post-event survey fans noted that they identified with the police (Stott & Adang, 2004). While these studies support the low profile approach and the underlying elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour, it may yet be argued that the success of Euro2004 was singular, merely applying for that one event or the specific groups that were present in Portugal during the tournament. Further evidence is required, particularly to learn if the suggested relations also apply in different contexts that may be formed by national or cultural features or the understandings and philosophies of the police forces.
The current study

The FIFA World Championships 2006 in Germany provided an excellent opportunity for such research, i.e. to explore if the proposals of the low profile approach also apply to a German context. Furthermore, we sought to explain if and how Germany2006 was a successful event or if the success was just a ‘fairy tale’. On the basis of previous research, we saw a successful event related to two aspects. Firstly to safety and security; indicated by the frequency and severity of violent incidents and secondly associated with a good atmosphere that manifests itself in positive inter-group relations. We expected ‘success’ to be associated with the principles of ESIM being incorporated in the police force and low profile tactics employed on the ground. Using the same methodology it was possible to compare findings from previous studies with the policing that was carried out at the WC 2006.

Prior to the tournament, the Federal German home office had issued an official summary of their security concept for the WC (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2006). It must be noted however, that German police is decentralised and subject to the respective federal states, resulting in 16 different state police forces with different legislations, respectively. The WC security concept therefore provided a framework for police conduct that was then translated into action by the individual police forces. In contrast to the PSP approach for Euro 2004 and the Belgian/Dutch approach for Euro 2000 that explicitly underlined the individual officer as ‘acting in a festive context’ (PSP, 2003, p.3) and emphasised the facilitation of legal fans, policing in Germany was seen as being concentrated around a minority of problematic or confrontational fans. As had been the case for Euro 2000 and Euro 2004, the German national framework described the use of extensive international cooperation and internal measures, e.g. intelligence, foreign officers and border controls. Unlike Euro 2000 and 2004, it also included regional bans of internal (German) risk fans. Support and facilitation of fans and visitors was to be organised by the World Cup Committee and not described as police task. No information was given on the kind of deployment and the police profile, forms of communication with fans and visitors or kinds of intervention (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2006). The current paper sets out to explore which tactics and forms of deployments were used and how this related to the overall number of incidents and the group relations.

Method

The tournament was held between June 9 and July 9, 2006. 64 games were played in 12 host cities in 9 German States. Structured observations were carried out around 10 of these games
from the first round to one semi final, all of which being played in the three host cities of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW): Cologne, Gelsenkirchen and Dortmund. NRW hosted 16 matches in total. In addition unstructured observations were carried out on three different occasions relating to current developments e.g. prior to a risk game when fans had already arrived in the cities.\(^{12}\) The decision to focus on NRW was based on organisational and methodological reasons. With three host cities, NRW provided an ideal field for research. The dense area with its broad infrastructure allowed for easy access to the venues and quick deployment of observation teams. Furthermore, despite the joint federal security concept, we were seeking to avoid an effect of policing culture of a particular state. The games were selected in order to cover both events with and without increased risk. Games with participation of either Poland or England were classified as risk games. Of the 10 games we observed 6 non-risk games and 4 risk games, with two being played in Gelsenkirchen and one in Dortmund and Cologne, respectively. An overview is depicted in table 1.

Table 1
Games observed at the World Cup 2006 in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Game</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09/06/2006</td>
<td>Gelsenkirchen</td>
<td>Poland : Ecuador</td>
<td>Risk(^{13})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/06/2006</td>
<td>Dortmund</td>
<td>Trinidad/ Tobago : Sweden</td>
<td>Non-risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/06/2006</td>
<td>Dortmund</td>
<td>Germany : Poland</td>
<td>Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/06/2006</td>
<td>Gelsenkirchen</td>
<td>Argentina : Serbia/ Montenegro</td>
<td>Non risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/06/2006</td>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>Czech Republic : Ghana</td>
<td>Non-risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/06/2006</td>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>Sweden : England</td>
<td>Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/06/2006</td>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>Switzerland : Ukraine</td>
<td>Non-risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/06/2006</td>
<td>Dortmund</td>
<td>Brazil : Ghana</td>
<td>Non-risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
<td>Gelsenkirchen</td>
<td>Portugal : England</td>
<td>Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/07/2006</td>
<td>Dortmund</td>
<td>Germany : Italy</td>
<td>Non-risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{12}\) In particular observations were carried out on the day before the game between England and Sweden (Cologne) and England and Portugal (Gelsenkirchen) and after the match between Switzerland and Togo (Dortmund).

\(^{13}\) In spite of the focus by media and police on the threat allegedly posed by Polish hooligans, the game between Poland and Ecuador was not formally classified as an ‘increased risk’ match according to a police source (Mathies 2006).
Although the game between Poland and Ecuador was not officially classified as a risk game, we did include it in the risk category, given the extensive media coverage of the threat posed by Polish fans (Schreiber & Adang, 2010) and the attention for this threat in police preparations we had observed during talks with Gelsenkirchen police. Considering that the proposals of the low profile approach can best be tested around risk situations, and given that our sample contains half the risk games of the tournament, our study can be said to be representative in this respect.

**Data collection**

The data collection followed well established research methods that had been used at previous mass events and tournaments (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001, Stott & Adang, 2004, Stott et al., 2008). Using a form of systematic social observation where also the qualitative dimension was taken advantage of, data was gathered on a) police strategy, tactics, operational structure and behaviour b) fan perspectives and behaviour c) police-fan interactions d) overall levels of ‘disorder’.

Structured observational data collection was carried out by 23 participants of the master course ‘Criminology and Police Science’ at Ruhr-Universität Bochum (on two occasions the team was assisted by a group of five teachers and students from the Police Academy of the Netherlands); the class comprised both police officers and post graduate students from different disciplines such as law, social sciences or psychology. The observers were trained by the authors during a course module preceding the tournament; this included information on the theoretical background, observation techniques and a final test observation around the German league match between Cologne and Leverkusen in February 2006 in Cologne. During the tournament an observation was carried out by a team of four observers under supervision of the authors. The observers were instructed to choose areas where large groups of fans gathered, at the central station, before and inside public viewing zones, and at squares in the city centre. Every fifteen minutes a sample was taken on the number of persons, interaction between fan groups and fans and the police, incidents and interventions. With regard to police deployment we differentiated officers in normal uniform and officers in riot uniform. Riot police was additionally distinguished according to the kind and use of equipment. ‘Full-riot’ was recorded when the officers wore full protective equipment, helmets and/or had drawn a baton or shield. If the baton was not used and the helmet was attached to the belt, observers noted the officers as ‘partial-riot’. Incidents were measured as small (with at most four individuals acting violently), medium (involving five to ten individuals) and
large (involving more than ten persons). Police intervention referred to dispersal, stopping or arrests and it was noted if police had made use of force. 1020 samples were taken in total.

The structured observations were complemented by semi-structured observations, participant observations, interviews, photos and video footage. The interviews held during the observations related to fans’ general perception of the context and the atmosphere, to their group relations (with other fan groups or the police), or to specific incidents that occurred during the observation. Questions were based on a semi structured interview schedule that had been used at previous research (c.f. Stott & Adang, 2004, Stott et al., 2007). Additionally, media data such as newspaper, internet articles and TV coverage was collected before, during and after the tournament. Due to an open co-operation with the local police services we had access to actual risk assessments and had admission to speak to officers and commanders on the ground or in the command room or to conduct follow-up interviews after the tournament. A total of 40 interviews were conducted with police officers of different ranks, 31 during and 9 after the tournament.

Analytical strategy
According to the underlying model, the structured observational data was analysed with regard to deployment, communication and the number of incidents, following previous research methodology (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001, Stott & Adang, 2004). In addition to the data gathered in Germany 2006, we also used structured observational data sets that had been collected at the European Championships 2004 in Portugal. The data consists of 1894 samples that were obtained within a multinational cross cultural research project (Stott & Adang, 2004; Stott et al., 2008). As the same methodology is applied at the two tournaments, this allows for a comparative analysis. Qualitative data refers to two data sets: Field notes and interviews are being used as a means of data triangulation, completing the quantitative analysis. 184 interviews were held with visiting and local fans, 9 with members of security companies and 2 with FIFA volunteers. The qualitative descriptions from the different observers were first analysed along the main research issues: deployment, communication and incidents and in relation to the specific location and times. The individual reports then got summarised by triangulation of sources. Interviews with police commanders were carried out with regard to specific issues that arose during the first analysis. The interviews were carried out along an individual schedule that related to the specific incident. Notes were taken during

14 In particular we spoke with: officers of riot teams, bronze, silver and gold commanders, media officers, dog handler, spotters, members of special intervention units and officers from the Federal Police.
or immediately after the interview, in some cases interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed.

**Results**
The analysis is based on the structured observational data considering deployment, equipment, police-fan-interaction, group relations and incidents. The quantitative findings are completed by a summary of the qualitative descriptions that the observers noted in-between sample time.

**Policing**
Police was not present in all the samples we took. In Germany police was openly present in 60% of all cases (N=1020), this is comparable to 56% measured in Portugal (N=1894). The average ratio of officers per 100 fans was 4 at both tournaments. Other than in Portugal we found significant differences between the number of officers at risk-games and non-risk games in NRW: while the average ratio was 3 officers per 100 fans at non-risk games, this number was three times as high at risk-games (9/100) (U=88915, z=-8.773, p < .001).

Considering the samples with police presence, the majority of officers in NRW 2006 were deployed in partial riot uniforms, which were present in 76 percent of samples. 47 percent of the samples recorded officers in normal uniform and in 4 percent full riot uniform were present. These numbers relate to both risk and non-risk games in total. A nearly reverse image was displayed in Portugal where 80 percent of the officers were deployed in standard uniform and 31 percent in partial-riot, less than 1 percent were recorded wearing full-riot equipment.

The differences in the deployment of (partial) riot police during normal and during risk-games in Germany were 82 percent (risk, N=457) versus 69 percent (non-risk, N=563; χ²=33.36, df=1, p < .001), the numbers in Portugal showed no significant differences (χ²=0.36, df=1, p > .05). Riot-vehicles were recorded in 17 percent of the samples in NRW. These numbers roughly match those of Portugal (15%), whereas we found no significant differences between normal and risk-games in Portugal, which was the case in NRW: (risk: 28 %, non risk 8 %, χ²=67.67, df=1, p < .001).
Table 2
Police deployment at Euro 2004 and WC 2006 (NRW) in percentage of samples with police presence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Portugal 2004</th>
<th>NRW 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal uniform</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial riot uniform</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot uniform</td>
<td>&gt;1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot police vehicles</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>risk</th>
<th>non risk</th>
<th>risk</th>
<th>non risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal uniform</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial riot uniform</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot uniform</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot police vehicles</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ethnographic data confirm the above numbers of deployment: In Dortmund and Cologne we also observed the deployment of special communication units who patrolled the city centre. In Dortmund and Gelsenkirchen officers in normal uniform were deployed at dedicated information points close to the central stations, in Gelsenkirchen this was also observed at the public viewing zone where officers handed out leaflets and small stickers. These officers showed great enthusiasm and actively approached the visitors. Our data records that this was very positively valued by the visitors and fans. In the remaining part of the city, however, only (partial) riot-officers were observed. This was the case in all venue cities. According to our recordings, these officers performed different activities: Communication, mere presence and also surveillance, while their actual task was not always obvious. For example during the game of England versus Portugal we observed small units inside the public viewing zone. Some officers wore partial-riot uniform with a helmet attached to the belt. A few meters apart we saw other officers of the same unit; without helmet or baton and wearing a t-shirt.

**Fan-police interaction**
Positive interaction between fans and police was recorded in 17 percent of the cases with police presence in NRW, nearly doubling the results of 9 percent from Portugal. At risk games a slight but non significant trend towards an increase of communication between fans and police was found at both tournaments. In NRW we found significant differences between
games with participation of the German team and the other matches: During ‘Germany matches’ positive interactions between fans and officers were recorded in 46 percent of the samples (N=164) and in 12 percent during the other games (N=856, $\chi^2=78.61$, df=1, p < .001). At Euro 2004 police–fan interaction was slightly but not significantly higher at games without the hosting country with 12 percent (N=663), versus 8 percent (N=383) at ‘Portugal games’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive interaction between fans and the police</th>
<th>Portugal 2004</th>
<th>NRW 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive interaction between fans and the police during games of the hosting country</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive interaction between fans and the police at games without the hosting country</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive interaction between fans and the police at games</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The qualitative observations confirm numerous positive interactions between fans and the police in NRW, though with an imbalance concerning the direction of the communication, as conversations and contacts were almost entirely initiated by the fans and visitors and not by the officers. Pro-active communication from the police was only observed at information points or coming from special communication officers. There were only small differences regarding the quality of communication depending on the risk assessment.

**Communication between the fan groups**
Data concerning the interaction between the fan groups indicate clear differences between the two tournaments, with positive interaction in 14 percent of the samples in Portugal and in 26 percent at the observed games in NRW. In Portugal there were significant differences between risk and non-risk games, with a decrease of positive fan-fan communication from 15 percent at non risk games to 13 percent at risk games ($\chi^2=6.729$, df=1, p < .001). Differences between risk and non risk games were not significant in Germany. Negative interaction
between fan groups was very low with less than 1 percent measured in Portugal and 2 percent in Germany 2006 of which nearly all occurred during risk games.

Table 4: Interaction between fan groups at Euro 2004 and WC 2006 (NRW) in percentage of samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive interaction between fan groups</th>
<th>Portugal 2004</th>
<th>NRW 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative interaction between fan groups</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive interaction between fan groups</th>
<th>risk</th>
<th>non risk</th>
<th>risk</th>
<th>non risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal 2004</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRW 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the qualitative data, interaction between fan groups was mostly positive, characterised by encounters like chatting, singing together or at each other, dancing, hugging, giving away items and taking mutual pictures. At some risk games, or between rivalling groups, groups rather did not interact, reacted neutral but treated each other with respect. Local Germans were also involved in the encounters, also old people and families. Many locals were also seen in the colours of the teams that played and / or supported them with chants or clapping.

Incidents
Incidents were measured in 4% of the samples in NRW and in less than 1% in Portugal. In NRW there was a clear difference between incidents at normal and at games with increased risk (2%) and at risk games (7%); \( \chi^2=18.00, df=1, p < .001 \).

Table 5: Incidents at Euro 2004 and WC 2006 (NRW) in percentage of samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Portugal 2004</th>
<th>NRW 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>risk</th>
<th>non risk</th>
<th>risk</th>
<th>non risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRW 2006</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Issues arising from these findings

There are several correspondences of the PSP style and the NRW-police approach. In Germany a distinction was made between risk games and non-risk games, indicated by significantly higher numbers of visible officers and riot vehicles at risk games. The main differences in police deployment in Portugal and Germany relate to the overall picture that police displayed. In Portugal the vast majority of officers were deployed in standard uniforms and baseball caps, while the picture of police in Germany was characterised by riot-officers. This deployment entirely contradicts a message that NRW police had given via a PR-campaign that was run in connection to the World Cup, portraying six male and female officers all in standard uniform, welcoming guests and fans.

High numbers of positive interactions between fans and the police in NRW 2006 suggest that group relations were generally good. However, the analyses suggest that the higher figures in Germany are entirely caused by the contacts between the police and German fans. Surprisingly, the fans (and the Germans in particular) seemed to have been the active part in this relationship, as our data revealed that it was more the fans who were looking for contact with the officers, rather than police engaging in pro-active communication. German fans and local Germans were also rather active communicating with other fan groups. Quantitative and qualitative data indicate a good and friendly atmosphere that manifests in numerous positive inter-group relations, so that – referring to our definition of success Germany 2006 has been successful in this respect.

The recorded incidents suggest that Germany 2006 was peaceful but not as calm as the positive media coverage may imply. Incidents are less than half of what had been measured at Euro 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands (4% versus 10%; cf. Adang & Cuvelier, 2001) but more than five times the numbers recorded in Portugal, which were less than 1%. Higher numbers of incidents in Germany also go along with higher arrests numbers during the tournament. Around the 16 games that were played in Germany 2006, NRW police detained 1219 persons due to criminal offences and 1838 were arrested preventively (Wolf, 2006). This compares with 261 arrests around 31 matches during Euro 2004 in Portugal (COT, 2005), taking into account that the PSP cannot make preventive arrests. It should be kept in mind though, that differences in arrest figures are not necessarily an accurate reflection of differences in the frequency of incidents. They are rather a reflection of differences in police

15 In total German police detained about 9000 persons, 3200 for criminal offences and 5800 were taken into preventive custody during the World Cup (Mathies, 2006).
strategy and activity, however, the difference between Portugal and Germany (even when one only considers arrests for criminal offences) is striking.

**Analysis of single incidents**

It might be argued, that the Portuguese ‘style’ was only successful in connection with a particular holiday atmosphere or that there were simply more violent people on the streets in 2006. In order to come closer to the ‘truth on the pitch’ we will therefore take a further step and present an analysis of different situations during the tournament where conflict occurred and did or did not escalate. In doing so we are selecting incidents in all three cities. The observations presented here were made by the authors, completed with real-time interviews, follow-up interviews and reports from other sources. Following the ESI-model (above) we are particularly looking at ways of interaction and how group relations developed in these situations.

*Climbing a monument in Cologne*

At the evening before the group game of England versus Sweden in Cologne, numerous England fans already gathered in the city centre. On the ‘Alter Markt’ square, at around 20:50 hrs an England fan climbed onto a huge monument. Riot police intervened and got the man from the monument. The commander in charge for this operation explained to us that the fan was drunk and he was removed because he had climbed up so high and got himself into a dangerous situation. This view is also shared by England fans who witnessed the scene:

Field note: The police get somebody from the monument. The crowd chants: ‘There are ten German bombers in the air’.

Int.: Why do you think they (the police) are doing it?

ENG10: They are idiots. ….Because they are pissed … they are all drunk.

Int.: Who are the idiots? The police or-


19.06.2006, Cologne, Alter Markt, 20:48 hrs

Later that evening, further fans unhindered climbed up the monument. One, also not stopped by the police, even carried an England flag to the very top where he attached it, being applauded by the crowd. Another England fan, trying the same, later fell down being seriously injured. Riot police intervened, taking actions to help the man. However, misunderstandings about the situation led to a confrontation between England fans and the police, resulting in 15 injured officers and five arrests. (Polizei Köln, 2006). Stott and Pearson

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16 It should be noted though, that our study also included observations around the biggest incident of the tournament, a confrontation between German fans and the police around the game of Germany versus Poland. As we are reporting on this elsewhere (Schreiber & Adang, 2010), this incident is not covered extensively in the present paper.
(2007) explain this misunderstanding by riot police moving in when the injured person needed help and reactions of the crowd against a police officer filming the injured. ‘We were standing right next to a couple of lads and everyone was saying ‘Look, he needs attention.’ They [the police] came over and everyone was getting out of the way so they could get to him, and then this woman17 comes in with her camera and started filming this guy who is lying unconscious, and there is no need for that.’ (Stott & Pearson, 2007, p. 314).

Bengal lights in Dortmund

In Dortmund we observed different approaches of how the police dealt with the use of pyrotechnics. During the (high-risk) game of Germany versus Poland a Bengal light was lit in the city centre at 22:50 hrs, shortly after the goal for Germany. The person was immediately arrested; presumably it was a Poland fan as he wore a red/white hat.

After the game between Switzerland and Togo the Swiss celebrated their victory around the ‘Bläser’ fountain on the Alter Markt square, some Germans joining them. The people sang and danced. Two officers of the riot police were seen, a group van was parked in the background. At 00:48 hrs a Swiss fan lit a Bengal light. No police intervention was recorded, also no visible police was observed. The incident did not develop any further.

The third example describes a situation after the semi-final of Germany versus Italy, also at the Alter Markt square in Dortmund. Germany had just been thrown out of the tournament by a 0:2 defeat. The city was crowded with people who had been watching the game in the stadium or in the different public viewing zones. Like at many other occasions before, the Alter Markt square was a central point for fans, particularly the ‘Bläser’ fountain was often chosen for celebrations and gatherings. After the semi final a lot of Germany fans assembled there but also Italians and fans from other countries. Around 23:50 hrs a Bengal light was lit. Riot police officers approached the scene. They wore caps, no helmets. The fans engaged in a ‘humpa’18. We then observed a German fan approaching the officers and talking to them. Being asked what he had done there, he replied that everything was peaceful and they [the police] should remove again. The officer had answered that it was not them to decide. In the meantime the fans sang (in German) ‘We will never eat pizza again’. A German fan commented: ‘We do only celebrate. We are out, still we celebrate. Look, the police here want to prohibit all this? … We are celebrating peacefully. Here are no hooligans whatsoever. Look, look at all this, it is all peaceful.’ While the crowd sang ‘who doesn’t jump is no

17 A female police officer, gathering intelligence.
18 A famous game or ceremony among Germany fans, where they are basically making fun of themselves, usually indicating peaceful behaviour and intentions.
German’, police officers approached the scene. A German fan remarked that that was not necessary. ‘This is bloody dangerous, that is what this is about’, a police woman replied. The crowd again prepared for a ‘humpa’. Fans from different nations were present, also Italians who sometimes chanted. At 23:56 at least 20 people were on the fountain. French, Italians, Germans. People sang ‘stand up when you are German’ as well as ‘Italia, Italia’, whereas the Italy fans were a bit set off from the remaining crowd. When German fans sang that ‘Stuttgart is much nicer than Berlin’ a further bengal light was lit. The person was clearly visible. The crowd booed. The police did not intervene but discussions were obvious, one officer was on the phone. About 15 minutes later the seventh or eighth humpa was celebrated and also Italian fans joined in. Inside this crowd some chanting that can be valued as negative was audible (‘Zick zack Zigeunerpack, Hurra, hurra, die Deutschen, die sind da.’) while there were also more funny chants like ‘you are only a pizza deliverer’. The officers of the riot police were still watching and observing but did not directly intervene. The fans later also sang songs for or against the local club. The officers appeared more and more relaxed. They talked with the fans, some smoked, some were on the phone. Around 00:28 hrs we noted that fans sang to the officers: ‘Green-while party van’ and ‘you can go home’. Time and again officers approached the scene and then withdrew again. On the fountain different flags were put up. Sometime it was a Swiss, sometime a German flag. Bit by bit the officers were removed, eventually about seven remained at the fountain. During the whole observation we recorded no violent incident.

Provocations in Gelsenkirchen

After the quarter final between England and Portugal in Gelsenkirchen, that was won by Portugal, many fans returned to the city centre from the stadium and the public viewing zones. The vast majority were English, a few Portuguese, some Germans and other locals. Around 21:45 hrs a fight took place between two persons at the ‘Café Arminstraße’. The Arminstraße is a side street of the main shopping street in Gelsenkirchen. Here, and also in the ‘Café Extrablatt’, roughly opposite, numerous England fans had gathered; they drunk, talked and sang. Two persons had been involved in the fight: An English man and a person of darker colour, but unknown nationality. The English man was seriously injured and collapsed in front of the bar. A riot officer provided first aid until the arrival of the paramedics. The incident obviously attracted some attention and when the ambulance was overdue particularly the England fans uttered disapproval and showed impatience. Amidst this tense situation a

19 Stuttgart hosted the bronze game, whereas the final took place in Berlin.
group of about five probably local Lebanese men verbally provoked the England fans. It was not clear if there was a connection between these people and the fight, however, the darker skin could have led people to draw such a conclusion.

‘We had a casualty lying there, the ambulance still had not arrived, the English now were very cross, as one of their fans was injured and this escalated and for the English it was not recognisable if the guy who fought the English was part of that Lebanese group.’
Police silver-commander, follow-up interview.

A police officer ordered the provoking Lebanese to leave the site. He clearly told them that there wouldn’t be any discussions and that they would be arrested in case they did not comply with these orders. At the same time a female officer directly addressed an older Lebanese and said: ‘Take your colleagues with you’. This person reacted accordingly and drew the others with him. However, one member of that group loudly discussed with the police and refused to comply with the orders. ‘You want to arrest me?’ he said. He was again firmly told that he had to follow the orders but still refused and said: ‘Fuck off’ to the officers, at which time more other Lebanese joined him. On the other side of the Arminstraße, around Café Extraball now England fans openly assembled, apparently ready to confront the Lebanese. The officers now shouted at the Lebanese: ‘You leave now!’ The Lebanese complied and withdrew toward the other end of the Arminstraße. However, this was where the ambulance that had arrived in the meantime was parked. The England fans then chanted ‘Engeland’ and a group of about ten moved towards the Lebanese. The police formed a cordon between the groups, the England fans approached that cordon, singing ‘Engeland’ and ‘England ‘til I die’. One officer stood in front of the cordon and slowly approached the England fans. He talked calm and politely to the England fans and asked them to go back again. He was slowly followed by the cordon. The England fans withdrew and the situation calmed.

‘My impression was that we were very close to a real escalation, that the England fans wouldn’t take it any longer. Therefore my thinking was: First get the Lebanese away. When we are only dealing with the English we will also be able to calm the situation.’
Police silver-commander, follow-up interview

Discussion

Cologne
The initial police intervention against a fan climbing a monument was met with approval from England fans and followed without any problem. Fans even explained that they had expected rather heavy use of force. However this relation was not maintained as police later withdrew and/ or ignored further climbing. The situation even developed negatively due to different
judgements that the fans and the police held in a very tense and serious situation. Filming the scene that may be important for police documentation was in the fans’ view no appropriate action in a situation where they felt that a person simply needed help. This disapproval then triggered confrontational behaviour against the police and led to an escalation of violence on both sides. The happenings are a typical example for conflict escalation during which a group that had initially complied with police instructions, in the course of negative interaction came to challenge them.

Dortmund
Considering its huge danger the unauthorised use of pyrotechnics such as Bengal lights is illegal in Germany. However, these devices are very popular amongst fans, seen as a means of expressing fandom and are frequently – illegally – brought into stadia and public places. Drawing upon this law, the use generally has to be prosecuted. During our observations, we observed a rather differentiated police approach in dealing with Bengal lights, apparently considering the respective situational contexts. Lighting pyrotechnics led to an immediate arrest during a risk game but was ignored when there seemed to be little risk. After the German defeat, however, this situation was not obvious. The observations reveal though how policing that situation was very much considering the actual situation and the context in which the lights were lit, rather than merely acting upon legal issues, that may then have triggered negative group dynamics and confrontations. It was also obvious how closely the officers observed the goings on and were aware of the potential of danger that the use of pyrotechnical devices bear. Like our observations indicate, it was noticed that even fans from the rivalling teams behaved peacefully and there were no confrontational intentions coming from the persons themselves. The police have probably acted the best way possible in this ambivalent situation; but this raises the question of how legal issues have an impact on policing and how and to which extent legal issues or aspects considering group dynamics are guiding police conduct. This does particularly concerns states in which a principle of legality is applied.

Gelsenkirchen
As the commander in charge indicated, the situation in Gelsenkirchen bore all aspects that might have led to a huge confrontation. There is indication that it did not because of a differentiated and balanced policing that took group relations and the actual risk into account. Firstly it seemed to be important for the group relations that though the ambulance was late, an officer provided some first aid to the injured England fan. The tensions that subsequently
built up were clearly recognised by the police and reacted to accordingly: Officers acted very strict and firm toward the provoking group, while also using conversational techniques of de-anonymisation when persons were individually addressed. The England fans, on the other side were treated very calmly and quietly thus demonstrating empathy and understanding. This differentiation also displayed a clear message from the police of what behaviour was acceptable and what was not and that they were serious in their acting. This was also obvious when the officer who asked the English to retreat had a whole squad behind him, showing that police was ready to act, if necessary.

**Conclusions**

The lessons learned from Portugal imply that incidents cannot completely be prevented but the way in which they are responded to, is essential. Stott et al. (2007) pointed out that ‘low profile’ tactics prevented outbreaks of violence while inflexible and undifferentiated responses contributed to the escalation of conflict, as it manifested in riots at the Algarve in 2004. The current study set out to explore if these mechanisms also apply to a German context and in doing so, to explain if and how Germany2006 was indeed a successful event. It was expected that low numbers of incidents and positive intergroup relations were established if the principles of the ESIM were incorporated in the police force and low profile tactics employed on the grounds.

At first, the results presented here seem to give no clear answer. The number of incidents was moderate (related to previous measures), though suggesting that the tournament was not as peaceful as the positive media coverage may have implied. The rather high arrest numbers support this view, although it should be borne in mind that arrest numbers are indicative more of police activity than a true reflection of the level of disorder. This is especially true of preventive arrest, and the high number form a direct contrast with the ‘time to make friends’ image of the tournament. On the other hand, group relations were mostly positive, indicated by positive interaction between fan groups and the high number of police communication with (mainly German) fans.

Findings concerning the policing were also mixed. We observed examples of crowd policing at NRW 2006 where the low profile approach was fully applied. In these cases we found legitimate group relations, facilitation of fans on the one hand and marginalisation of confrontational behaviour and conflict de-escalation on the other; this was mainly evident at the incidents in Dortmund and Gelsenkirchen, thus implying that the ‘low profile policing’ approach and the proposed positive outcomes also ‘work’ in a German context. However,
friendly and firm low profile tactics were not consistently applied during the WC 2006, and did not seem to have been integrated into an overall approach, i.e. we observed several features that are part of the approach but were only applied halfway, thereby giving out ‘mixed messages’ to the fans and citizens. The policing of the risk match between Germany and Poland was done more with a focus on ‘hooligans’, involving a large number of preventative arrests, rather than on low profile approach (Schreiber & Adang, 2010). Recommendations derived from the ESIM, for example, emphasise the role of communication in order to establish positive group relations. NRW police also valued police-citizen-communication and deployed officers in normal uniforms in all host cities who actively approached fans. Yet, their work was limited to single spots and their deployment appeared more like something ‘nice to have’ rather than being integrated into a communicative approach in which the officers would also have a role with regard to dialogue and information gathering. As we observed that the fans reacted very positive toward these officers and contacted officers in normal uniform more frequently, we conclude that the role of this police unit was rather underestimated and could have been used more seriously.

Communication tasks were also carried out by the riot police officers. These officers reacted positively, when they were addressed or asked by fans, though they did not actively approach fans themselves. Given the importance of communication in crowd situations, NRW police gave away the opportunity to play a more active role in defining their relationship with the fans and visitors. Furthermore, the model suggests that active communication should include the setting of behavioural limits. We observed situations where police was defining these limits. However, it was not always carried out firmly. In one situation for example, dangerous fan behaviour was first stopped, but later disregarded by the police. At another occasion behavioural limits were set and acted upon and it appeared that this police action prevented a major conflict escalation.

Balance between policing and risk is another pillar of the low profile approach. It was striking in NRW that from the very beginning nearly all policing was carried out by riot police, irrespective of the nature of the situation: violent or peaceful. While Portuguese police used different units on different stages of escalation, the NRW officers fulfilled several tasks at once, so that it was not always clear, what their actual assignment was. Deploying one unit that will adjust to changes of risk in their equipment and behaviour may have practical advantages. It must be considered though, that deployment is also communication and the use of riot police signals the presence of danger or risk. During the WC, the picture of riot police had become such a normal feature, that it was not always perceived serious anymore, so that
during a police intervention in Cologne, for example, a fan mistook the use of pepper spray for police making fun with cans of ‘silly string’ (Stott & Pearson, 2008:316). These findings suggest further research on how balance can be achieved and how a ‘friendly but firm’ approach can be applied. The examples about Bengal lights further point to the difficulties of establishing balance, as policing not only needs to consider the actual risk and the surrounding context but also the legal circumstances of one country.

We conclude that the German security concept did not incorporate nor implement a full friendly and firm low profile philosophy, though it bore a lot of its features. We would suggest that the friendly and firm ‘low profile’ concept should not be seen as just another tactic but that it involves a whole philosophy and strategy that needs to be understood and applied within the whole operation and by all officers involved. These results also bear implications for police training and education; not least of which is the need for a close liaison of police practise and scientific research in order to provide police forces with up to date expertise and to avoid practices that are based on outdated knowledge.

Taken together, the study suggests that legitimate group relations and positive fan behaviour were at place in Germany 2006 when policing was carried out targeted, differentiated and in relation to the situational context and the actual risk and when tolerance limits were communicated and acted upon, but we observed problems when these conditions were not met. In several ways Germany 2006 was indeed a fairytale, yet considering it merely peaceful is a myth.

Acknowledgements
We thank all the fans and visitors from all over the world that contributed to this work, to the members of the fans’ embassies in Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen and Cologne, particularly Jelka Röper, Rolf Marewski, Thilo Danielsmeier, Wayne Colbert, Martin Curi, António Holzmeister, Kevin Miles, Michael Gabriel. Data collection was made possible through cooperation with Prof. Thomas Feltes, Chair of Criminology at Ruhr-University Bochum, in particular by the Students from the Master Course Criminology and Police Science: Andrea Wiesener, Andreas Weidenbörner, Birgit Winkelsett, Dettev Schürmann, Dominique Best, Frank Mitschker, Jens Broderius, Jürgen Kleene, Kathrin Böhling, Kathrin Krämer, Kavita Solunke, Dr. Ludwig Hermeler, Manfred Schroeder, Michael Stiels-Glenn, Michaela Franke, Mirjam Wille, Norbert Hebborn, Oliver Bossert, Petra Schmittner, Reinhard Mokros, Sandra Giesemann, Sara Schmitz, Stephan Prinz. Teachers and students of the Netherlands Police Academy: Eric Bervoets, Lonneke de Bis, Marc Douma, Tanja van Dintheren, Theo Bakker, Femina Hoekstra, Frank Scheffer, Jeroen Wolff and Robin. Furthermore by Chief-Superintendents Kenneth Scott from (then) Strathclyde Police in Glasgow and Chief-Superintendent Wim van Oorschot from the Netherlands Police Academy. Access to police officers and internal information was made possible by NRW police; in particular we give thanks to the local police force: Cologne Police, Dortmund Police and Gelsenkirchen Police, especially to LDP Uwe Thieme, LPD Martin Mester, PD Frank Kaiser and LPD Michael Kuchenbecker. We are grateful for Prof. Klaus Boehnke’s comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References


For Paper 3
In this paper research activities focused on German and Polish fan groups. In that way the intention to focus on other than British fans was fully achieved. It did even seem that the Poland fans had been designated the England fans’ successors in terms of hooliganism; at least that was how German media had portrayed the Poland fans. As we have outlined in the paper, the Poles were stigmatised from the beginning. Some days before this game we had already made our own experiences with Poland fans during research activities at the match of Poland against Ecuador in Gelsenkirchen. From this no negative behaviour was observable between the two groups and even after their defeat Poland fans were in fact very fair and friendly towards the Ecuadorians. In contrast to this, the game between Poland and Germany was officially assessed as ‘high risk’, but then our research was not the basis of the assessment and it may also have been possible that hooligans would save themselves for the Dortmund game.

The research activities in Dortmund were carried out within the same framework as it had been described in the previous paper. Two senior researchers were involved in the research (one of which being the author) and five student observers. The team was further supported by observation activities from two senior police chiefs from the Netherlands and Scotland. Considering the complexity of this event, the use of nine persons was justified if not necessary to cover the most important incidents. During this event it had also been necessary to put an increased focus on observer safety. The group had in general been instructed to put safety first and step away from any danger but when the incident on ‘Alter Markt’ was most vibrant it was in fact necessary to interrupt data collection and to make sure that everybody was safe. – This concerned a confrontation between more than 100 German ‘fans’ and the local police outside the ‘Wenker’s’ pub on the Alter Markt square, which was observed by a part of the research team. At the peak of the incident there was substantial throwing of missiles and physical attacks against police officers which also involved uninvolved persons in the area. In this situation it was helpful for the research team that contacts had been made with the local police force and that the activities were known and approved. Thus it was possible to access a safe area and observe the further operation, during which the team always made sure that the work would not hinder or interfere with police interventions in any way.

The data collection provided structured observational data, qualitative descriptions from the observer group, semi-structured observations and interview data from fans. In the course of the analysis for this paper we also made use of the data from structural observations
at other games in NRW 2006 so that we could compare deployment numbers. As it was done in other research, the data was cross referenced with media reports, photos, press releases and police documents. However, given the density of this event and the controversy that emerged from the different sources, it was necessary to carry out additional interviews that would supplement the existing data body. This included talks to the owner of the pub where the incident occurred, a German fan and former hooligan who had been witnessing the incident, the silver commander on the ground, a police officer in the general NRW command centre and three officers of the local Dortmund police force. At one occasion it was also possible to watch internal police video footage and police officers also mentioned several video documents that would be available on YouTube. As it was pointed out earlier, the personal contact with police forces and openness about our activities helped a lot to carry out the actual work and also to get access and speak to officers who were involved in the incident. All in all the work on this study has been substantial but it seemed necessary in order to get the full picture of what happened in Dortmund that day. Later, when speaking with colleagues or within a circle of friends about the incidents around this game, it was remarkable how much the view of a riot from Poland fans or between Polish and German fans persisted. This even more highlights the need to provide for an account of events that considers different angles and relies on proper scientific methods.

The complexity of the situation is also reflected in the outcome and the conclusions of this study. The paper discusses how media, police tactics, infrastructural issues and bad management had an impact on the fans’ behaviour and perception. With regard to the actual riot in the evening the findings support the idea that violence initiated either from frictions, of which the chaotic situation bore a lot. On the other hand, it was obvious that there were people who can be related to Adang’s (in press/a) ‘spontaneous’ violence. It also showed that a big riot does not start out of the blue but that there are observable signs that indicate such developments. Observer data records at 16:30 hrs ‘a group which will later account for the closing of the Alter Marks. They sit outside of a pub, doing nothing but closely observe the whole scene.’ According to police accounts, however, spotters reported the presence of these people at least one hour later. Without wanting to be patronising there seems to be a huge difference in what police officers observe and how scientist see human behaviour. It appears that police often seeks to detect ‘known troublemakers’ while scientist who do not know the individual ‘hooligan’ are looking at behaviour, in particular such behaviour that is in any way different from the rest. A closer cooperation and a combination of these views could be fruitful.
The Poles are coming! Fan Behaviour and Police Tactics around the World Cup match Germany vs. Poland (Dortmund, 14 June 2006)

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Abstract

This article examines how Dortmund police dealt with the dilemma of providing for both a ‘time to make friends’ and security at the high-risk game between Germany and Poland during the World Cup 2006. It was expected that the application of a friendly but firm low profile approach would establish positive group relations and marginalise disorderly behaviour. Data collection was carried out in real time on policing strategy and tactics and fan psychology, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Specifically, the study compares two incidents that occurred in the city centre on match day, resulting in more than 400 arrests. Findings suggest that a successful event is not only related to the absence of disorder but a matter of facilitating legitimate behaviour, while a concentration on risk fans bears the danger of creating a self fulfilling prophecy. The role of preventive arrests and media reports are being discussed.

Though football games involving German, Polish or Italian fans are often categorised as high-risk games, football violence has for many years been named the ‘English disease’. The disease, however, appeared to be on the road to recovery and prior to the World Cup 2006 a German paper noted that England fans had been particularly conspicuous in not being conspicuous at the last tournaments (Hettfleisch, 2006). However, a successor seemed on his way: In the months approaching the World Cup 2006 in Germany Polish fans increasingly came under scrutiny, seemingly substituting the English for their reputation. Newspapers ranging from tabloid to quality papers, noticed that ‘the Poles are coming’ (Wehner, 2006) or that ‘Poland hools want to smash the WC’ (Biewald & Lebie, 2006). TV programs portrayed
German hooligans in preparation for the fight with the Poles, the German police union uttered warnings of Polish hooligans (Focus online, 2006) and videos of Polish hooligan fights were spread around German police forces and used in intervention trainings. In contrast to these fears FIFA promoted the tournament as ‘a time to make friends’ and the Organising Committee explicitly welcomed fans from all over the world and set up facilities to provide a platform for positive encounters. Given these stark contrasts, the question arises of how the police dealt with the dilemma of providing for both a ‘time to make friends’ and security?

**Fan behaviour and public order policing**

Different explanations were put forward for the change of England fan behaviour: English fan organizations put great efforts in changing the image of England fans for the better, for example by road shows before and specific social actions during the event. Others attributed a great deal of the positive development to increased security measures, especially the extensive use of travelling bans for ‘known troublemakers’ (IFC, 2004). Research on crowd dynamics suggested a connection between a specific style of public order policing and positive fan behaviour: In their evaluation of the European Championships 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands, Adang and Cuvelier (2001) presented an analysis of different policing styles and their impact on fan-behaviour within the same event. Two different approaches were applied during the tournament, approximately corresponding to those of ‘escalated force’ and ‘negotiated management’ identified by McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy (1998) for the policing of protest. ‘Low profile’ referred to the open deployment of small surveillance units in regular uniforms, easily approachable and actively contacting fans. In doing so, the officers should also set behavioural limits and intervene if these limits were exceeded. If necessary there would be support from decentralised intervention units which were kept away from the street scene for as long as possible. In the cities that used a ‘high profile’ approach, there were three times as many officers visible, deployed in larger groups, talking a lot with each other and not actively approaching fans. Relating the different styles of policing to the number of violent incidents, the highest number of incidents was measured at games that had been assessed as posing low risk but that were policed with a high-profile strategy. In other words: Where an imbalance between policing and the actual risk was present.

**Social-psychological explanations**

The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (ESIM) (Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998) has recently gained increasing support in explaining the psychological processes that govern the dynamics within a crowd event. The model suggests that crowd
participants behave according to the norms and values of a common social identity that, in turn, is specified by the respective context. Given the interactional nature of crowd events, the context in which any one group acts is constituted partially if not wholly by other groups (Drury & Reicher, 2000). It follows from this that, while collective action and crowd behaviour is driven by social identity, this identity can fundamentally change because of the way in which the intergroup relations are affected. Studies among different crowds, such as protesters, demonstrators and football crowds (Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005) revealed that identity change occurred as a result of an asymmetry of group relations, when out-group action – this generally being the police – was perceived by crowd members as illegitimate and indiscriminate. The perception of illegitimate out-group action led to a redefinition of group members’ relationships with the police. People felt empowered to sustain their position and to confront the police so that conflict and resistance were eventually seen as legitimate group behaviour and persons actively seeking conflict were regarded as ‘prototypical’ in-group members (Stott & Reicher, 1998; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001). More recent research shows how more differentiated policing facilitates legitimate fans and prevents conflict escalation. At the 2004 Championships, for example, the Portuguese Security Police, PSP, used a friendly but firm low profile approach. It was friendly as the security concept envisioned the officers as acting within a festive context, aiming to facilitate legitimate fans and visitors thus establishing positive group relations (PSP, 2003; Stott & Adang, 2004). The PSP aimed for positive group relations with the fans, but also communicated behavioural limits and the officers were firm (but not violent) in enforcing them. A broad tactical concept allowed the PSP to adjust measures to emerging risk and provide for differentiated and targeted interventions. Research on England fans attending the tournament found that this approach prevented further escalation in conflict situations and facilitated self policing among the fans and the marginalisation of hooligan elements (Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, 2007, 2008). A total of 53 arrests for football related disorder during the whole tournament (IFC, 2004) seemed to confirm the effectiveness of the friendly and firm low profile approach.

The present study
At the World Cup 2006 in Germany Poland was scheduled for playing Ecuador, Germany and Costa Rica. The match between Poland and Germany in Dortmund was seen by police as the one posing the highest risk and Dortmund police was challenged with a dilemma: to keep up with the welcoming World Cup motto ‘a time to make friends’ and at the same time to
provide for safety and security. Dortmund seemed to be the perfect place to deal with this dilemma: Dortmund police has a tradition of using no segregation of fan groups at international games but to deliberately bring groups together, to encourage meetings in a positive atmosphere and to target those who do not behave peacefully (Kuchenbecker, 2002). This was a strategy that was totally in line with the friendly but firm low-profile concept as it had been identified by Adang & Cuvelier (2001). Dortmund police see their prime intention in being communicative, thus telling the fans: ‘we see you as peaceful fans as long as you do not show the opposite. As long as you are peaceful the police will respond peacefully’ (Hau, 2008).

This situation provided an excellent opportunity to examine how the dilemma between a friendly and firm low profile approach on the one hand and the need to provide safety and security in a situation considered to constitute increased risk was handled. In this way it is examined whether or not the friendly and firm low profile cure for the ‘English disease’ can as well be recommended for the treatment of other high risk groups? Specifically, the study examines the relation between the policing strategy/tactics and the behaviour and perception of Poland and Germany fans in contexts of risk and non-risk. We further seek to examine in which way the negative image that was portrayed of the Poland fans was justified and whether this had an impact on the relation between the groups. The analysis concentrates on comparing two incidents that occurred that day, both on the Alter-Markt-square in Dortmund’s city centre. The first one occurred around midday and involved a group of approximately 30 Poland fans. The second incident took place in the evening, when a large group of German fans confronted the police.

Methods

Research strategy

The research strategy of this paper is that of an exploratory case study, focussing on a better understanding of the behaviour around a particular event. A case-study is an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2003, p.13), looking for detail of interaction with its context (Stake, 1995). Given that our methodological approach is informed by the ESIM, suggesting that crowd behaviour is shaped by contextual factors (outgroup action and police behaviour, respectively), we felt that adopting a case-study approach was matching our objective to explore the group dynamics around this particular event. More specifically, the underlying ESI model goes along the criteria for a case study design suggested by Yin (2003), i.e. to answer ‘how and why’-
questions, where the researcher cannot manipulate behaviour, wants to cover contextual conditions, and when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear. Using a variety of data sources it facilitates the observation of unpredictable and sometimes dangerous events in real time and to gather contemporaneous data on underlying processes in an opportunistic manner (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Stott et al., 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Data Collection

Data was collected within a wider research project carried out by the Police Academy of the Netherlands in co-operation with the Ruhr-Universität Bochum/Germany. The overall study covered 10 World Cup games, all carried out in the state of North Rhine Westphalia, NRW

Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, data was gathered on a) police strategy, tactics, operational structure and behaviour b) fan perspectives and behaviour c) police-fan interactions d) overall levels of ‘disorder’.

The quantitative data were obtained by structured observations, carried out by 23 participants of the master course ‘Criminology and Police Science’ at Ruhr-Universität Bochum. This methodology followed a method that was initially developed for observations around Euro 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001) and was similarly applied during research at Euro 2004 in Portugal (Stott & Adang, 2004; Stott et al., 2008).

The observers were trained by the authors during a course module preceding the tournament; this included information on the theoretical background, observation techniques and a final test observation around the German league match between Cologne and Leverkusen in February 2006 in Cologne. During the tournament an observation was carried out by a team of four observers under supervision of the authors. The observers were instructed to choose areas where large groups of fans gathered, at the central station, before and inside public viewing zones, and at squares in the city centre. Every fifteen minutes a sample was taken on the number of persons, interaction between fan groups and fans and the police, incidents and interventions. With regard to police deployment we differentiated officers in normal uniform and officers in riot uniform. Riot police was additionally distinguished according to the kind and use of equipment. ‘Full-riot’ was recorded when the officers wore full protective equipment, helmets and/or had drawn a baton or shield. If the baton was not used and the helmet was attached to the belt, observers noted the officers as

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20 An analysis of all ten games is provided by Schreiber & Adang (in press).
‘partial-riot’. Incidents were measured as small (with at most four individuals acting violently), medium (involving five to ten individuals) and large (involving more than ten persons). Police intervention referred to dispersal, stopping or arrests and it was noted if police had made use of force. Quantitative data for the current study were gathered by a team of four observers (supervised by both authors) in Dortmund city centre, fan zones and near the railway station on the day of the match between Germany and Poland on 14 June 2006 from 12:00 pm to 2:00 am the following day (kick off was at 21:00 hrs). During this time, a total of 104 samples were recorded using the methodology described above.

Qualitative data
The observers also carried out semi-structured observations. Taking notes contemporaneously, the observers’ recorded the course of events and their qualitative impressions of fan behaviour, fan group interactions, fan-police interaction and police deployment. The observations were supplemented by photos and video footage. Two experienced senior police officers, one from Scotland and one from the Netherlands independently collected data on police deployment, composition of fan groups, police-fan interaction and the work and cooperation of international police teams and delegations. The first author carried out follow up interviews with 5 police officers (3 commanders), an eyewitness and the owner of the public house at which the second incident described in this study occurred. Additionally, media data such as newspaper, internet articles and TV coverage was collected before and after this game.

Fan data
Data on fans’ perspectives were gathered by the first author through on-the-scene interviews with fans. The interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire that covered in-group definition, relation with out-groups, perception of policing and perception of context. The questionnaire was initially developed for research around the Euro 2004 in Portugal (Stott & Adang, 2004; Stott et al., 2007). The fan data were collected opportunistically in real-time in the places where fans gathered, in the city centre, in pubs, restaurants, parks and other public places and in the official public viewing area. In total 65 fans were interviewed (47 German, 14 Polish, one English, one Dutch, one Eritrean and one Swiss). Interviews with German fans were conducted in German; those with other fans were conducted in English.

We would like to note that observers were instructed explicitly to prioritise their own safety at all times: they were trained and instructed to avoid or withdraw from situations they felt to be potentially dangerous and not to intervene in any way. The observers were expected
to keep their distance from individual fights or people running after each other and to make sure that there was always an escape route available to them in case of further escalation. Due to an open co-operation with the local police services we had access to actual risk assessments and had admission to speak to officers and commanders on the ground and were able to access areas that had been condoned off. We are aware of the fact that our observations include only a part of what was going on in Dortmund during that day\textsuperscript{21} did not cover every single event. We believe though, that our observations are representative of events in the city centre during. Both media reports and information from police did not reveal major incidents that we did not witness. Conversation with police officers from both Poland and Germany revealed that a number of what they referred to as ‘hooligans’ had been arrested on their way to Dortmund. These arrests had been carried out away from the general public and were not covered by our observations.

Analytical strategy
The analysis is divided into two sections:
First a chronological account of police deployment, incidents and fan behaviour was constructed, based on triangulation of the structured observational data, field notes and qualitative descriptions, interviews, photos, video footage, media reports and police press releases. Where data diverged or only one source is given, this is stated explicitly. This account serves to identify the features of the event which will be the focus of further analysis (Stott et al., 2007; Drury & Reicher, 2000).

Secondly, fans accounts were analysed using the principles of thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Kellehear, 1993) and interpretative phenomenological analysis (Reid, Flowers & Larkin, 2005; Smith & Osborne, 2004), looking for a form of pattern recognition within the data. In particular, the analysis sought to explore the meanings that participants assign to their experiences and the developing content of fans’ social identity and the relationship of this content to perceptions of the surrounding social context. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and those that were conducted in German were translated into English by the first author. The time and location of each interview was noted and the transcripts were brought into chronological order. The transcripts were read and re-read, this initial process was informed by the theoretical approach and the questions from the interview schedule, such as the fans perception of the event and attitudes toward the groups that are involved, the views of ingroup behaviour and intergroup relations and any further points of

\textsuperscript{21} It was estimated that 90000 fans/visitors were present in Dortmund (Kuchenbecker, 2006)
interest and emerging issues that seemed to be relevant. The right-hand margin was used to annotate these themes. These notes were organised and sorted into categories and subcategories. From this a coding scheme was developed and again applied to the interviews. Codes were assigned to the transcripts. Segments were grouped under each code before they were related to issues from the interactional context, as it was described in the behavioural account. For each theme a verbatim extract from the interviews is presented that best illustrates the analytical point.

Case background

General set up in Dortmund

As indicated by the official World Cup motto ‘A time to make friends’ the organising committee welcomed visitors with and without tickets from all over the world and provided a platform for gatherings and possibilities to get together in a friendly way (Florin, 2006). The city’s infrastructure permitted a concentration of events in a very dense area. The stadium, with a capacity for 60000 visitors was situated about 2 km from the central station and the inner city. In order to facilitate traffic flow, fans were encouraged to walk to the stadium along the ‘Fan mile’. To this purpose, a red carpet was rolled out along the entire fan mile, particularly for this event. Two ‘public viewing zones’ (PVZ) offered fans the opportunity to watch the games on giant video screens; a cultural program provided for entertainment in-between the matches. One public viewing zone was set up for about 16000 visitors on the ‘Friedensplatz’ square in the heart of the city. A second one, the ‘Westfalenhallen’ concert and trade-fair halls, situated close to the stadium, provided space for another 20000 persons. Additionally, numerous private businesses offered screens and TV for fans to watch the games. Both the official zones and the private businesses were obliged to secure the premises by private stewards and to search visitors for bottles and dangerous items. The ‘Alter Markt’-square, close to the Friedensplatz PVZ, was also highly frequented as it contained numerous pubs with outside facilities. A fountain on the east-side attracted fans who used it as a refreshing facility and to put up flags. Pub owners at the Alter Markt had agreed on a joint security by one single company. The police of North Rhine Westphalia had set up a poster campaign portraying six male and female officers all in standard uniform that welcomed guests and fans. For the game between Germany and Poland, Dortmund police had made changes to the operations compared to preceding World Cup games, by deploying additional spotters and a special response unit (SEK) of heavily equipped officers, specifically trained to make arrests. Furthermore, police increased the number of controls on railways, motorways
and parking areas and in the surroundings of Dortmund. According to a police source, 2501 officers had been deployed (Hau, 2006). Our structured observations suggest a clear difference between the police deployment around this game and what we recorded at our other observation:

The overall visible police presence of 57 percent samples observed in Dortmund (N=104) was comparable to 60 percent at the other measures in NRW (N=916 samples), though police deployment in Dortmund was lower during the other three games that were played in Dortmund (N=254). With regard to the kind of police deployed, we recorded distinct differences between this game and others observed:

With 16 percent there was significantly less deployment of officers in normal uniform than in the whole of the NRW samples (30%, χ²=8.07, df=1, p<0.004), as well as in the other games played in the city (30%, χ²=7.05, df = 1, p = 0.008). This corresponds with the observation of significantly more officers in partial uniform. In 55 percent of the samples taken during this game we observed officers in partial riot uniform, compared to 45 percent in the NRW samples (χ²=3.96, df=1, p=0.05) and 29 percents in the other Dortmund games χ²=20.9, df = 1, p < 0.0001. Though there was a trend towards more officer in full riot uniform deployed at this games, difference here were not significant (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police deployment at the game between Germany and Poland, three other games in Dortmund and at the nine other games observed during the WC 2006 (NRW).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police presence (visible)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GER v POL</td>
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<td>3 other games in Dortmund</td>
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<td>9 other games in NRW</td>
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Note: Numbers display percentages of samples.

Midday: Arrest of Polish fans at Alter Markt

Though kick off was scheduled for 21:00 hrs, the city was already filling up around midday. Particularly the pubs and cafes at the Alter-Markt-square were highly frequented and both Polish and German fans gathered at the outside facilities. In front of the Cotton’s pub a group of about 30 Polish fans had put up a huge banner, they sat at the outside tables drinking and singing in Polish without incident. However, in cooperation with Polish spotters German
police risk-assessed the group as known ‘troublemakers’ and judged their behaviour as aggressive regarding (body) language (interview with police commander). It was decided to take them into preventive custody. At about 13:30 hrs the group was enclosed by approximately 50 officers in partial-riot uniform and the group was taken into preventive custody. There was no visible or audible reaction to this police intervention from other fans in the street cafés or from bystanders, neither from the Polish nor from the German side.

_The afternoon_
In the course of the day more and more fans arrived in the city. In addition to the fans with tickets, many people had just come to enjoy the atmosphere and to watch the game at one of the public viewing zones. The central station was policed by both standard uniform officers from the federal police and NRW riot police. Following the ‘Fan Mile’ and the red carpet, fans walking from the railway station would then meet a police information van. Here officers in standard uniform took pictures of fans, the atmosphere there seemed very positive. Polish liaison officers in uniform openly patrolled the city centre together with one or two German colleagues. In the remaining areas of the city centre only riot police was deployed. 90 spotters worked around this game. They were supported by Polish colleagues who assisted in the spotting and preventive arrest of ‘known troublemakers’. Little interaction was observed between fans and police. Most took place at the central station and around the information van. Those interactions observed were mostly positive, short, and the result of questions asked by fans. The questions were answered politely and quickly by the officers. The relationship between both fan groups was friendly. Our data recorded numerous interactions between the two groups, all of which were positive in their nature, e.g. shaking hands, dancing and singing. Our data contain no negative or conflictuous interactions between the two fan groups during the afternoon.

_The evening_
_Congregation of ‘prominent fans’_
At 16:30 hrs we observed a group of Germans outside of the ‘Wenker’s’ pub on the Alter-Markt-square. Their behaviour superficially matched that of other fans as they talked and drank but it was remarkable how they also looked around and monitored the area, rather than participating in the overall exuberance and festive atmosphere. As the pub owner later stated

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22 Preventive custody is allowed in Germany and often used by police forces as a means of crowd control at public order events.
to us, there were approximately 40 persons inside the pub, while 20 to 30 were gathered at the outside facilities on the square. Some wore T-shirts with texts like ‘Problemfans Ostdeutschland’. Around 17.30 hrs (according to police information) German spotters reported known troublemakers at this location. Other police sources, however, stated that these people were recognised by the police at 19:15 hrs (Kuchenbecker, 2006) or 19:30 hrs, respectively (Polizei Dortmund, 2006) and police had immediately taken action against them. An eye-witness had seen police to be present and vans, including an intelligence vehicle, parked close by. Around 18.45 hrs, about two hours before kick-off, the pub owner noticed that all vehicles but the camera van were removed and police presence noticeably declined, possibly related to events at the adjacent public-viewing-zone ‘Friedensplatz’, which was closed at 18:45 hrs due to overcrowding. Thousands were still waiting outside, pushing and pressing. The atmosphere was tense and some people tried to force their way as security staff protected the entrances and received support from riot police. Some arrests were made. Later police informed the crowd by loudspeaker announcements about the closure and suggested fans to go to the other PVZ inside the Westfalenhallen. However, at 20:40 hrs, just 20 minutes before kick-off, this PVZ was also closed so that thousands of people were left looking for a place to see the game.

*Increase of ‘prominent fans’ (app. 19:00 hrs)*

According to the owner of the Wenker’s pub, the use of mobile phones (text messages and calls) among the ‘prominent’ fans on the Alter-Markt-square increased noticeably when the police presence declined around 18.45 hrs. More persons approached from the side streets and within a few minutes the number of these ‘prominents’ outside the restaurant had risen to approximately 200 persons. The security staff present at the pub informed the police command room about this development and also suggested to those officers who were still present, to increase the deployment.

*Police intervention*

Around 19:30 hrs, about 30 officers formed a cordon and separated the group outside the bar from the rest of the fans in the square; according to police information the decision was made on account of the presence of known hooligans. Following the police action, a large proportion of the enclosed persons verbally provoked the police. Between 19:30 and 19:45 hrs police presence on the Alter-Markt increased quickly with about 250 officers in full riot equipment and the square was partially closed off.

*Escalation I Poland fans*
The owner of the pub reported that no physical violence had occurred until a group of about ten teenaged Poland fans wanted to go into the pub. Their appearance was ‘normal’ and their behaviour was not aggressive. A bottle was thrown into their direction. The pub’s security staff shut the doors and the group of Poland fans was later secured in the pub kitchen. The violence outside escalated, German fans threw tables and chairs and other missiles; however, the aggression was then directed at the police. The police formed a second line around the group. The pub owner further noted that about 40 of what he saw as German hooligans were also inside the restaurant, some aggression was shown by them, but this lowered quickly when police presence outside increased. People then went back to their tables resuming watching the TV broadcast. On the outside an apparently heterogeneous group of fans and hooligans, gathered behind the police cordon and uttered disapproval for the police action; they called it unfair, that they had not done anything wrong and uttered chants such as: ‘Deutsche Fußballfans sind keine Verbrecher’ [German football fans are no criminals].

**Escalation II Deportation**

When the first prison bus arrived at 19.48 hrs and it became clear that the enclosed persons were going to be arrested, people tried – and some succeeded – to escape the containment. There was solidarity from by-standing fans, supporting them both verbally and physically, e.g. by throwing missiles such as bottles and phosphor-smoke bombs at the police. Some of their chanting had racist content such as: ‘Germany rules in Germany’, ‘Polenkanaken out’. Between the two cordons set up by police, more vehicles and riot officers arrived, including the special intervention unit (SEK). A helicopter monitored the area. The arrests and deportation took several hours, was still going on after the match had started and lasted throughout the first half of the game. According to information from police this delay was due to the fact that not enough prison buses were available for such a huge number of arrests  and additional vehicles had to be brought in from other cities. Other police sources explained that the streets had been blocked by police vehicles making access problematic. Also the procedure used contributed to the delay: one by one fans were escorted from the group to the bus where they were searched extensively before being put on the bus. During this time the Alter Markt was still closed off; young fans swore and shouted at the police. However, the officers reacted mostly calm and tried to keep contact with ‘normal’ fans. Some aggression

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23 According to a press release from Dortmund police this containment concerned a group of 148 people. See: Polizei Dortmund. ‘6. WM-Tag in Dortmund’
was noticed in side streets. We observed fights within groups and arrests of fans. Bystanders flew from the area. At 21.50 the Alter Markt-square was opened to the public again.

**General atmosphere in the city centre during the game (21-22:50 hrs)**

The atmosphere in the city centre during the game was tense. The incident had not only affected the area on the Alter-Markt, but violence had spread to the side streets and the presence of fully equipped riot police and special intervention units was high. There were fights between German fans and we also observed what seemed to be unconnected fights between German and Polish fans (mostly Germans attacking individual Polish fans). On several occasions arrests were made and police chased fans. This also affected thousands of neutral fans that wandered around aimlessly trying to find a place to watch the game (some even gathered in front of a police van that had a small monitor inside where the game was shown). At 22:48 hrs, Germany scored the only goal of the match during additional time and won.

**After the game 22:50 to 02:00 hrs**

After the game crowds of people streamed back from the stadium, the PVZs and the pubs into the city centre. Our data record that police presence remained high, with officers mostly deployed in full riot equipment. According to a police source, Dortmund police had taken some strategic measures during the game. The city centre was designated as a separate operational area and the number of officers had been increased by 400. Still small interventions and arrests were made, however we did not observe any fight or major incidents until 23:31 hrs. The majority of the German fans celebrated cheerfully; the relation with the Poland fans was rather relaxed, more characterised by sympathy for the loser. Though the pubs at the Alter-Markt-square had agreed to close their businesses after the game, the square filled up again. People jumped around, some entered the fountain on the east side of the square and some jumped into the water. Fans waved German flags, walked around in small groups, some stood on tables that had not been removed. At 23:20 hrs more and more people gathered at Alter-Markt. Some of them behaved differently from the other fans. They looked around and made phone calls, occasionally they chanted: ‘Hurra, hurra, die Deutschen, die sind da.’ ['…the Germans are here']. Police was not visible. After 10 minutes around fifty people ran in a north-westerly direction. Many other fans followed them into the main shopping street where they then spread in a westerly direction, for no apparent reason. We observed several incidents: the throwing of objects, some against police but most seemingly randomly, attempts to damage shop windows and attempts to attack Poland fans (who were
protected by police forming a cordon). A group of drummers stood at a corner, chanting ‘Germany in, fascists out’, ‘Germany, Germany’. ‘Here is no room for right-fascists’. A television company filmed a bin that had been overturned and some blood that was on the ground beside. People ran to and fro, a rationale was not apparent. As the situation calmed down, the shopping street and the side streets were characterised by a high police presence with officers in full riot gear. Fans of both groups walked along, chanting. Occasionally people, individuals or small groups of two or three, got arrested; however, no clear incidents were visible. In front of a shop the police cordoned off a group of 10 Poland fans, that was surrounded by a crowd of about 100 Germans, shouting ‘You can go home’ at them. The police action appeared to be carried out in order to protect the Poles. Around midnight it started raining heavily, this apparently facilitated the soothing of the situation, however, we still observed police cordons and a number of fans milling around until 2 am.

The official numbers later issued by Dortmund police speak of 340 preventive arrests and 92 arrests for crimes over the whole day. Of these 270 were Germans, 119 Poles with 43 of another nationality (Polizei Dortmund, 2006). Rumours about a huge group of Poland hooligans that was preventively arrested outside Dortmund before a pre-arranged fight could take place were not confirmed. In our structural observations we recorded incidents for 19% of the samples taken in Dortmund (N = 104), a number that is significantly higher than 2.8% total for our study during the World Cup (N = 916 at 9 observation days, \( \chi^2 = 60.25, p < 0.0001 \)) and the 0.4% in Portugal (Stott & Adang, 2004). During the whole day we did not observe any major aggression starting from Poland fans.

**Fan Data**

**Midday: Arrest of Polish fans at Alter Markt**

During this first incident we interviewed several Poland fans who witnessed the happenings, though they were not directly affected by the action. The interviews show distinct differences of perception of out-group behaviour, though the perception varied with regard to a different definition of their in-group content. Some clearly differentiated from what was in their view unacceptable in-group behaviour:

POL1: … I'm ashamed to be a Pole at this moment I think, because of these guys. What they do is a shit, I think.
MS: What did they do?
POL1: They do, they were just screaming some exclusive expressions about the police, dick into they arses or something like this.

Interview Poland fan, Alter Markt 13:40 hrs

For these fans, police action against that group was clearly adequate.

MS: How did you perceive the police here?
POL1: The police? I think their behaviour is acceptable.
MS: So what they are doing now, standing around them [the Polish fans] with like 50 people?
POL1: Yes, I think it is good. They should take them [the Polish fans] out of the place.
Interview Poland fan, Alter Markt 13:40 hrs

Other Poland fans described the behaviour of the enclosed group (drinking, singing and playing football) as typical and acceptable, whereas (possibly insulting) song content was not seen as being really directed at the out-group.

POL6: Just was singing and they were singing Polish rhymes… and so they [the police] did not understand that.
MS: Do you know what they were singing?
POL6: That the police are bad. But it was a Polish song; who cares?
Interview Poland fan, Alter Markt 14:48 hrs

In the eyes of these Poland fans, the subsequent police intervention against this behaviour was inappropriate, given their understanding of group norms. Relating to the police action, they even questioned group relations on a national level.

MS: What do you think about what is happening over there?
POL3: That all the German nation maybe don't like the Polish people, there has nothing happened here.
Interview Poland fan, Alter Markt 13:53 hrs

The perceived inappropriateness of police action is further related to the context that had been constructed and advertised before the tournament. The Poland fans interviewed here saw clear differences in what they experienced in Dortmund and the official explicit friendly welcome of fans from all over the world.

MS: How do you feel here in Germany, being a Polish fan?
POL3: Not making friends, I am not making friends.
MS: So you do not feel welcome, right?
POL3: Yes, we not feel welcome.
MS: Does this refer to the police or the people or to the German fans?
POL3: No, the people, the people I see the people are all right. The people … no problems, all right.
Interview Poland fan, Alter Markt 13:40 hrs

However, the situation is also related to the media coverage and the fans see a connection between the treatment of Poland fans on the Alter-Markt-square and the negative image that was constructed by the media beforehand.

POL4: All the newspapers for the last couple of months, yes? All the hooligans in the country especially England. But all these papers are saying about Polish hooligans. So they are feeding German people the stories about coming hooligans from Poland. We come here … Armageddon … [but] we are faithful we don't fight.
Interview Poland fan, Alter Markt 13:40 hrs
The afternoon: peaceful and festive atmosphere

During the afternoon fans from both sides saw the group relations between fans from Germany and Poland as positive with prototypical group behaviour defined in terms of peaceful and friendly behaviour.

GER34: (laughs) We are absolutely peaceful.
MS: And the Poles?
GER34: Perfect so far, no problem.
Interview Germany fan, city centre 15:17 hrs

Some actively strived for good relations by attempting to overcome language barriers or saw positive group relations as incorporated in an inclusive supra-ordinate identity of being a football fan that is exceeding the boundaries of the single categories.

MS: And how do you go on with the other fans?
GER40: With the Poles? Yes, very well actually. I do not speak the language but I have somebody with me … two Polish, yes Polish Germans, I would say. They translate a bit then.
Interview Germany fan, city centre 16:40 hrs

MS: And how do you go on with fans from other countries?
POL11: … This is World Cup. This is World Cup. This is our time. We are football fans. That is our time to enjoy. It happens once in four years.
MS: Does being a football fan mean to enjoy yourself?
POL11: In a kind of way, yes it is. To enjoy.
Interview Poland fan, city centre 16:34 hrs

Describing their relationship with Poland fans, German supporters uttered clear differences between the negative image that had been displayed in the media and the positive behaviour that they eventually experienced in Dortmund. Some Germany fans even uttered ‘concern’ about the positive relations that contrasted their expectations of group relations and they did not seem to ‘trust’ the peaceful scenario.

GER38: So far it has been shocking positive here at the World Cup.
MS: Shocking?
GER38: Yes, shocking. Somehow you can’t, you do not dare, well, one does not understand this, right? Since before there had been so many warnings issued and so far everything worked out so fantastic; so that one, one day naturally it will really go off.
Interview Germany fan, city centre 15:39 hrs

Fans’ perception of policing in Dortmund

In general fans from both nations regarded the behaviour of police during the day – where no major incident was observed – as appropriate and contributing to the positive atmosphere.

MS: What do you think about the policing here?
POL12: They are visible, you know. I am sure they keep everything under their eye, right. But they are invisible [i.e. unobtrusive, the authors]. Because she makes very good atmosphere here. I like it. Very nice. Very, very nice.
Interview Poland fan, city centre 16:45 hrs

GER40: I came here and I thought that there will be some high profile policing, somehow. But this actually … well they are present but they keep in the background. I guess, if somehow things will happen, they will be there. But they do not stand upfront, that’s nice but, isn’t it?
Interview Germany fan, city centre 16:40 hrs

Particularly German fans noticed a different quality of policing and obvious endeavours for a close and positive relationship with the fans, as opposed to policing that they knew from normal games, for example around Bundesliga matches. It was described, for instance, how a little boy was allowed to sit on an officer’s motorbike, also the pro-active engagement of officers at the information van was seen very positively. One fan described very detailed the difficulties that the police faces in order to account for a balanced and differentiated policing.

GER38: It is really difficult: Not to be obtrusive and not to communicate to the people that you are only there because you expect some to cause trouble but to keep an eye on it at the same time. That is something really difficult, like tightrope walking. If, for example later there would be 10000 officers and the Poles, or the Germans, dependent on who’s winning or losing, when they try to remove one party quickly from the stadium, then I suppose that some people will get annoyed by that and then something can happen more easily. That’s why it is always so difficult.

Interview Germany fan, city centre 15:39 hrs

Taking pre-tournament information about the dangerousness of Poland fans into account, high police presence was seen as legitimate, if not as welcomed among German fans.

GER37: Of course, there is more presence. Sure … Yes, they must be like that, they have to, definitely. Well, they must show presence against the Poles, right. What we heard before, about the hooligans that are expected to come here.

Interview Germany fan, city centre 15:39 hrs

The evening: after mass arrest of German fans and incidents around Alter Markt
Fans interviewed in the city centre in the evening spoke about witnessing a rather negative atmosphere.

GER61: … today the atmosphere is aggressive, somehow, though we did not expect that.

Interview Germany fan, Alter Markt 22:19 hrs

This was in one aspect related to the direct perception of the violence between German fans and the police. Fans in general saw an appropriateness of high police presence in a high-risk situation. Yet, there was incomprehension and disapproval of certain tactics and deployments which were not seen as related to the actual risk that had been posed.

GER65: Yes, I just witnessed a kind of fight and I wanted to separate them … because I thought, what is happening? They wanted to fight. And I thought, I cannot allow that! But then it turned out that that was police who went onto the Pole.

Interview German-Italian visitor, city centre 22:27 hrs

GER73: Well, that is a threat, it creates additional threat. I was over there at the shopping centre, there were a couple of arrests, right, the people ran, only because of the police presence. Shied away all the people. Normal people. Sure, today police presence was necessary but not like that. Well you can deploy police, normally, but when they even arrive with balaclava and helmet and with these new batons and ammunition and things, well that was so threatening!

Interview Germany fan, Alter Markt, 23:08 hrs

POL16: The Polish fans, who did nothing, and the police took them with them.
POL15: He did nothing. We celebrated and suddenly Germans threw a bottle and suddenly they all wanted to beat us up.
Interview Poland fans, city centre 23:40 hrs

Following the official invitation to watch the game on public screens, thousands had come to Dortmund, particularly to pick up on the atmosphere and to be part of the goings-on.

GER62: Actually we are no fans, actually we are not interested in football. But we noticed that there is a real cool atmosphere at the World Cup, and we wanted to take part in that.

Interview German visitor, city centre 22:19 hrs

However, these people later uttered feelings of disappointment and frustration because both public viewing facilities had been closed, leaving thousands stuck in the city centre unable to watch the match.

GER65: I expected this to be a bit different. It is so crowded here and I thought I could go to the Friendensplatz-square and watch it from there. But there is no possibility where I can watch it …where I can to some degree see something.

MS: Can you understand that the people are a bit frustrated now?
GER65: Yes of course, because they actually do not see anything. They go from one place to another in order to find something where they can see. But they do not find anything where they can watch.

Interview German-Italian visitor, city centre 22:27 hrs

Discussion

Our study set to explore if and how Dortmund police solved the dilemma of providing for both safety and ‘a time to make friends’. The findings suggest that the friendly and firm low profile concept was to some extent applied at this game. At the fan mile and in the public places of the city centre policing was carried out within the general setting to welcome fans, and supporting the security services at the PVZs.

However, police deployment differed from the image projected in the police PR-campaign in the lead up to the tournament. For the most part, units were deployed in partial riot uniform, rather than in normal uniform, and more of these officers were deployed for this game than around other games, either in Dortmund or in other host cities in NRW. Yet, their appearance did not come out as excessive or intimidating. In peaceful situations officers acted friendly although on the whole they did not actively contact fans. Even during incidents we observed how officers attempted to maintain positive relations with uninvolved persons. Some interventions were carried out quickly and decisively, others took very long; however, even high profile interventions by the special unit (SEK) were not of a violent nature. It did not appear to us that behavioural limits were communicated in any other way than by arresting individuals; having said that, it was not clear what the behavioural basis was for most of the preventive arrests we observed. For the most part arrests seemed to be based on appearance and a person’s history. The vast majority of arrests, 340 of 432, were preventive.
The 92 arrests for criminal acts made on this single day in Dortmund were almost double the figure for the whole of the Euro 2004 tournament in Portugal (53 arrests for criminal offences, preventive arrests are not possible in Portugal).

The situation in the evening showed the other side of the success of the ‘a time to make friends’ approach, not only because of the fact that the making of preventive arrests led to confrontations and an hour-long stand-off: unexpectedly, so many people turned up at the public viewing zones that these had to be closed. Not only did infrastructural facilities prove to be insufficient, crowd management with regard to the fans excluded from the PVZs was nonexistent. There was no clear and timely information for fans and this contributed to a chaotic situation which not only frustrated fans and visitors, but also led to them becoming unwittingly affected by the fights around the Alter Markt, further complicating police operations. Visitors to Dortmund affected by these events certainly will not have felt they were ‘making friends’. Organisational aspects also affected the efficiency of police action, as the deportation of hooligans took several hours and thereby attracted further spectators.

Relating to the fans’ psychology, both Polish and German fans we interviewed generally saw police behaviour as appropriate and policing strategies were welcomed when they went along with the fans’ perception of risk. In a situation where the fans’ perception of risk did not match the police action (i.e. at the situation at midday), group relations were considered negative and Poland fans saw themselves as treated unfairly. It must be mentioned, however, that this negative perception was not associated with aggressive behaviour among the Poland fans. Accounts of both fan groups during the tense situation in the evening show that there is a very thin line in what is seen as proper police action and what is perceived as improper, ambivalent or even threatening. Similar to previous ESIM research, these findings emphasise the need for balanced policing and differentiated intervention. Furthermore, we found that context did not only appear to be composed of what was present in a specific situation but also of participants’ cognitive representations of information that had been provided beforehand. Even in peaceful situations where positive group relations were observable between Poland and Germany fans and confirmed by the fans’ accounts, there was still an expectation of risk among the German fans because it had been announced in the media. This view further appeared to facilitate the acceptance and justification among fans of a rather high police presence in a peaceful situation in the afternoon. I.e. policing was imbalanced with regard to the observable risk; but it was perceived to be balanced if related to the fans’ (negative) expectations. The effect of prior (media) information on the perception of context was also clear among groups of Poland fans, though now in a reverse direction:
Poland fans saw themselves as victims of a false media campaign, this view being confirmed for some by a police action that they regarded as entirely inappropriate. Given the meaning of ‘context’ as a central concept within the ESI-model, these findings suggest further research is needed on the way that ‘context’ is constructed and perceived. The negative pre-categorisation of Poland fans may also have affected police expectations and police decisions. Poland fans were taken into preventive custody at a very early stage, while the presence and obvious accumulation of known troublemakers from Germany was tolerated for several hours. There was an obvious gap between the negative pre-event picture of the Poland fans and the actual events on match day. Small fights between Poland and Germany fans were observed and more than 100 Poland fans were arrested. But rather than Polish ‘hordes’ it was some hundred Germans that confronted the police in a major riot at the Alter Markt square and it was German fans that attacked Polish fans rather than the other way around. Still, reports of battles between Poles and Germans in Dortmund made their way in some newspapers (IRNA, 2006; Telegraph, 2006). A media scan of reports at 17 international papers after the game did not reveal any report about the absence of major attacks from Polish fans and there was very little coverage of the violence from German fans that had really occurred. A deeper analysis of these aspects would exceed the boundaries of this paper; however, further research is suggested on the role of media in shaping expectations and possible actions of fans and police. Research of this type could help counteract negative pre-event coverage and help in sending the message that it is ‘a time to make friends’.

Was policing in Dortmund successful and was there actually ‘a time to make friends’? The relationship between Poland and Germany fans was generally good, people were indeed making friends and fans generally described the policing and their relations with the police as positive. There were no incidents at all inside the stadium and PVZs. For a long time, basically until the incident on Alter Markt in the evening, there were no major incidents in the city centre either. However, friend-making-time was over around 19.30 hrs. From that time onwards, the area around Alter Markt was not peaceful but characterised by confrontations between German fans and the police, both before and during the match. In addition, many frustrated fans were not able to see the game. After the match, tensions built up. There seemed to exist a feeling among part of German fans that ‘something had to happen’, but there was no real target, no group of Polish hooligans to confront. Several hundreds of fans

24 The account is based on an analysis of 17 newspaper articles and internet reports from Germany (11), Austria, the UK (2), the USA (2) and Iran.
joined in the ‘rush’ initiated by a group of troublemakers, although relatively few actively behaved violently. We have no way of establishing in how far the consumption of alcohol (or other substances) that fans had been involved in throughout the day contributed to the course of events. We did note however that at least the individuals that were most active during the start of the incidents were not excessively drunk. Some people described their panic and frustrations in internet blogs and forums like this, for example:

Last night after the Poland game. … Hooligan rioting in the city centre. Cries, pushing, glasses burst. And a wall of some hundred humans already runs on me too. I feel panic ascend, ‘Away, away, away!’ someone calls from the crowd, … I take refuge at the entrance of a shopping centre. … My hands tremble. I must smoke a cigarette. That is unhealthy, I know. But on this evening the WC for me could have been far unhealthier. (Menke, 2008)

However, the main papers hardly reported these incidents. A Swedish research team that was present in Dortmund only spoke about a ‘mainly peaceful and orderly major football event’ (Hau, 2008). The question may be raised what actually defines a successful event? In terms of the hooligan confrontations that had been predicted and anticipated it could be justified to speak in terms of ‘success’, as the Dortmund police put it, as such confrontations did not occur (Keil, 2006). Our observations indicate that this success came at a price though, not only in the high number of preventive arrests, but also in a relatively high number of incidents (reflected both in our samples and in the high number of arrests for criminal offences). In addition, the confrontation and stand-off lasting several hours in the heart of the city affected a large number of uninvolved visitors. Another cost of the ‘known troublemaker’ oriented approach with its focus on ‘hooligans’ could be diminished or insufficient attention for crowd management issues and the interests of ordinary visitors. The results from the Euro 2004 study suggested that low frequencies of incidents and arrests are associated with positive intergroup relations that are maintained in situations of conflict. Whereas intergroup relations in Dortmund were positive during the afternoon, in the conflict situation that arose in the evening many uninvolved Germany fans showed solidarity with the enclosed ‘known troublemakers’. Still, even in this situation, officers were trying to maintain positive relations with non-violent fans and did not resort to random use of force. In the end, the answers to the questions that we had set initially must be mixed: Results indicate that the negative pre-tournament image of Poland fans was not justified but did have an impact on fans’ expectations and their perception and understanding of the context. The broad - and biased - media attention also seemed to have influenced policing. Though in a way striving for positive intergroup relations, Dortmund police did not (maybe did not dare to?) fully hold on to their original concept. In contrast to being ‘peaceful’ as long as the fans are, intervention
and the use of coercive measures at this game was based on a person’s reputation rather than on his actual (mis)behaviour. Euro 2004 showed that the cure for the ‘English disease’ was linked to the room given to England fans to show positive behaviour, despite their reputation. An approach that focuses mainly on ‘known troublemakers’, however, prevents such a development and bears the danger of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy and thus a new patient.

Acknowledgements
We’d like to express our thanks to all the fans that visited the World Cup in Germany and especially to the fans from Poland and Germany that contributed substantially to this work. Data collection was made possible through cooperation with Prof. Thomas Feltes, Chair of Criminology at Ruhr-University Bochum, in particular by the Students from the Master Course Criminology and Police Science. Michael Stiels-Glenn, Stefan Prinz, Kathrin Krämer, Kathrin Böhling and Ludwig Hermeler, who have been with us on this day in Dortmund as well as Chief-Superintendents Kenneth Scott, then Strathclyde Police in Glasgow and Chief-Superintendent Wim van Oorschot from the Netherlands Police Academy. Further students were involved in the data gathering at the other venues during the WC: Andrea Wiesener, Andreas Weidenbörner, Birgit Winkelsett, Detlev Schürmann, Dominique Best, Frank Mitschker, Jens Broderius, Jürgen Kleene, Kavita Solunke, Ludwig Hermeler, Manfred Schroeder, Michaela Franke, Mirjam Wille, Norbert Heborn, Oliver Bossert, Petra Schmittner, Reinhard Mokros, Sandra Giesemann, Sara Schmitz. And teachers and students of the Netherlands Police Academy: Eric Bervoets, Lonneke de Bis, Marc Douma, Tanja van Dintheren, Theo Bakker, Femina Hoekstra, Frank Scheffer, Jeroen Wolff and Robin Stellarta. We are grateful for the open cooperation with NRW police; in particular we give thanks to the local police force in Dortmund, especially to LDP Uwe Thieme and LPD Michael Kuchenbecker. We would like to thank Prof. Klaus Boehnke and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References


Foreword Paper 4

This paper differs from its predecessors in several ways. It spans over five years, which may not be enough to call it a longitudinal study but as it covers three major tournaments in a row, it provides a substantial body of data to explain developments in German fan identity over time. Secondly, this paper is not about policing or fan-police relations. While policing at the three tournaments may have contributed to a context that facilitated legitimate relations, this paper only concentrates on the interaction and group relations between such (facilitated) fan groups. In that respect it covers an aspect of the ESIM that has up to now not been studied. Thirdly, it presents an analysis of social change that is not directed at conflict or motivated by challenging dominant forces but focuses on the positive relations between groups.

The idea to conduct this study developed during the data collection and the analysis of the fan data from Portugal. From previous ESIM studies an interview schedule had been developed that covered aspects of ingroup content (e.g. How would you describe the German fan group?) outgroup relations (What is the most important group for you here in Portugal? / How would you describe your relations with ...?), perceptions of policing (What do you think about the police here?) and attitudes to violent behaviour (What is your opinion of people who engage in violence? Would you, under which circumstance?). With regard to the history between fan groups and the actually scheduled game between Germany and the Netherlands, it was expected that the ‘most important’ group for German fans would be Holland or England because the rivalry with these groups had up to then been the strongest. In a way these expectations were met during the interviews but there were also answers that substantially differed from this where fans made comparisons that were not in the direction of rivalry. In the following quote from an interview with German fans in Porto on 14 June 2004, the interviewer’s (rather unprofessionally uttered) astonishment becomes quite obvious:

INT.: What do you reckon is the most important group for the Germans here in Portugal?
G56: Denmark.
INT.: Denmark? But why Denmark?
G56: Well for me it is Denmark, ... We celebrate with them every night, actually. Also today we will meet them again down there at the harbour. … yes, and then we celebrate. That is why I am wearing red-and-white today, specifically for that.

That was odd but interesting so in the course of the research the interview questions were adjusted and included more aspects of the German fan identity. In these interviews German fans related to groups that were funny, could party, that they went along with well – and they
regretted the fact that the German history hindered them to live out their identity in similar ways.

At the World Cup then the Germans had completely changed with regard to the expression of national identity, but were actually doing what they had wished for in 2004. Of course it would be interesting to know more about how they would see themselves. During the research activities in 2006 I then had the role of a senior researcher which involved also responsibilities that exceeded the mere data collection, for example supervising the observer group, making contacts with police forces, etc. This restricted the option to conduct extensive interviews but still there were possibilities to speak with fans. Further I took advantage of the fact that I lived in Dortmund city centre and the World Cup was literally at my doorstep, so it was easy for me to go out for some more interviews during ‘days off’.

After 2006 it was interesting if and how the new found identity would persist at a similar event but outside the own country and without being a host. Luckily it was possible to get some more data at the subsequent tournament in Austria and Switzerland. The research situation during the Euro 2008 was similar to the one in Germany. I was coordinator of a research group that came out of activities from a course of the European Police College, CEPOL. Teams were composed that consisted of scientists and police officers, actually looking for police-fan interaction and how the intended policing concept was put into practise. However, it was further possible to ask the German fans some questions about the understanding of their identity and about their explanations for the identity change. Back home in Dortmund some more interviews were done. Since the World Cup the public viewing had become so popular that thousands of fans came to the city centre and watched the games of Euro 2008 on the big video screens – a great opportunity for crowd researchers.

The value of this research is based on different aspects. The novelty of this study regarding the social-psychological model has been described. The paper further adds to the discussion in Germany about the new expression of national identity. There had been questions and concerns about possible dangers of this development, in particular with regard to a new tendency towards National Socialism or a support for neo Nazis. This research now provides accounts from the people themselves, not only about them and in doing so it helps to understand the psychological processes that were at place during these changes.
A time to make friends with Germany – Peaceful relations at football games

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Offside the pitch, the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany was characterised by peaceful encounters between fan groups and an - up to then - uncommonly cheerful expression of German national identity. Drawing upon the Elaborated Social Identity Model of Crowd Behaviour (ESIM), this study explores the dynamics of intergroup relations and the developing aspects of German (national) fan identity. It is based on interviews held with German football supporters attending the Euro 2004 in Portugal, the World Cup 2006 in Germany and the Euro 2008 in Austria/Switzerland. The findings reveal that symmetric group relations facilitated the development of positive emotions such as togetherness, unity and euphoria. In many cases these exceeded national boundaries, resulting in a meta category of ‘football fans’. Further it is suggested that the specific context of the WC facilitated German fans to express a form of national identity that is connected with positive out-group relations. Data collected during Euro 2008 indicate a long term effect.

Keywords: Social Identity, National Identity, Social Change, Football fans, World Cup 2006

When football events make it to other than the sports section, it is usually about conflict or even riots between fan groups and/or fans and the police. Reports on the World Cup 2006 in Germany substantially differed from this. Although the tournament had not been without conflict (Stott & Pearson, 2007; Schreiber and Adang, 2010; BBC, 2006), the themes of Germany 2006 mainly concentrated on two aspects: Peaceful group relations and a newly discovered national German identity.

In line with the official motto ‘a time to make friends’, fans and visitors (also those without tickets) were explicitly welcomed and this invitation was indeed well accepted. Around 21 million people visited the fan zones (DTZ, 2006) and turned Germany into a countrywide party zone. Sepp Blatter, the FIFA president, later spoke about the ‘best championships of all times’ (Bundesregierung, 2006, p. 13). In doing so he particularly referred to the global emotional meaning of this tournament and also wide media praised the
peaceful behaviour and the cheerful hosting and ‘even the English raved about the land on the continent’ (Mirbach, 2006; see also Hyde, 2006). The people formerly known as boring and to have little sense of humour presented itself as fun-loving outgoing host that had turned in ‘one of the happiest collective frames of mind since the end of the War’ (Bernstein, 2006). This cumulated in a ‘special mention’ from the Brussels International Supporters Award (BISA) to the German supporters. Part of this happiness was the expression of national identity, in particular the use of national symbols: People wore Germany shirts, carried or wrapped themselves in German flags, painted their faces and decorated houses and cars in national colours, and sang the national anthem just like any other football song (for a comprehensive press analysis c.f. Retzlaff, 2009). Expressing national identity in such a way was something new in post-war Germany. In a survey published shortly before the WC, Germany had scored last on the patriotism scale. The authors suggested a connection with the German past (Smith & Kim, 2006). Similarly, Hamilton (2004) pointed out that ‘in striving to exorcise their past the Germans have surrendered their ability to love themselves and their country’. Besides the international media attention it was probably the Germans themselves that were most astonished about this new development. The issue was heavily discussed in media and academic circles. Some saw the new behaviour as a relaxed patriotism and as sign of overcoming the past on the basis of a generational change (e.g. dradio, 2006a,b; Mayer, 2006), others however uttered fears of a change toward a new nationalism (Keil, 2006; Bayer, 2006).

Theoretical issues of social change and crowd behaviour

Social psychological explanations for crowd behaviour and identity change in crowds have been formulated by the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour, ESIM (Reicher 1996b, 1997, 2002; Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 1999; Stott & Reicher, 1998). Drawing upon the social identity approach the model suggests that crowd participants behave according to the norms and values of a common social identity that is specified by the respective context. Given the interactional nature of crowd events, the context in which any one group acts is constituted partially if not wholly by other groups (Drury & Reicher, 2000).

25 ‘The jury also wanted to pay respect, in particular, to the German supporters for their exemplary behaviour throughout the whole period of the recent World Cup. Observers were unanimous in their recognition of the festive atmosphere that prevailed in all of the stadiums from the start to the end of the competition. The German public respected to the letter the grand principles of the Brussels International Supporters Award (BISA)– peaceful encouragement to their favourite team, dignity in defeat, a warm welcome to foreign supporters and an atmosphere of festivity during the matches.’ (Brussels International Supporters Award, 2007).
So while collective action and crowd behaviour is driven by social identity, this identity can fundamentally change because of the way in which the intergroup relationships are affected.

The ESIM was initially concerned with identity changes toward collective conflict. Studies among different crowds, such as protesters, demonstrators and football fans (e.g. Reicher, 1996a; Stott & Reicher 1998; Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005) revealed that identity change occurred as a result of asymmetric group relations, when out-group action, which usually was the police, was perceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate. This led to a redefinition of the initially uninvolved crowd members’ relationship with the police. People felt empowered to sustain their position and to confront the police, so that conflict and resistance were eventually seen as legitimate group behaviour and persons actively seeking conflict were regarded as ‘prototypical’ in-group members (Stott & Drury, 2000). Drury and colleagues (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson & Rapley, 2005) have examined the processes that accompany crowd participants’ resistance against out-group action. Their findings reveal a connection between crowd participants’ realisation of their social identity against the power of dominant forces and feelings of empowerment and positive emotions.

More recent studies propose the ESIM’s utility in accounting for the absence of collective ‘violence’ and the development of peaceful norms at crowd events. An analysis on the policing at Euro 2004 (Stott, Adang, Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2007, 2008) concluded that a ‘low profile’ approach had been applied, that was characterised by a broad and flexible tactical concept, allowing for quick escalation and de-escalation, high visibility of the officers and an emphasis on communication. This form of public order policing, together with a welcoming context facilitated fans with peaceful intentions and in doing so prevented – during situations of conflict – a negative shift of social identity among the majority of fans. (For a more detailed description of this approach see Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang 2004).

What is more, it was shown that a supra ordinate ‘fan identity’ developed that was defined by peaceful encounters between fan groups and marginalised those who acted against these norms, this being anybody behaving violently, for example. So while previous accounts describe social change to emerge from conflictual interactions between groups, these outcomes rather draw on Reicher’s suggestion that change ‘needn’t always be in the direction of radicalization and empowerment. It could be that one’s view of an outgroup and of one’s social position is moderated when they facilitate actions when they were expected to impede them’ (Reicher, 2002, p. 202). Recently, Neville and Reicher (2009) presented a study on the relationships between connectedness, emotional intensity, and future participation in different
social contexts. Their findings revealed significant correlations between connectedness (in a sense that others are a source of support and warmth) and emotional intensity and suggest that emotional intensity may have a mediating role between the strength of social identity and the likelihood of future participation.

**The present study**
Given the importance of positive relations at crowd events, this paper seeks to examine processes that occur when symmetric group relations are facilitated. In contrast to previous research, it does not consider the interaction between fans and the police but merely focuses on the relations that emerge between fan groups. More specifically, it seeks to explore the dynamics of intergroup relations and the developing aspects of German fan identity at tournaments before, during and after the WC. In addition, the present study explores the dynamics that facilitated the social change that occurred among the German fan category around the WC 2006. It is based on fans’ accounts of fan identity, their in-group norms and the way they perceived their relation with other fan groups. In doing so, it sets to contribute to a growing body of research that has been carried out to develop the ESIM as an approach to explaining both conflictual and peaceful group dynamics at crowd events.

**Method**
This paper presents three data sets that were collected during the European Championships 2004 in Portugal, the World Cup 2006 in Germany and the European Championships 2008 in Austria and Switzerland. The data was obtained as part of different multinational research projects, addressing aspects of crowd psychology and public order policing. Within these projects a variety of methodologies were being used, such as systematic social observations (e.g. Adang & Cuvelier, 2001) and an ethnographic approach, including semi-structured observations, participant observations and interviews. However, the present paper makes only use of the data that was obtained from the ethnographic approach, in particular semi-structured observations and data that was gathered during interviews with fans. The idea for this research arose when - during data collection and analysis of the first data set collected in Portugal - unexpected themes concerning the specific identity of German fans emerged and a decision was made to put a further focus on this issue during data collection at subsequent venues.

The first data set was collected in Portugal 2004 as part of a comprehensive study that was made possible by funding from the ESRC and the UK Home Office (Stott & Adang, 2004; Stott et al., 2007, 2008); the data this paper reports on was collected between June 13
and June 25, 2004 in the cities of Porto and Lisbon. The main data was gathered around the games of Germany versus the Netherlands and Germany versus Latvia in Porto and Germany versus the Czech Republic in Lisbon.

Research during the World Cup 2006 was part of a cooperation between the Police Academy of the Netherlands and the Ruhr-University Bochum. Data collection was carried out between June 9 and July 6, 2006 around 10 games in the cities of Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen and Cologne (see also Schreiber & Adang, in press).

During Euro 2008 data was obtained between June 7 and 16, 2008 as part of an initiative coming out of a seminar of the European Police College, CEPOL and coordinated by the Police Academy of the Netherlands. The data this paper reports on was obtained around the games Germany versus Poland and Germany versus Croatia in Klagenfurt; Sweden versus Spain in Innsbruck and Austria versus Germany in Vienna. Further data was obtained through interviews of German fans attending a fan zone in Dortmund on June 19, 2008 where the game of Germany versus Portugal was broadcast on a giant screen. The present paper reports only on specific aspects of these projects, namely a qualitative account of fan behaviour and a phenomenological analysis of German fans’ accounts. The data was obtained through the following methodological techniques:

*Semi-structured observations*

Semi-structured observations were carried out by the senior researcher and supplemented by teams of observers, recruited to conduct observations as part of the wider projects. In Portugal the teams consisted of 12 local Portuguese students (Stott et al., 2008); in Germany observations were conducted by 23 participants of the master course ‘Criminology and Police Science’ at Ruhr-Universität Bochum and (on two occasions) a group of five lecturers and students from the Police Academy of the Netherlands (Schreiber & Adang, in press). Observations in Austria were carried out by 6 participants (police gold commanders and scientific staff of the Police Academy of the Netherlands) of the CEPOL course ‘Public order and crowd management’. The semi-structured observations record the course of events, the observers’ qualitative impressions of fan behaviour and group interactions and any further events or issues that the observers saw to be relevant. Data from all three tournaments were obtained contemporaneously during the tournament, while the observers participated in gatherings and events where great numbers of fans were involved.
**Fan data collection**

Interviews were carried out with German fans that attended the respective venues, opportunistically and contemporaneously at public places where fans gathered such as fan zones, in pubs, restaurants and campsites. The interviews were conducted in German following a German version of an interview schedule that had been used for the analysis of England fans’ psychology at Euro 2004, focusing on the fans’ ingroup content, outgroup relations (with other fan groups, the police and locals) and their attitude towards violent behaviour (Stott et al., 2007). With regard to arising issues concerning national identity, in the interviews in 2006 and 2008, questions were added concerning the specific behaviour of Germany fans during the World Cup. After informed consent was obtained, interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed. 173 interviews with German fans were carried out during Euro 2004, 82 during the World Cup 2006 and 64 during Euro 2008 (301 interviews in total). The difference in numbers refers to the fact that the 2004 study contained a focus on German fans which allowed for the collection of a substantial body of data of this fan group which were also focused on the fans’ relation with the Portuguese police (Stott & Person, 2007). The interviews were translated into English by a German speaking member of the observer team.

**Analytical strategy**

The analysis follows previous ESIM research in providing two sections of analysis (e.g. Reicher, 1996a; Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001; Stott et al., 2007). Firstly an account is provided for each of the three tournaments, covering the main issues that German fans were involved in. This section is based on different data sources, including data obtained by direct observations, newspaper articles, radio and TV reports. Triangulation of different sources is used to provide for a consensual account. This is based on the agreement of at least two or more different sources. In cases where data differed or only one source is given, this is stated explicitly. Secondly, fans accounts were analysed using the principles of thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Kellehear, 1993) and interpretative phenomenological analysis (Reid et al. 2005; Smith & Osborn 2004). This section seeks to explore the meanings that fans assign to their experiences and the developing content of their social identity and the relationship of this content to perceptions of the surrounding social context. A verbatim extract is presented for each theme identified in the analysis that best illustrates the analytical point.
Results

Behavioural account in Portugal 2004

The Portuguese security authorities had specifically aimed to provide for a ‘festive context’ (PSP, 2003, p. 3). This was put into practice by a specific style of public order policing and practical measures, such as meeting points for fans. Germany was drawn into a group with the Netherlands, Latvia and the Czech Republic. The first two games were both scheduled in the city of Porto. The city authorities had set up several fan zones in the city centre, two of which with a giant TV screen - so that fans without tickets were able to see the game -, and a stage where a cultural program was provided between games. It turned out that the German fans mainly gathered at the ‘Praça D. João I’, this may be due to the fact that the mobile German ‘Fan Embassy’ (Schneider & Gabriel, 2004) was also placed at this square. However, our observer group had problems to spot German fans, as they – unlike fans from other nations such as Holland, Denmark, Sweden or England, for example – did not appear in unique country colours but also wore shirts from their national football club or no specific fan outfit at all. Considering past tensions the game between Holland and Germany had been assessed as the one posing the highest risk by the Portuguese security authorities. However, despite one small incident around this game, no violence occurred and the whole tournament was instead characterised by peaceful and friendly encounters between fan groups, during which German fans where often observed mingling with others – and in particular with Dutch fans. Less often contacts were recorded between Germany and Latvia fans. In Lisbon, where Germany played the Czech Republic (and this being their last game of the tournament) German fans again gathered in the city centre, around the Praça Rossio, which had turned out as the major meeting point for fans and the adjacent Praça da Figueira, where the mobile Fan Embassy was located. Again, we only recorded positive encounters between fan groups, also before and after the game against the Czech Republic – after which Germany was out of the tournament. Some German fans were subjected to provocations from groups of England fans (that were also present in the city as England played Croatia one day before), by chants such as ‘There are ten German bombers’. However, this had been mostly ignored or laughed about. After being out of the tournament German fans were still observed in Portugal, watching games of other countries and mingling with fans.

Fans’ accounts in Portugal 2004

The German fans that attended the Euro 2004 perceived the Portuguese context as very positive. They referred to a peaceful atmosphere, provided by friendly and helpful locals that made them feel very welcome and enabled them to enjoy themselves, to live out their fandom and to meet and celebrate with other fan groups. As a sign for good hosting, they valued for example the fact that prices had not been raised and the Portuguese helpfulness, for example that people made huge efforts to guide them and help out when they had gone lost. However, they also highlighted the fact that the Portuguese could party and enjoy themselves. The policing was also seen as very positive. German fans described the officers’ behaviour as very friendly, open and helpful.

G21: It is so peaceful… all are united by football and enjoying a huge football party. This is what the hosts really achieve: to organise a football party for the fans. Not overdoing security or marketing, but really making a football party for all the fans that came down here. Respect Portugal, really!!
Interview Lisbon, 23 June 2004

German fans spoke about themselves as peaceful and friendly. Their aim was to meet with other football fans, to party and to have a good time.

G45: The atmosphere here, on the camping site, there are really Danes, Dutch, Germans, Greek … and there is really nothing about competition. All are one, football fans. That is fascinating.
Interview Porto, 14 June 2004

German fans described the relations with other groups in two ways: On the one hand group comparison was made in terms of historically based rivalry; in this respect they mainly referred to England and Holland as relevant outgroups. But the rivalry with these groups was more based on the sportive aspect, when they explained for example that ‘you cannot get beat by Holland’, or that only the Germans and the English were the real supporters.

INT.: … you think the English and the Dutch display the main concept of the enemy?
G139: Because this is such an old tradition. And it is stimulated by all the fans. Also concerning the standard of the players, the English and the Dutch, they always were equal to us. … and the English and the Dutch also bring the same amount of people [supporting fans] with them.
Interview, Lisbon, 21 June 2004

However, a further aspect of outgroup relations emerged among Germany fans, where the group comparison was not made a level of competition based on rivalry, but on partying and on having a good time. The most important group for German fans was therefore the one that made the best party.

INT.: What do you reckon is the most important group for the Germans here in Portugal?
G56: Denmark.
INT.: Denmark? But why Denmark?
G56: Well for me it is Denmark, ... We celebrate with them every night, actually. Also today we will meet them again down there at the harbour. … yes, and then we celebrate. That is why I am wearing red-and-white today, specifically for that.
Interview Porto, 14 June 2004

This pattern emerged at a very early stage and went on throughout the tournament:
Being asked about their outgroup relations German fans’ increasingly named countries like Denmark, Sweden or Holland as most important for them. Even the latter was only partly seen as rivals, as German fans for example said that it was better to draw the game against Holland so that they can be partying with them again. But the comparison also resulted in more negative identity. Comparing to the carnivalesque groups, German fans saw themselves as boring and not socialising and expressed jealousy for these other groups.

G122: ‘… the Swedes and the Danes are far more socialising than the Germans, they make a better party, a better performance … The Germans are quite cool but I am a bit jealous of the Dutch, because they make a better party ….’
Interview Porto, 19 June 2004

At Portugal 2004 a number of German fans presented themselves as fans from a particular club. With regard to other fan groups’ distinct appearance, some German fans regretted the fact that their own group did not present itself as one unit.

G139: Well the German fans do go on with each other, of course, but then it goes like: ‘Well you come from Stuttgart, and we come from Berlin, okay …’ And the English: ‘You are from England? Me too.’ In Germany everything is related to the clubs, in England it is only: ‘We love England.’
INT.: What would you like then?
G139: All Germany flags. If they need to use their club banners, it should at least have a German flag integrated.

In the context of Portugal, the expression of national identity was desired by some German fans, at the same time it was - with regard to the German past - seen as something unthinkable.

G139: What we are missing is a bit the national pride, so. It maybe goes back to historical reasons but that is how it is like in Germany. Well but we saw, in one city where the little children ran around ‘Portugal, Portugal’. Shouted ‘Portugal’ across the street. You would not see something like that in Germany, little children running around, shouting ‘Deutschland, Deutschland’. All the people would get upset.

Behavioural account in Germany 2006
Years before the opening of the World Cup 2006, the organising committee advertised for the tournament with the slogan ‘Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden’, a hardly translatable sentence, meaning something like ‘the world visits friends’, or ‘the world a guest with friends’ similar to, but not directly matching the English version of ‘A time to make friends’. The mottos were
put into practise as the organising committee welcomed visitors with and without tickets from all over the world and provided a platform for gatherings and possibilities to get together in a friendly way. A specific infrastructure of fan miles, squares with giant TV screens, fan embassies and a cultural program framed the overall event and was standard in all host cities. This was well accepted by fans. From the first day on the host cities were crowded with German and visiting fans. We observed many positive interactions between the fan groups. The atmosphere was cheerful and mostly friendly. We did also observe clashes between fans and the police and / or mass arrests in all three cities (c.f. Schreiber & Adang, in press; BBC, 2006; Stott & Pearson 2007) but they did not seem to have a negative impact on the overall positive atmosphere. The rush at the fan zones entailed also infrastructural problems so that it was necessary for the organisers to extend the fan areas in all three cities. The way in which the German fans presented themselves in 2006 formed a huge contrast to their appearance in Portugal. This time, observers had no problems to discover the German fans, as they appeared in unique national colours, using them very creatively, for examples by painted faces, flags were being used as skirts or stuck on cars and bikes and windows. However, when Germany did not play we also observed many Germans dressed in colours of the visiting countries.

**Fans accounts in Germany 2006**
German fans saw the main characteristics of the WC in little violence and peaceful celebrations and the expression of national identity. More specifically they referred to a friendly, sometimes euphoric atmosphere and a feeling of being united and fans sticking together as one. The emotional aspect seemed to be of high importance and some spoke of having been ‘carried away by the atmosphere’.

GE5: All celebrate together; all are in a great mood.
Interview Gelsenkirchen 9 June 2006

GER28: Very peaceful, what I experienced, and very amicable, very amicable. You were hugging perfect strangers on Friedensplatz. There are always exceptions, but we do not support them.
Interview German fan Dortmund 19 June 2008

Their good feelings refer on the one hand to experiences of unification on a national basis, to ‘share the positive emotions for Germany’ and an expression of this identity by symbols and behaviour such as waving flags. On the other hand identity was defined by positive and very close outgroup relations: to celebrate together with people from other countries. The fact that ‘everybody celebrated with everybody else’ and even hugging perfect strangers and cheering for other countries or wearing their colours when Germany was not
playing, was seen as prototypical fan behaviour during this tournament. And the outgroup relations were best with those groups they could party with

DO5: The ones we found best were the Swedes. They were our top group. And Trinidad-Tobago, they really could party.
DO9: The Mexicans were smashing, the Mexicans were super.
INT.: What makes a fan group ‘good’?
DO5: Always: when they can make a good atmosphere.
Interview Dortmund 6 July 2006

German fans saw both, the collective expression of national identity and the cheerful encounters with people from all over the world as something special. Before 2006 the expression of national identity in Germany, for example by attaching a flag to a car, was seen as unthinkable and as a taboo. Some German fans compared being German to being preferably unobtrusive and not to attract attention together with a fear of expressing national identity because it may be related to the German Nazi-past.

DO1: Well, looking at the Second World War, for example, that is still in the people’s heads. When you go abroad or so, you automatically think, being a German, they all immediately think that you are a Nazi.
Interview Dortmund 6 July 2006

Some saw the reasons for the new expression of national identity connected with the success of the national football team. Fans explained that because of the team’s successful performance they felt encouraged to show the national colours more explicitly. Some explained that this attitude had been there before, however, the specific WC context had facilitated them to develop and express a positive sense of national identity away from the Nazi past. Part of this context had also been the fact that national symbols were now broadly available.

The reasons for the new behaviours were also seen in reference to outgroups, i.e. to the visitors and foreigners that came to Germany. Some Germany fans explained how they identified with the official motto of ‘die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden’, that describes Germans as hospital friends. German fans saw that the WC context had enabled them to display another identity on both levels and to overcome prejudices. The positive behaviour of German fans was seen as a possibility to change the negative image that they felt prevailed in the rest of the world about Germany and the Germans.

GER33: I believe prejudices are being dismantled.
INT.: By whom?
GER33: By the Germans. Well that the Germans want to show that they can be different.
GER32: That things can be different -
GER33: - from what the general opinion suggests.
GER32: That we are all xenophobic and that the people should be afraid to come here. I believe that is what many want to show: that it is not like that.
GER29: Being a host.
GER32: Just being a host. Just thinking: it can be different. One is helpful, one shows the people around … you approach them: Can I help? You show them something; it is a very pleasant atmosphere.
Interview Dortmund 19 June 2006

Behavioural account in Austria/ Switzerland 2008
Similar to the Euro 2004, Germany played the first two games in the same city, Klagenfurt: Against Poland and few days later Croatia. Following previous tournaments, the hosts had prepared specific areas for fans to meet. The host cities set up ‘fan miles’ with small pubs and restaurants and provided ‘fan zones’ with giant stages and additional squares with stages for music and cultural programs. In Klagenfurt the tournament was only sparsely accepted by the locals. This was clearly observable, as there was little participation from Klagenfurt locals in the gatherings and a number of houses seemed abandoned with shutters being down. Radio stations broadcast appeals to encourage people to join the happenings, and newspaper articles invited Austrians to take part in the tournament. We were told in interviews with local hotel and shop owners and the police that there had been many fears of ‘hooligan’ violence. These fears were not apparent in other parts of the country, where similar to Germany 2006, locals joined the goings on in the city centre and mingled with the visiting fans. In Vienna 200000 fans were expected around the Game of Austria against Germany and an extra fan zone was set up for 40000 in the west of the city. A specific feature of this tournament was the deployment of foreign police. Several riot squads had been assigned from Germany to support their Austrian colleagues. In Klagenfurt we observed German units, while Vienna police used their own resources. In terms of fan culture the Euro 2008 appeared like a sequel of 2006 as German fans again, expressed national identity by using national colours in the same way as during the World Cup. We hardly saw any club shirts or flags. German fans were also seen mingling with Austrians and other fans, some also support other countries when Germany was not playing.

Fans accounts in Austria/ Switzerland 2008
German fans interviewed in 2008 described their ingroup content in similar ways as in 2006. With regard to the emotional aspect of their social identity fans referred to feelings of companionship and togetherness, being euphoric and expressing national pride. They had the view that the WC brought about a positive national identity and that a sense developed that made them dare to fly the flag without being connected with National Socialism.

INT.: Can you explain what was so special in Germany that so much has changed?
GER28: I believe that is because many, say foreigners have experienced what has changed in Germany …. They got a new picture of Germany and we thereby got another opinion about them. They have a new attitude about Germany because they have been treated in another way than they had expected.
Interview Dortmund, 19 June 2008

The more specific aspects of their social identity related to German fans’ aims to meet, to make friends and to celebrate with the Austrian hosts and with fans from other countries and to pick up ‘on the atmosphere’.
GER9: We swapped our scarves [with Polish fans], we are just happy to be here, to have fun, to enjoy ourselves.
Interview Klagenfurt, 9 June 2008

German fans saw the celebrating behaviour not as limited to their own category, as they uttered disappointment and disapproval about groups that did not comply with these norms. This concerned in particular the little presence and engagement of Austrian locals in Klagenfurt.
GER15: I am missing a bit that the Austrians take the action. That is missing, I am sure everybody here thinks like that.
GER14: Yes, the enthusiasm is missing. I don’t know how it is like in Switzerland, but this is weak.
Interview Klagenfurt, 9 June 2008

Fans believed that there was a change of fan identity in 2006 which had been initiated by the specific context and that this change had a sustainable effect that was maintained in 2008. Outer signs were described in wearing national colours and the use of national flags. In a more neutral context, however, when Germany was not playing, some German fans also supported teams from other countries.

INT.: My impression is that people clearly show it when they follow Germany.
GER17: Yes, yes of course.
INT.: Do you also see it like that? Do you also do it?
GER17: I have a German flag on my car and …
INT.: Well, right now you look a bit Swedish.
GER17: Yes we decorated ourselves a bit.
INT.: How do you look like when Germany plays?
GER18: Black, red, gold.
GER17: Black, red, gold. Germany top, flag.
Interview Innsbruck 14 June 2008 (around the game of Sweden versus Spain)

In contrast to Euro 2004, the diverse appearance of German fans in club colours was not seen as appropriate ingroup appearance within the context of the tournament.
GER3: … right from the beginning we said: We will not take the [club] shirts with us. This here is the national team now. That is something completely different.
Interview Klagenfurt 7 June 2008
Behaviour that related to the club level was not seen as legitimate in-group behaviour in a situation where nationality was salient: Before the game between Austria and Germany in Vienna some German fans started chanting for their respective regions. They were stopped by a fan who said: ‘No, you cannot do that. This here is [about being] together against the Austrians.’ Another German fan commented on this scene:

GER22: Yes, that is how it is like. This here is Germany against Austria. And it is not somehow: they are from the Ruhr area and the others from Hamburg, those from Munich. This here is Germany and not Schalke or Berlin or Bayern.

Interview Vienna, 16 June 2008

Discussion
In contrast to previous ESIM research, which has focused on identity processes in connection with – mostly -conflictual group relations between citizens and the police this study examined social change within a peaceful context. The findings of all three sub studies reveal that symmetric group relations facilitated the development of positive emotions such as togetherness, unity and euphoria. In many cases the experiences of such emotions were not only referred to the own category but exceeded national boundaries.

The context in Portugal enabled peaceful gatherings and parties between different fan groups from all over Europe. Such gatherings were defined in terms of cheerful fandom and national identity at the same time. German fans uttered their joy in joining this category, and emphasised the positive atmosphere which characterised such togetherness with fans from other countries. On the other hand, the fan data reveals that German fans saw their ingroup content as negative, this being so because they did not see themselves in a position to express their identity in terms of such a joyful unity. Some used individual mobility strategies for example by ‘becoming Danish’ and wearing red-and-white; others acknowledged a superior status of other groups for example by mingling with the Dutch fans and a large number avoided the direct national competition and chose another comparative level by expressing football fandom on a level of club affiliation. However, comparing themselves to the behaviour of other groups, the German fans felt the desire for a similar expression of national identity but with regard to the German past they saw themselves morally restricted to do so.

The specific context at the World Cup facilitated German fans to rearrange their social position. For German fans at 2006 ‘Germanness’ was defined in terms of expressing national unity together with positive outgroup relations and friendly hosting. The data suggests that the specific context of the World Cup provided them with the ability to bring to the fore an identity that was contrasted with the negative stereotype they had seen themselves displayed in. The home situation may also have facilitated the availability of the respective merchandise
articles, such as flags but also ice-cream, socks or soap were offered in German national colours (Amend, 2006, cited in Retzlaff 2009). Some had argued that the campaigns run prior to the WC had instigated this identity change. According to the present study the desire for a relaxed expression of national identity was already prevalent among German fans. On the other hand, football is the ‘national sport’ in Germany, so that the hosting of the Football World Championship was something that Germans could identify with so that campaigns may have catalysed the developments in Germany. It was in particular the German motto ‘die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden’, which equalled ‘friends’ with ‘Germans’ that reflected the attitude of the fans: to be able to show ‘the world’ a happy and welcoming face. The WC was an unprecedented opportunity for Germans to do so, and many did. A study on the impact of the WC on guests’ stereotypes (Albrecht, Kökgiran, Schmitt & Schott, 2007) revealed an effect of the WC, as visitors valued Germany and its citizens more positive, in particular friendlier than before the event and the vast majority of Germans felt strongly as being a host and promoting a positive image of the country.  

The analysis of the data from 2008 suggests that the identity change of 2006 was maintained. German fans again appeared as ‘German’ while they aimed for peaceful relations with other fan groups. These results go along with the findings of Neville and Reicher (2009) suggesting that emotional intensity may have a mediating role between the strength of social identity and the likelihood of future participation. Thus it may be argued that the positive emotions that went along with football fandom in 2006 together with the German’s newly found ability to express a positively laden national identity strengthened this form of identity so that it was kept up in the following tournament and in a situation where Germans came as guests.

The results suggest that peaceful relations are more than the absence of violence. Here it was shown that feelings of togetherness, unity and euphoria emerged that expanded the boundaries of nationalities. However, these do not evolve accidentally. Previous ESIM studies have highlighted the role that the police play in order to shape intergroup relations. While the role of the police was not considered in the present study, their importance becomes even more obvious as the dynamics presented here can only occur with a peaceful context, which, as previous research suggests, can best be achieved by the ‘low profile approach’. The study

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27 It should be noted however, that there were also signs of a different attitude prevalent in Germany, as for example more that 100 German hooligans gathered in the city centre of Dortmund, apparently preparing to confront Poland fans (Schreiber & Adang, 2010).
also bears theoretical implications with regard to the ESIM as the findings presented here indeed support the idea that social change can emerge within peaceful relations.

Fears of a new nationalism were uttered with regard to the German identity change. The present data reveals that in-group identity was connected with both: the joy of being united on a national level and positive outgroup relations, so that being German, symbolised by the national colours, meant to engage in positive intergroup relations. The (for Germans) unorthodox use of the flag as a skirt for example can be seen as an illustration for a relaxed use of national symbols, more as a party tool than anything else (Retzlaff, 2009; Majer-O’Sickey, 2006). In this sense the World Cup 2006 served as opportunity for Germans to make friends with Germany.

Acknowledgements
Many thanks go to all the fans and visitors that were willing to give their ideas and comments and contributed highly to this work. The research carried out during the Euro 2004 was made possible by grants from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-000-23-0617) and from the U. K. Home Office. Special thanks are given to Clifford Stott from Liverpool University who introduced me to this research subject and provided me with the opportunity to be a member of the research team in Portugal. Data collection in 2006 was made possible through cooperation between Ruhr-University Bochum and the Police Academy of the Netherlands. Many thanks to Thomas Feltes, Chair of Criminology at Bochum and the students from the Master Course Criminology and Police Science of 2006, teachers and students of the Netherlands Police Academy, in particular to Otto Adang, who supervised the 2006 research with me. During Euro 2008 data was obtained as part of an initiative coming out of a seminar of the European Police College, CEPOL and coordinated by the Police Academy of the Netherlands. Special thanks go to Bjarne Christensen from Copenhagen police and Gerald Müller from Frankfurt police for their courage to take on a researcher’s role; many thanks also to Miriam Gorzel (Ruhr-University Bochum) and Elaine Brown (Liverpool University) who also helped collecting the data in Klagenfurt, Innsbruck and Vienna. Thanks also go to Otto Adang, again, for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References


Discussion

This thesis set out to explore if the propositions of the ESIM also apply in crowd situations that involve groups other than British. The ESIM proposes that social change toward conflict arises as a result of asymmetric group relations, when out-group action (this generally being the police) is perceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate. Such perceived illegitimacy leads to a redefinition of group relations and to feelings of empowerment to confront the outgroup. Legitimate relations on the other hand, have been shown to prevent such a change and to facilitate positive crowd behaviour, such as self-policing, avoidance of conflict and the marginalisation of those who act against the group norms. Practical implications for public order policing derived out of this research. It is suggested that legitimate group relations are created when policing is carried out in a ‘balanced’ way, i.e. when it is oriented along the actual risk in a given situation, as opposed to a static view where risk is pre-categorised. This requires a preferably flexible tactical model that can quickly adjust to changes in risk and allows for rapid escalation as well as de-escalation of police action. Though outcomes of this research have had a high impact on practical policing, empirical support for this model only comes from studies involving groups from a British background. In order to address the question if the proposals of the ESIM also apply amongst cultural groups from non-British countries, this thesis presents analyses of a substantial body of data from German and Polish crowd participants. In particular it consists of studies of German fans at the Euro 2004 in Portugal, German and Poland fans at the WC 2006 in Germany and German fans at the Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland. These studies have been presented in individual scientific papers.

The first paper dealt with the social psychological processes of German fans during Euro 2004 in Portugal. The findings largely correspond with the processes that occurred among England fans that attended the same tournament (Stott et al. 2007, 2008). In both cases a connection was evident between low profile policing and the support of non-violent group norms among the wider crowd and the disempowerment and marginalisation of confrontational groups. In doing so, the results suggest that the absence of large scale disorder can be associated with the style of policing.

Drawing upon these findings, Papers 2 and 3 aimed to investigate if and how these mechanisms apply in the context of the World Cup 2006 in Germany. With its focus on policing, Paper 2 suggests that legitimate group relations and positive fan behaviour were at place in Germany 2006 when policing was carried out targeted, differentiated and in relation
to the situational context and the actual risk and when tolerance limits were communicated and acted upon, but problems were observed when these conditions were not met.

Research around the game of Germany and Poland (Paper 3) revealed that both sets of fan groups saw police behaviour as appropriate and policing strategies were welcomed when they went along with the fans’ perception of risk. In a situation where the fans’ perception of risk did not match the police action, group relations were considered negative and Poland fans saw themselves as treated unfairly. However, the accounts also suggest that there is a very thin line in what is seen as proper police action and what is perceived as improper, ambivalent or even threatening. Furthermore, there is indication that media reports have an impact on the fans’ behaviour and perception, in particular with regard to the cognitive construction of context (Paper 3). While these outcomes go along with the model’s propositions and thus serve as additional support for its validity, parts of the findings do also reveal aspects that are not congruent with the ESIM. On the other hand, results may be explainable using alternative models of crowd behaviour.

In contrast to Stott and Reicher’s (1998) suggestion of an instantaneous effect of police intervention on crowd conflict, some outcomes of the research presented here reveal that violence does not necessarily start as a result of negative intergroup relations and actions but that persons enter a crowd situation with the intention to cause violence. This has been described in Paper 1 by both fans and the police, also the incidents around the game of Germany versus Poland in Dortmund (Paper 3) rather support the idea that violence can start spontaneously and that there is a tendency of young males to actively seek and engage in risk situations, as it is proposed by Adang (in press/a). To some extent this can be related to the ‘Individualistic Approach’ which relates crowd conflict to an accumulation of people with similar personal traits. It may be argued, that the active participation of people in the riot in Dortmund (Paper 3) was related to abnormal personal propositions. However, it was also obvious in the studies that conflictual intentions only referred to a fraction of the whole crowd and their presence did not necessarily cause violence (Paper 1 and 2). Critique relating to this has also been uttered by Kerr (2004a). Drawing upon reversal theory (Apter, 2001; Kerr, 1994, 2004b) he suggests that there may also be motivational changes that ‘can cause fans already likely to be highly aroused to become negativistic and rebellious, and engage in provocative and angry violent acts against the police’ (Kerr, 2004a, p.430). Kerr argues not to ignore the dynamic and inconsistent nature of group motivation and suggests including reversal theory in the social identity approach. Vider (2004), on the other hand, criticised the notion that crowd behaviour is meaningful, as it fails to account for ‘the attraction and
excitement of joining the crowd and the violent crowd in particular’ (p. 159). His analysis of the riot at the 1999 Woodstock music festival challenges the assumptions of behavioural norms within a crowd. He proposes that simple vandalism occurred and that the destruction was not meaningful but that rather ‘in a kind of false consensus effect, each individual attributes his own values and motives to the other rioters’ (p. 149). While the findings of this thesis did not reveal indications for a loss of rational control of crowd participants as it is suggested by the classic theories of deindividuation, this concept may need to be reconsidered. Other than deindividuation causing anti-social behaviour, offenders were found to deliberately choose anonymity in order to commit violent offences (Adang, in press/a). Anonymity was desired with regard to authorities to avoid punishment but not so concerning in-group members.

A further issue in this respect is the fact that many offences during demonstrations are committed from people throwing missiles while hiding behind demonstration banners or within the crowd or covering their faces in order to avoid recognition.28 These findings have implications for practical policing, as reversely, the detection or de-anonymisation of potential offenders can serve as a preventive measure. During the World Cup 2006 the German police actively used de-anonymisation strategies before and during the tournament (Paper 2) as a part of violent prevention. Before the tournament ‘know troublemakers’ were visited at home where officers asked them not to engage in violence and warned them that they would be monitored. During the tournament, police ‘spotters’ were deployed who identified potential troublemakers. Activities of such spotting teams often resulted in preventive arrests of the suspected persons (Paper 2 & 3). Such forms of arrests, however, must be seen critically, on the one hand with regard to implications for the violation of human rights (although this is legal in Germany). On the other hand, while such measures may help to prevent disorder within the current situation it does also contain the danger that they contribute to a manifestation of conflictual relations between certain groups and the police in the long run. This does also apply to kettleing and preventive mass arrests, which regularly involve a substantial number of uninvolved persons. The perception of illegitimate treatment initiates or confirms the psychological shift towards negative relations with the police. It is suggested to explore how measures of de-anonymisation can be used more moderately and

28 A recent analysis of police officer’s descriptions of the May Day riots in Berlin suggest that 80 percent of the criminal acts were committed out of the crowd. An analysis of participants’ accounts in the same study reveals that the number of hooded persons was seen as remarkably high (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010).
graded, for example by means of communication and in connection with the setting of behavioural limits.

Schmalzl’s (1996) model, although more specifically describing police-protesters’ relations, contains a number of overlaps with the ESIM but his assumptions do also raise some questions. Like the ESIM his model is interactive and with the notion that refusal of communication and confrontational attitudes serve as the first step towards escalation, he goes along the ESIM’s claim of the importance of positive group relations. On the other hand, this raises the questions of how police can deal with a situation in which a confrontational attitude is already immanent. Studies based on the ESIM have in detail described the escalation of conflict and suggest how escalation can be avoided. Additionally, suggestions are made for active cooperation between organisers or fan projects and police forces before and during the event (Stott & Adang, 2009; Reicher et al., 2004). However, it does not address the question of how police should deal with a crowd which – at least in part – reject their role as such, irrespective of the tactics they choose. Such extremely hostile relations are typically found during protest against the political system in which the police are per definitionem, as the representative of that system, seen as enemy. But also some fan-police relations, in particular between some Ultra groups and the police have escalated in a way that can be described as ‘refusal of communication’. This situation also compares with the structural, ideological and political levels within the ‘Flashpoints Model’ described by Waddington, Jones and Critcher (1989). In relation to the ESIM’s this stage describes a confrontational in-group outgroup situation in which the category prototype differentiates most from the out-group.

Practical steps toward deescalation, for example meetings and the use of mediators go beyond the mere crowd situation. The internal office of Catalonia for example, has recently introduced a ‘Community Relations and Mediation’ department as a reaction to increasingly hostile relations between protesters and the police. Such activities should be accompanied by evaluations and further research should be carried out on ways of reconciliation.

Another aspect raised by Schmalzl refers to the police’s role during escalation, suggesting that tense situations may distort police officers’ ability of proper judgement. In this respect he leads intergroup processes back to police action. This goes along with the ESIM’s basic idea of interaction but such processes have merely been researched with regard to crowd members’ change of social identity. Although identity change is also suggested for the police’s side, there is a lack of consideration on how crowd processes actually influence police conduct and intra-group processes within the police force. As to today there are only few studies of officer’s stress reaction during the policing of crowds. Only recently a study
was presented by Buchta (2010), which proposes a relationship between stress and frustration as a result of deviant behaviour of crowd participants, and subsequent deviant behaviour of the police officers themselves. Schmalzl (1996) argues that the more police behaviour becomes ritualised, the more reliable and the more ‘immune’ the police will become against uncontrolled and pointless action. In some police forces, however, the riot units are the first stage of the training, so that there are many inexperienced officers. But what police do during a crowd event is not purely a result of intergroup relations. The analyses around the World Cup in Papers 2 and 3 do also point at difficulties that can arise as a consequence of infrastructural malfunctions and organisational problems for police forces as a result of legal restrictions.

The fourth paper was not yet considered in this discussion because it differs from the other studies as it does not focus on crowd – police relations but ‘merely’ on fan-group relations and dynamics within a positive context. It suggests that social change among German fans toward the open expression of national identity occurred as a result of a specific context that was given in 2006. In that way the results go along with the basic assumptions of the model. Results from this paper also point at the role of emotions within the crowd scenario and suggest a relation between facilitation of positive emotions and peaceful intergroup behaviour. Such findings however, may then have implications for public order policing and support the suggestion that policing should aim to establish legitimate group relations.

In all studies police officers have been involved in the research activities. The involvement of non-scientist naturally implies the need for training for example of observation methods. On the other hand it turned out that such collaboration between police and research has practical advantages as it can facilitate access to police officers on the ground and it may also help to observe the goings on from different perspectives, while potential biases must be taken into account. Or, as a more implicit goal, it can serve to break down reservations that both parties may have of each other. Research carried out at Portugal 2004 suggests that the success of the tournament was connected with close cooperation between research and practise. Current positive experiences with mixed groups in peer review teams do also suggest that such collaboration should be encouraged.

**Conclusions**

Do the propositions of the ESIM – and its implications for public order policing – also hold amongst groups coming from other cultural backgrounds than the UK? According to the
findings presented here the answer is: ‘Yes – but...’ Yes, there is indication that the dynamics that were present among England fans are also present among other cultural groups. Social psychological processes that the ESIM proposes were found among sets of Polish and German fans. Positive group relations were associated with a style of low profile policing. Considering these results and previous ESIM research, the model seems to be a valuable tool to explain the escalation of violence upon wider parts of the crowd. Furthermore plenty support has been provided for the low-profile policing approach. The findings suggest that the recommendations of this approach are justified and should be considered as a general means of public order policing. But it must be borne in mind that this study was not a test of the ESIM as it is not possible to falsify the model. While the material provided here and in other studies suggest the ESIM to be a plausible explanation for the dynamics around crowd events, the question may be raised of what would we see if the model was falsified? Is there something people would say that would contradict the theory? And indeed, do we not often hear in explanation of rioters that they cannot explain what happened to them in that situation – and would this not support deindividuation theory? Wouldn’t accounts of fans that say they just got ‘affected by the good atmosphere’ also support a kind of group mind? Such questions should be taken seriously and considered within further research activities in order to define the scope of the ESIM more precisely from alternative explanations.

Further limitations concern the research carried out around this thesis. Although suggestions can be made that the processes the model proposes apply to groups from different cultural backgrounds, the current study is not conclusive. The findings provide support for the cross cultural validity of the ESIM but these merely refer to crowds of football fans and to European football fans in particular. So while this thesis aimed to answer one research question, it created even more. But in doing so it merely joins in the ongoing circle of research endeavours. Activities coming out of this thesis may focus on how police can deal with situations that contain a manifest confrontational attitude of crowd participants. With regard to the long term process, research is suggested on effective measures toward deescalation and reconciliation. Further, it is suggested to explore how measures of de-anonymisation can be used more moderately and graded, for example by means of communication and in connection with the setting of behavioural limits. The ESIM would be substantiated by considerations on how crowd processes actually influence police conduct and intra-group processes within the police force. And finally, studies delineating the model from alternative explanations should address the questions how or if aspects of vandalism or emotional contagion can be explained by the model.
Much of the research and the research activities mentioned in this thesis are connected with the research group from universities in the UK and the Police Academy of the Netherlands. This emphasis relates to the fact that systematic crowd research has nearly only been carried out by these teams. Germany for example does not have any public order research group. In this respect, this research adds to cross cultural activities in public order research.
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