Civil Society and Democracy: The Country Level Interrelations and the Individual Level Impact

By

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I hereby declare that I have written this PhD thesis independently. I have used only the sources, the data and the support that I have explicitly mentioned. I have not submitted this work at any other university for the conferral of a Degree.

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Civil society is currently one of the most actively discussed concepts in political science. Many authors stress the importance of civil society for consolidating and strengthening democracy (Bernhard 1993; Diamond 1999; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005, Shin 2006). Others contest the notion of importance of civil society, considering it either an irrelevant factor in the process of democratization, or an outcome of democracy rather than its cause (Berman 1997; Dowley and Silver 2002; Kumar 1993; Skocpol 1999).

This PhD thesis examines the relationship between civil society and democracy. In doing so, it utilizes a number of new measurements of civil society. It combines the study of the impact civil society has on the polity it operates in, with an examination of the influence civil society has on individual members of the respective society. Thus the research presented in this thesis includes two important levels of interaction between civil society and democracy: the societal level and the individual level.

The first part of the analysis establishes the connection between civil society and democracy and addresses the question of a more likely direction of impact between the two variables on the country level. Although no final conclusions can be made due to certain data limitations, the results point towards democracy as having more influence on civil society rather than vice versa. The second part of the analysis adds the individual level to the study of conduciveness of civil society for democracy, by exploring how civil society influences elements of individual democratic political culture. It demonstrates that civil society is an important predictor of support for democracy and political activism.

The general conclusion of the work is that on the country level there is no clear evidence of civil society’s impact on democracy; civil society however has a positive influence on individual elements of democratic political culture.
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List of Abbreviations
CIRI - Cingranelli-Richards (Human Rights Data Project)
CSI – Civil Society Index (by CIVICUS)
CSO – Civil Society Organization
EVS – European Values Survey
FH – Freedom House
FH CS – Freedom House (“Nations in Transit”) Civil Society score
GCSI – Global Civil Society Index
ID – (Vanhanen’s) Index of Democracy
NGI – Non-Governmental Individual
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NGO SI – NGO Sustainability Index
SD – Standard Deviation
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
VA – Voice and Accountability (a World Bank Good Governance indicator)
WB – World Bank
WVS – World Values Survey
Introduction: The Concept of Civil Society

For the past two decades civil society has become a popular concept among scholars of democratization, as well as among policy-makers and development aid donors. It has inspired hopes and vigorous debates about its potential of improving and sustaining democracy. It has been hailed as a true democratizing force ‘from below,’ capable of representing the interests of the people in a new direct way, serving as a mobilizing agent, aggregating and voicing the concerns of otherwise disconnected and disadvantaged groups, functioning as a ‘school of democracy’ and so on. To put these expectations to a test, it is important to scrutinize both the idea of civil society and the existing empirical evidence of its performance, differentiating the theoretical ideal constructs from the reality.

What is civil society? Does it help democratization? If yes, in what way? The first is a theoretical question. The other two are theory-driven, but have to be answered empirically. These questions are addressed in many scholarly works from various perspectives: civil society is currently one of the most actively discussed concepts in political science. With regard to the first question “what is civil society?” there is a broad spectrum of definitions and interpretations of the concept. This introduction provides a short overview of the history of the idea of civil society and maps the main dimensions of the conceptual debate around the term. With regard to the questions of importance of civil society for democracy, there is no conclusive answer either, despite a rigorous academic debate and numerous studies of the relationship between the two phenomena. The theoretical and the empirical aspects of the interplay between civil society and democracy are discussed in Chapter I; a brief preview focusing on the main shortcomings of the current state of the literature is presented here.

The current research of the role of civil society for democratization can be divided into two broad categories: studies of external effects of civil society, examined mostly from an institutional perspective, and studies of internal effects of civil society on its members, examined mostly from a cultural perspective. The insights gained from these two perspectives are rarely combined in one study. Another limitation of the current research of civil society is that there are very few comparative studies examining the relationship between civil society and democracy on the country level. The examination of effects of civil society on micro-foundations of democracy (i.e. individual attitudes and patterns of behavior) is almost exclusively focused on membership in civil society associations, which is yet another limitation of current research of the role of civil society in maintaining and improving
democracy. Living in a society with a vibrant associational life can have a positive impact on one’s democratic culture, irrespective of individual membership. Thus, an important aspect of the relationship between civil society and democracy, mainly the impact of civil society on the general public, has so far been mostly overlooked in social science research.

This PhD thesis seeks to address the limitations of the previous research by:

- combining the institutional perspective and the cultural perspective in the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy;
- conducting a comparative analysis of 69 countries;
- combining the country level with the individual level analysis;
- examining the importance of civil society for democracy, taking into consideration not only membership in associations, but also by operationalizing civil society as a broader societal phenomenon, which influences people irrespective of their personal involvement in associations and organizations.

The purpose of the PhD research project is to analyze the relationship between civil society and democracy. The basic assumption proposed and tested in the thesis is that there is a positive relationship between civil society and democracy. Given that such a relationship exists, it can manifest itself in various ways and on various levels. This thesis examines three manifestations of this relationship on two levels of analysis:

1. On the country or institutional level democracy as a regime and civil society as a societal phenomenon influence each other to a various degree.
2. The relationship between civil society and democracy also manifests itself on the individual level via democratic attitudes and political participation enhanced by civil society.

The relationship between civil society and democracy manifests itself on the country level in the link between institutions of democracy and general levels of civil society. An important question to ask in this respect is whether civil society influences democracy, or whether democratic settings enable civil society to flourish. Hence, the following research question is formulated:

*Research Question 1: Is civil society’s impact on democracy stronger than democracy’s impact on civil society?*
The relationship between civil society and democracy also manifests itself on the individual level. Civil society can strengthen (or undermine) micro-foundations of democracy by influencing individual democratic attitudes, such as, for example, support for democracy as a form of government. It can also enhance political participation by providing incentives and infrastructure for political involvement. To address both the attitudinal and the behavioral dimensions of the possible impact of civil society on democratic political culture, the following research questions are proposed:

**Research Question 2: Is people’s support for democracy influenced by the state of civil society in the country?**

**Research Question 3: Is individual political participation influenced by the state of civil society in the country?**

Thus, the PhD thesis analyzes the relationship between civil society and democracy, taking into account the two important levels of interaction between these two phenomena: the societal level and the individual level. It establishes the connection between civil society and democracy, and addresses the question of a more likely direction of the impact between the two variables on the country level. It also includes the individual into the analysis, by exploring how civil society influences elements of individual democratic political culture.

The **structure** of this PhD thesis is as follows:

The PhD thesis consists of an introduction, four chapters and a concluding section. The Introduction maps the conceptual debate concerning the meaning of civil society and its empirical measurements. Chapter I summarizes the theoretical discussion and existing empirical evidence of the relationship between civil society and democracy, both in times of regime transitions and political stability or gradual change. It points to the gaps in the existing knowledge on the relationship between civil society and democracy, thus demonstrating the need for further research and justifying the formulation of the basic assumption and the research questions listed above. Chapter II describes the data sources and the methodology used in the process of analysis, with a special focus on the new measurements of civil society and the issue of their validity. Chapter III presents the results of the country level analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy, testing the basic assumption of the study and answering the first Research Question. The Chapter demonstrates the existence of a strong linear positive relationship between civil society and democracy, but fails to support
the argument about an impact of civil society on democracy. Chapter IV introduces the individual level variables and formulates two models for the two dimensions of individual political culture that are tested in the multi-level analysis. The outcomes of the analysis and answers to the Research Question 2 and the Research Question 3 are presented. In both cases, civil society emerges as an important predictor of support for democracy and political activism. The Conclusion and Discussion section summarizes the findings of the PhD research project, linking together the outcomes of the country level and the multi-level analysis and suggesting a broader perspective on the question of relationship between civil society and democracy. The outcomes of the PhD project point to the need for further research, elaborated upon at the end of the concluding section.

The following limitations of the study should be mentioned:
- The thesis does not address the economic aspects of civil society, although one could argue that civil society contributes to the economic development and hence, indirectly, to democratization;
- The thesis is predominantly focused on national civil societies, although international civil society organizations are represented in one of the measurements of civil society;
- The pool of the countries and the choice of the timeframe are restricted by limited availability of data on civil society.

One of the major challenges in studying civil society is the concept of civil society itself. As the next section demonstrates, it has an old and intriguing intellectual history, which has resulted in a proliferation of its meanings. Before attempting an empirical study of civil society, the first question asked at the beginning of this introduction “what is civil society?” needs to be answered. More importantly, it has to be demonstrated that civil society can be defined in a meaningful way that allows it to be empirically measured.

1. The Concept of Civil Society

If ideas were compared to living beings, and their use in scholarly debates compared to biographies, the concept of civil society would have a life story by far more dramatic than most other concepts in social science: a story that encompasses a long history of gradual development and a period of oblivion, followed by a sudden return to the academic spotlight.
Some authors trace the first appearance of the idea of civil society to works of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (Cohen and Arato 1994; Ellis 2000; Seligman 1995). A more recognizable modern concept of civil society as a self-regulating, self-governing sphere of activities, differentiated from the state, was developed by Adam Smith and intellectuals of the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment (Cohen and Arato 1994; Seligman 1995; Trentmann 2000). It was further developed in works of Hegel, Marx and Gramsci, but received little attention from political scientists and sociologists of the 20th century.

The situation changed in 1970s, when civil society re-entered the vocabulary of political activists and scholars. Eastern European dissidents re-discovered the idea of civil society in their struggle against the totalitarian Socialists states. It played a central role in the ideology of the Polish opposition to communist rule from the late 70s (Cohen and Arato 1994), and from there and then the concept of civil society entered the democratization discourse, where it plays a prominent role till the present. While Eastern Europe was employing the idea of civil society for building up resistance to communism, dissatisfaction with both the market and the state grew in the West beginning in 1970s. The state was repeatedly criticized as too rigid, cost-inefficient and unresponsive both in academic and political discourses. The market was blamed for deepening social inequalities and harming the environment. Calls to find a ‘middle way,’ that does not rely solely on the market or on government, to cope with public problems emerged from the dissatisfaction and the criticism. As civil society is the sphere between the market and the state, it has often been pointed at as a potentially important agent in this new ‘middle’ or ‘third’ way (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003).

In essence, two parallel developments have been taking place, probably influencing each other: a change in the objective reality in terms of the scope and the functions of civil society organizations, and a steady grow of interest towards civil society in the circles of scholars and practitioners. Although civil society (non-profit, voluntary, third, NGO sector) is not a new phenomenon, the late 20th and early 21st century has witnessed a worldwide massive grow of this sphere of social activity, in terms of numbers of organizations, people and money involved in it. Some even go as far as to call this phenomenon a “global associational revolution” and suggest that it might prove to be as significant a development as the rise of nation-stated for 19th century (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003). The proliferation in the numbers of civil society organizations is paralleled by an intensified interest from scholars and policy-makers, particularly those working in the field of democracy and development. The appeal of the idea of civil society is based on the fact that it
suggests the potential of developing societies ‘from below’ and ‘on the ground’ as opposed to ‘top-down’ reforms and imposed transformations of questionable success.

The arguments about civil society’s conduciveness to development and democratization also caught the attention of donors and developmental entrepreneurs. Since the mid-90s, the term ‘civil society’ has been routinely employed by various international organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Agency for International Development (McIlwaine 1998). Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are something like a “favorite child” of development agencies and are perceived as a panacea for all problems (Edwards and Hulme 1996). Hopes and expectations placed on civil society are at times so high that Carbone (2005, 168) speaks of “the myth of civil society” as a solution to all development problems.

Thus, the concept of civil society has been revived to become popular among activists, donors, policy-makers and social scientists. Long history of the concept of civil society, combined with its current popularity and frequent usage, produce a broad range of interpretations of the term. Depending on what an interpreter wants to emphasize, civil society comes to mean different things to different people while used in various discussions and contexts (Cohen and Arato 1994; Hyden 1997; Seligman 1995). The problem is: it is so diverse, that it is not clear what civil society actually is, and whether we need such a blurry concept at all. The next section addresses this problem, clarifying the definition of civil society to be used in this thesis and arguing in favor of the theoretical relevance of the concept. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that despite the alleged ‘fuzziness’ of the term, current social research has accumulated and implemented a number of ways to empirically measure civil society.

1.1. Conceptual Debate and Current Definitions of Civil Society

There are many definitions and implied understandings of civil society. To make the matters even worse, there are also many terms that are used interchangeably with ‘civil society,’ such as ‘third sector,’ ‘voluntary sector,’ ‘non-profit sector,’ ‘NGO sector,’ ‘charity sector,’ ‘social economy,’ etc. Some authors discuss civil society when in fact terms like ‘public sphere’ or ‘the public’ would be more appropriate (Dbrowska 2007). Civil society is
even sometimes equated with social capital or with civic community, both of which are complex concepts in themselves\(^1\).

The lack of conceptual clarity is not just a theoretical issue. Using the idea of civil society without proper conceptualization sometimes leads to inadequate descriptions of reality and wrong predictions. For example Blaney and Pasha (1993) point out such misuse of the term in the literature on civil society in Africa, where in most cases it is not applicable at all. “Having freed civil society from its logical corollaries, scholars immediately find in the existence of informal economic activity or in any organized opposition to the state arising within society an emerging ‘civil society’ and the bellwether of a democratic transition” (Blaney and Pasha 1993, 16-17). Needless to say, such a wide, hence – inadequate, interpretation of civil society leads to unrealistic assumptions and expectations as to what civil society is or is not able to achieve in terms of supporting democracy.

A clear definition of civil society is necessary if it is to be used as a heuristic tool in empirical research. Since civil society is often subjected to a sharp theoretical criticism already on the definitional level, I consider it important to devote some space to the definitional problems and controversies. In the next section, the main theoretical approaches of defining the concept of civil society are shortly presented\(^2\). As the first step of the conceptual discussion the two general contesting interpretations of civil society – the idealistic and the critical one, are outlined; the understanding of civil society that has guided this PhD research is identified in relation to these two paradigms. After that the conceptual discussion of civil society is narrowed down to the definition of the term.

**1.1.1. Idealistic vs. Critical Approaches to Civil Society**

On the general level, two distinct interpretations of civil society derived from different historical schools of thought are identified in the literature: the idealistic interpretation of civil society, also referred to as the liberal approach, and the critical interpretation, also called the radical, neo- or post-Marxist approach (Lewis 2001; McIlwaine 1998). The first one almost automatically assumes civil society to be a ‘good thing’ while the second takes a much more critical stands, as its name suggests. The two traditions lead to

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1 The relationship between civil society, civic community and social capital is discussed in more detail below.

2 For a comprehensive overview of various understandings of civil society in Western political thought and its role in different discourses see Cohen and Arato (1994) and Seligman (1995).
different understanding of civil society, different research agendas and different explanations of success or failure of civil society.\(^3\)

The idealistic approach, inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville’s ideas, emphasizes the benefits of civil associations for the creation and maintenance of democracy (McIlwaine 1998). Civil society is a place where civic democratic values are upheld. It is an arena of organized citizens that serves as a balance on the state and the market.\(^4\) Scholars belonging to the idealistic tradition understand civil society as a sum of institutions and activities that take place outside of the state, the market and the private life, and expect it to generate pro-democratic outcomes. The question of conflicting interests and values is of no special interest, since it is assumed that conflicting interests are part of the democratic ‘game.’ The idealistic view is the one that has been the most popular with governments and donors (Lewis 2001). Since the idealistic view of civil society omits possible drawbacks and negative outcomes of civil society, little thought is given to a suspicion that just supporting civil society might not be enough to strengthen democracy in a given country. As a result, policies, developed by adherents of the idealistic interpretation of civil society tend to unquestionably support civil society simultaneously placing high expectations on it, in terms of democratization. “According to Western development agencies, money, training, seminars, and partnerships with Western nonprofit organizations can provide a tangible, quantifiable solution to the puzzle of constructing democracy” (Henderson 2002, 140).

The critical understanding of civil society has its roots in writings of Hegel, Marx and Gramsci. According to this view civil society is unavoidably linked with the state and political organizations, and it is anything but neutral. On the contrary, it is an arena of oppression, internal divisions and power inequalities (McIlwaine 1998). The critical approach to civil society emphasizes negotiations, conflicts and competing ideas within civil society and between civil society and other actors. Furthermore, the critical view reminds us that not all of these conflicts and ideas originating from civil society contribute positively to democratic development (Lewis 2001). Thus, in contrast to the idealistic interpretation of civil society, those inspired by the critical approach, are interested in the conflict dimension and are skeptical of a) the possibility to delimit civil society from other spheres of social activities and b) the capacity of civil society to contribute to democracy. If the idealistic view

\(^3\) For example Kubicek (2002) describes Eastern European civil society of 1970es as playing a “De Tocquevillean [democratizing] role” while Turkish civil society of late 1990es plays a “Gramscian role”. See also Clarke (1998).

\(^4\) The relationship between civil society and the market is a contested issue. Although the majority of current definitions of civil society delimit it from the market sphere, some authors argue that civil society is closely related to the market, as will be explained later.
tends to cherish civil society as something ‘good’ and almost automatically contributive to
democracy, the critical view suggests that one should be more cautious about the quality of
civil society, functions it performs and powers it reflects.

The two interpretations of civil society have their strengths and weaknesses. The
major advantage of the idealistic approach is its call for a clear demarcation of civil society
from other arenas of social activities, such as the market, the political sphere and the private
life. Without such delimitations civil society becomes increasingly difficult to define, left
alone empirically assess. From my point of view, this is the major contribution of the
idealistic approach to the foundations of the empirical research of civil society. The main
shortcoming of the idealistic approach is the failure to recognize potential drawbacks and
‘dark sides’ of civil society. If the starting point of the idealistic approach is an assumption
about positivity and usefulness of civil society, the starting point of the critical approach is in
questioning the ‘goodness’ of civil society. This, in turn, is the main strength of the critical
approach. Questioning and critical thinking, especially when it comes to potential democratic
effects of civil society, are the characteristic features of this approach. A major drawback of
the critical approach is that when the border between civil society and the state, or civil
society and the private sphere is blurred in accordance with the critical interpretation of civil
society, the empirical assessment of civil society is difficult if not impossible. For instance,
how can one study an impact of civil society on the state if the two entities cannot be clearly
distinguished?

Drawing on the strengths of both paradigms and in an attempt to avoid problems
inherent in both as mentioned above, the approach to civil society that has guided this PhD
research is a mixed one. While my understanding of civil society as a sphere of activity
outside the market, the state and the private sphere corresponds to the idealistic school of
thought, the thesis leans towards the critical tradition in questioning the existence of the
relationship between civil society and democracy, instead of assuming that civil society is
inherently and automatically a positive factor.

The discrepancy between the two interpretations of civil society as a social
phenomenon that is distinct from other social activities (in the case of the idealistic approach)
or as a deeply intertwined element of the social fabric (in the case of the critical approach)
points to one of the fundamental controversies in the conceptual debate about civil society. Is
civil society an attribute of the society in question, or is it a distinct element of the social
fabric? The next section discusses these two interpretations of civil society.
1.1.2. Civil Society as an Attribute vs. Civil Society as a Sector

One of the ways to classify the approaches to civil society is to group the interpretations of civil society into two categories: societal property vs. social arena (Heinrich 2005). Civil society can be understood either as a property of the society at large, or as a distinct sphere within the society. The example of the first is the interpretation of civil society by Hall (2000, 48), according to whom “civil society should be seen not merely as the presence of strong and autonomous social groups able to balance the state but also as a high degree of civility in social relations.” The example of the second is the definition of civil society as one of the five arenas of democracy\(^5\) formulated by Linz and Stepan (1996). “By civil society we refer to that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 7).

The understanding of civil society as an attribute of society at large is more prominent in the 1990es (Barber 1998; Bryant 1993). It is the one intuitively more plausible, suggesting that civil society is a society that is civil. This interpretation is closer to the historical meaning of the term, as it was employed by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment of the 18\(^{th}\) century. It often remains on a purely theoretical level, describing a society, as it should be to qualify as civil, thus it also is a normative interpretation by default. The problem with the interpretation of civil society as an attribute of the society is that such a definition opens up a potentially endless debate of what is “civil”. Is civil society a society that is peaceful? A society that is tolerant or not-atomized? What follows are a few examples of defining civil society as a normative quality. Bryant (1993, 399) defines civility as “equable treatment of others as fellow citizens however different their interests and sensibilities”. Trentmann (2000) mentions tolerance and pluralism as important characteristics of civil society. Hall (2000) considers acceptance of different views as crucial for civil society.

The interpretation of civil society as a characteristic of the society is problematic: even if a convincing list of qualities that define a society in question as civil is compiled, one can legitimately ask the following question: do we need an additional term to refer to a combination of other societal attributes? Paraphrasing the words of Kumar (1993, 376) what can civil society (in its interpretation as an attribute) offer that other concepts cannot? No convincing answer has been found as of yet.

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\(^5\) The other arenas are: political society, rule of law, state apparatus and economic society
Perhaps due to the conceptual and normative problems outlined above, the interpretation of civil society as a societal property is becoming less common in the current literature, especially in empirical works. Most current work conceptualizes civil society as an arena, or a sector of society, rather than its property (Anheier 2004; Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003) Thus, although the interpretation of civil society as an arena is by no means ‘the only game in town’ it is the one largely used in current empirical studies of civil society. It is also the one that appears less problematic and more susceptible to a reasonable operationalization, although controversies exist around the issue of its precise definition, as demonstrated in the next section. Since the interpretation of civil society as an arena, rather than as an attribute corresponds better to the empirical focus of the thesis, it is the one adopted in this PhD research.

1.1.3. Contested Issues in Defining Civil Society

Two lines of debate can be identified in the literature: there is a disagreement of what does and does not constitute civil society a) in terms of types of activities and b) in terms of normative evaluations of those activities. The first line of the debate is about the ‘boundaries’ of civil society, i.e. which sectors or spheres of social activities are subsumed under the term civil society\(^6\). The second disagreement is about the qualitative criteria, if any, that should be applied in defining civil society.

Most authors, in line with the idealistic-liberal approach outlined in the previous section, delimit civil society from the state, the market and the private life (Dekker and van den Broek 2005; Linz and Stepan 1996; Trivedy and Acharya 1996). They also describe civil society as a sphere of somewhat organized activity (Diamond 1999, 221). Each of these delimitations of civil society from other spheres of social life is disputed in the literature.

The exclusion of market from the definition of civil society is challenged based mostly on historical grounds: civil society, as we understand it today was ‘born’ in the 18\(^{th}\) century and was composed of economic actors as well as of civic associations. Market elements were considered the core or even the “motor” of civil society (Keane 2005), hence, some scholars argue that market-oriented organizations are important elements of civil society today as well (Carroll and Carroll 2004; Fowler 1997; Mazlish 2005; Nagle and Mahr 1999).

\(^6\) This debate is of course only meaningful for those who define civil society as a sector or arena of society, rather than as a quality or attribute of society.
The distinction of civil society from the state and the political realm is challenged by scholars of the critical approach. They point to numerous occasions of close ties between the state and the agents of civil society and argue that the idea of civil society as existing independent from the state is unrealistic to begin with (McIlwaine 1998)\(^7\).

Although most definitions of civil society describe it as a sphere of at least somewhat organized and institutionalized activities, some authors consider the “intimate sphere” as an element of civil society (Cohen and Arato 1994, ix), or focus on informal friendship networks and small groups instead of organizations and/or movements (Fine and Harrington 2004; Gibson 2001). Another aspect of social life sometimes included into the concept of civil society is the area of public communication (Cohen and Arato 1994; Diamond 1999).

I believe it is important to define civil society as a sphere of somewhat organized social activity that excludes the state, the market, the public communication and the private sphere. The theoretical reason for narrowing down the concept of civil society is outlined by Alexander (1999) who states that all-inclusive concept of civil society is outdated and as such does not provide useful insights. The practical reason is that civil society defined in such broad terms is close to impossible to analyze empirically.

The second line of debate about what constitutes civil society is less technical and more normative. Some authors delimit civil society from its ‘shadow,’ arguing that if we call a phenomenon civil society, it acquires a normative connotation, hence: some organizations and activities cannot be a part of it. Civil society is based on principles of tolerance, diversity and inclusion. It is also bound by the rule of law or at least by some common set of rules, such as mutual respect and non-violence (Diamond 1999; Schmitter 1997; Trentmann 2000). Following this logic of argument, organizations like Mafia or Ku Klux Klan should belong to ‘uncivil’ rather than to civil society. The distinction between civil and uncivil society is based on either or all of the following: 1) the use of violence, 2) the ideas of the actors (i.e. organizations with non-democratic or extremist ideas belong to uncivil rather than to civil society) and 3) the internal organization (i.e. only democratically organized groups belong to civil society) (Kopecký and Mudde 2003).

\(^7\) Although these two spheres are indeed interconnected i.e. it is difficult to imagine civil society existing without a modern state or operating in a political vacuum, a useful way to distinguish between the sphere of civil society and the sphere of politics is to keep in mind that civil society does not seek to win over the control of the state (Diamond 1999; Schmitter 1997) although it certainly tries to influence the state. I would use a similar argument against inclusion of market elements into civil society. These are different spheres, guided by different purposes.
I believe it is necessary to distinguish between civil and uncivil society. At the same time it is important to include the latter into the empirical analysis in order to get a more realistic picture of what is happening in a given country’s associational life. One of the measurements of civil society used in the PhD research project is sensitive to potential uncivil aspects of associational life such as corruption or lack of tolerance within civil society actors.

1.1.4. Defining Civil Society

Reflecting the variety of meanings of civil society, the amount of definitions of civil society found in the literature is impressive. Salamon, Sokolowski and List (2003) present a typology of definitions of civil society. The authors, however, are skeptical of the possibility to derive an empirically sound definition of the term from the theory and propose an alternative ‘bottom-up’ approach based on research. The “structural-operational” definition that was shaped while implementing Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project\(^8\) specifies that in order to qualify as civil society, the entity has to have the following five characteristics:

- Some kind of organizational permanence, regularity and continuity (membership, activities, procedures for legitimate decision-making, etc);
- Not being part of the state apparatus;
- Non profit distributing;
- Self-governing;
- Voluntary, i.e. people are free to support, join or leave the organization or the group (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003).

I adopt this approach for the purpose of my research, but find it important to add one more element, often included in definitions of civil society: the capacity to deliberate over and advance common interests (Anheier 2004; Diamond 1999; Schmitter 1997).

A somewhat lengthy but comprehensive definition of civil society by Diamond (1999) captures all the aspects mentioned above and is used as the main conceptual definition of civil society in this research:

Civil society is the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals,

\(^8\) Information on the project can be found online [http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/research/index.html](http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/research/index.html).
to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable (Diamond 1999, 221).

Shortly restating the main points, one can define civil society as a sphere of social activities and organizations outside the state, the market and the private sphere that is based on principles of voluntarism, pluralism and tolerance. This is the so-called ‘ideal type.’ Civil societies existing in reality do not necessarily match this definition, but it should be possible to establish empirically how close or far they are from this ideal type.

1.1.5. Civil Society, Civic Community, Social Capital and the Third Sector

An important aspect of the conceptual discussion of the term civil society is its relation to other important concepts that partially overlap or are often linked to it. There are three concepts that need to be mentioned in that respect: civic community, social capital and the third sector.

Civic community, according to Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1994), is a community, characterized by trust, tolerance, solidarity and civic engagement. It is embodied in horizontal ties of reciprocity and cooperation of the equal, and in vibrant networks of associations. Civic community differs from civil society in several ways. Firstly, it is a characteristic of a given community, rather than a distinct sector of social life. Secondly, the population of organizations and social structures, covered by civil society, overlaps only partially with those of civic community. For example, parochial associations belong to civic community but not to civil society, while big NGOs with countrywide membership characterized by little face-to-face contacts is a civil society organization but is not part of civic community, since the defining features of civic communities (horizontal reciprocal relationships based on trust) are lacking (Diamond 1999, 225-226).

Coleman (1990, 300-301) describes social capital as an individual resource found in “authority relations, relations of trust, and consensual allocations of rights which establish norms.” According to Putnam (2000, 19) “Social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.” These two definitions reflect two basic but somewhat different understandings of social capital. The first one describes social capital as something belonging to an individual, while the second one describes social capital as existing in relationships between individuals.

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9 This difference of course only makes sense if one understands civil society as a sector, rather than as an attribute of the society.
In whichever way social capital is interpreted, its relationship with civil society is interpreted in a similar way by various scholars. Civil society is perceived as the forum where social capital is developed (Hyden 1997; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003). On the other hand, since social capital enables collective action and cooperation, it enhances the functioning of civil society, thus creating something like a virtuous cycle of a vibrant civil society being powered by social capital and producing even higher levels of social capital as a result of its activities.

The third sector is defined via its distinction from the public (the first) and the private (the second) sectors of society. It is composed from non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations. The term ‘third sector’ does not bear any normative connotations, differing in that respect from civic community. The third or non-profit sector includes entities that are organized, i.e. institutionalized at least to some degree (Salamon and Anheier 1996), therefore elements like social networks and social movements do not qualify as the third sector. On the other hand, organizations that are not voluntary but rather professional (hospitals, education, research, emergency and relief, etc.) are a part of the third sector if the profits generated through their operations are channeled back into fulfilling their mission. Such professional third sector organizations would not qualify as civil society due to the lack of a voluntary element. One could say that civil society is somewhere between civic community and the third sector in terms of organizations, amount of horizontal networks as opposed to hierarchies, and volunteering as opposed to paid professionals.

In a nutshell, the relationship between these four concepts can be described in the following way: civil society partially overlaps with civic community and the third sector and is the area of social life where social capital is developed. On the other hand, social capital enables civil society to exist and function.

1.2. Ways of Measuring Civil Society

Despite the skepticism and the criticism of the concept, during the past two decades social science researchers have come up with several ways to measure civil society. A systematized overview of types of measurement of civil society is presented below.

Based on a review of the literature on civil society research I have identified three different ways of measuring civil society:

a) proxy measures;

b) combination\computation of proxy measures to produce one generic measure of civil society;
c) expert assessment.

Proxy measures approach is used in most of the empirical studies of civil society. Since there is no such thing as ‘civil society’ that could be measured directly (in a way similar to recording attitudes or observing behavior) researchers focus on other phenomena that are believed to be closely linked with, or signal the existence (scope, quality) of civil society in a given polity. The following proxy measures have been used in order to empirically assess the state of civil society:

1. **Number of voluntary organizations/associations** is an approach that is mostly discredited by now, since most researchers agree that a simple count of organizations in a given country/region is not very meaningful. The sheer numbers of civil society organizations (CSOs) can present a misleading picture of a vibrant civil society, particularly in developing countries (Howard 2003, 50-52). Relying only on numbers of registered CSOs is problematic, because there can be numerous organizations with very small membership, short life span, and almost negligible levels of activity. Also, civil society in developing countries often contains a significant number of “pretender” CSOs (Fowler 1997; Holloway 2001), or what Luong and Weinthal (1999; 1274) call NGIs – non-governmental individuals.

2. **Membership** i.e. number of people involved in voluntary associations/organizations is one of the most popular proxy measures of civil society in the current social research. Bernhard and Karakoç (2007) and Howard (2003) use World Values Survey data on percentages of respondents who are members of voluntary associations. Some researchers insist that counting numbers of people involved in voluntary associations is a suboptimal solution. “Organizational density (i.e. membership) does not provide much indication about the actual involvement of existing members in their organizations” (Kopecký 2003, 7). This measurement can be improved if some information on the levels of activity beyond formal membership is included such as active participation and doing voluntary work (Pichler and Wallace 2007; Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003).

3. **Economic indicators** such as expenditures of civil society, expenditures of a given society on philanthropy, civil society ‘workforce’ i.e. the equivalent of full-time employment (both paid and volunteer) work that is generated by civil society (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003) can be used to assess the strength of civil society in a given country and have an advantage of providing a cross-country comparative data.
4. *Elite challenging behavior* such as participation in demonstrations, boycotts and petitions (Anheier, Katz and Lam 2008; Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005) can signal a vibrant civic life.

5. *Informal social networks* are sometimes used as a focus of research on civil society (Gibson 2001).

A potential problem with using proxy measures to assess civil society is that one can legitimately ask why talk about civil society at all, instead of talking simply about numbers of organizations, networks, values, etc.

The second way of measuring civil society is to **combine several proxy measures** to compute one generic measure of civil society. An example of this approach is the Global Civil Society Index by Anheier and Stares (2002).

The third approach to producing a measurement of civil society is based on **expert assessment** of civil society in a given country, based on a set of more or less elaborate criteria. As a result, civil society as a whole, or in some cases the composing elements of civil society, receives a score based on its level of development. Examples include:

- Freedom House “Nations in Transit” civil society score (Freedom House 2006).
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) NGO Sustainability Index (USAID 2006).
- Assessment of civic coalitions (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005).
- CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) (Heinrich 2004).

A potential problem with expert assessment as a measurement of civil society is similar to that of other measurements produced in such a way. The reliability of scores assigned by experts can be questioned. This approach, however, has the advantage of producing a measurement of civil society that takes into account its various aspects. Since civil society is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, I believe the expert assessment method of measuring it should be utilized alongside with other approaches. This PhD thesis uses measurements of civil society based on proxy measure combinations and expert assessment, thus adding novelty to the existing research, which is predominantly based on proxy measures alone.

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10 See, for example, Appendix A for the list of indicators of civil society composing the CIVICUS CSI and the description of dimensions of USAID NGO Sustainability Index.

11 The measurements of civil society used in this PhD thesis are specified in the Methodology Chapter.
This section of the thesis has demonstrated that, despite a certain amount of terminological confusion and complexity, modern political science and sociology offer a variety of ways to operationalize and measure civil society.

**Conclusion**

Civil society is an old political-theoretical concept that has been recently revived and assumed a variety of meanings. The interest in civil society resulted in a number of more or less successful attempts at its empirical operationalization. There is a vigorous debate about conduciveness of civil society to democracy. The main aspects of this debate are presented in the next chapter. The expectations placed on civil society in terms of democratization have been high for the past two decades. This has lead to concrete policy decisions and substantial financial support in attempts at strengthening civil society worldwide.

It is plausible, that the current popularity of the idea of civil society has to do with the fact that it appeals to many different groups. Free-market advocates welcome the idea of the state taking less responsibilities and delegating some tasks to civil society actors. Those interested in democratization see the potential of civil society to serve as an additional channel for aggregation and representation of interests, a watchdog, a local partner to government initiatives, etc. Civil society even seems to be able to appeal to individualists and communitarians simultaneously, by somehow combining independence with importance of social networks. Political right welcomes the idea of self-organization that would reduce the need for state support. Political left is attracted by pluralism and diversity offered by a vibrant civil society.

Civil society seems to possess a double virtue of being an attractive idea and, at the same time, being easily applicable in policy-making. It is ‘a good thing’ from many points of view and according to many definitions of ‘good.’ At the same time a decision to strengthen civil society can be translated into concrete policies and action plans, particularly in the field of democratization. As Dowley and Silver (2002, 505) notice, “If democracy needs civil society, we will support civil society, we will fund voluntary organisations, we will make social capital wherever it is lacking” is a popular way of thinking among scholars and policy-makers alike.

Unfortunately there is a problem: after two decades of enthusiasm it is becoming clear that civil society does not live up to the high expectations. The empirical evidence of civil society’s contribution to democracy is mostly confined to transition periods (Bernhard 1993; Beissinger 2005; Diamond 1999; Geremek 1996), which is an important step in
democratization, but it is just the first step. There is a lack of evidence of importance of civil society in improving and sustaining democracy outside of regime transition periods. In addition there is a growing body of evidence of the negative impact of civil society on democracy (Berman 1997; Dowley and Silver 2002; Kaldor, Kostovicova and Said 2007). The importance of civil society for democracy is also challenged from the institutional perspective, which argues that democratic institutions precede civil society in time, and provide the grounds for civil society to flourish (Skocpol 1999).

It has to be acknowledged that measuring the impact of civil society on democratization is a difficult task, mainly due to two reasons: a) it is a complex processes and b) the amount of reliable data available to conduct such a research is limited (Uphoff 1996). Most of the studies on the relationship between civil society and democracy focus on a few aspects, such as individual membership in voluntary associations, trust, political participation, contributions of civil society organizations to the public sphere, etc. As reviewed in Chapter I, these studies produce mixed results with respect to possible contributions of various elements of civil society to democratization processes. They have the limitation of focusing either on the individual, as the carrier of a democratic political culture, or on the actions of civil society organizations and their impact on democratic structures of the respective polity. The variety of ways civil society could influence democracy, makes it difficult to aggregate the results of different studies and arrive at a definite conclusion of importance or irrelevance of civil society for democracy.

Nonetheless, a study of the interplay between civil society and democracy is both possible and justified, given the high policy salience of the question and the amount of scholarship available on the topic. The interest in civil society has lead to new developments in the sphere of methodology and data collection. Several new measurements of civil society have been proposed, making it possible to take the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy one step further - a task undertaken in this PhD project.
Chapter I

Civil Society and Democracy: Literature Review

*A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help transitions to get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages of the democratization process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society is invaluable.*

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 1996, 9)

For more than a decade civil society has been receiving significant amounts of attention from various circles of democratization scholars and policy makers. Hopes and expectations have been high in the camp of enthusiasts of civil society who have discovered a whole range of positive effects of civil society on its members and on social/political structures of the polity in general. At the same time skeptics of civil society have been scrutinizing theoretical shortcomings of the concept and collecting empirical evidence of sobering reality, pointing to cases of failures of civil society and even examples of its negative influence on prospects of democratization.

It seems intuitively plausible that an active civil society where people take interest and responsibility in matters of public concern fits very well with the essence of democracy and should contribute to the quality of democratic governance. Moreover, civil society appeals to those looking for practical solutions to flaws of democracy, because it seems to offer a simple and politically uncontroversial\(^\text{12}\) option: provide support for civil society, and it will flourish to the benefit of all. Theoretically and normatively engaging, the idea of civil society as an agent of democratization ‘from below’ finds empirical support in scholarly research (Beissinger 2005; Bernhard 1993; Geremek 1996; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Shin 2006).

Popularity of civil society as an agent of democratization is contested both on theoretical and on empirical level. Many authors consider civil society as a useless concept because it is too vague, hence – inapplicable for empirical research (Edwards and Foley 1998), adds little to the existing ideas of democracy (Kumar 1993; Seligman 1995) or carries a Western normative bias, making it irrelevant for a study of non-Western societies (Baker

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\(^{12}\) This option is at least less controversial than aid to governments with dubious records of democracy and human rights, or a direct involvement with domestic political forces.
Thus, there are two dimensions to the debate about civil society’s potential for democratization: the theoretical one and the empirical one. On the theoretical level the main concerns are that the concept of civil society is inadequate for various reasons. Although on the theoretical/conceptual level, it is probably impossible to come up with a final and satisfactory answer of what civil society is and how should be measured. The definitional controversies around the term where mapped in the introduction in an attempt to demonstrate that there is a core meaning to the term ‘civil society’ which captures an important aspect of social reality and renders itself to operationalization and measurement. On the empirical level, a broad range of studies notwithstanding, there is no clear answer to the question of the relationship between democracy and civil society. Empirical evidence both supporting and challenging the importance of civil society for the transition to, consolidation and functioning of democracy is presented in the second section of this chapter thesis, followed by formulation of research questions. Before that, however, it is necessary to introduce the concept of democracy.

1. Introducing Democracy

1.1. The Concept of Democracy

A discussion of various definitions of democracy could make a PhD thesis in itself. Collier and Levitsky (1996) systematize and map various contemporary definitions of democracy, noting a remarkable proliferation of subtypes of democracy. According to the authors, there are some 550 examples of democracy “with adjectives”. While the discussion of various types of democracy is beyond the scope of this work, the concept of democracy, by which my research has been guided, is outlined in this section.

Definitions of democracy currently used by political scientists differ in the scope of elements required for a polity to be classified as a democracy. The “minimalist” (Diamond 1999, 8) definition of democracy is based on the ideas of Joseph Schumpeter (1975 [1942]). It emphasizes free and competitive elections as the essence of democracy. Schumpeterian definition of democracy is referred to as electoral democracy (Diamond 1999).

Some authors insist that the concept of electoral democracy is insufficient and allows for misinterpretations of reality. Other elements, in addition to free and fair elections, have to
be present in a democratic state. Dahl’s “polyarchy” extends beyond electoral democracy by adding freedom of expression, alternative information and associational autonomy to election-related rights and institutions (Dahl 1989, 221). The concept of liberal democracy has been developed by including non-electoral dimensions, such as political rights and civil liberties, into the definition of democracy (Diamond 1999, 10). In words of Giovanni Sartori (1987, 383) the task of liberal democracy is to add liberty to equality.

This study uses several sources to empirically measure democracy, as explained in Chapter II. Some of these sources measure only the basic institutional elements of electoral democracy. Others have a broader coverage of some aspects of a polity in question, producing indexes of liberal democracy. Thus, it is possible to analyze the relationship between civil society and democracy understood narrowly as an electoral democracy or as liberal democracy.

Efforts to measure democracy have a long history. Two broad traditions of research in this field can be identified: 1) those who use objective measures such as voter turnout, composition of legislative bodies, franchise, etc. and 2) those who rely on expert ranking of countries’ performance on aspects of liberal democracy such as fairness of elections, freedom of press, rights and liberties of citizens and political groups, and so on (Bollen and Paxton 2000). I combine both approaches for the purpose of my research, utilizing both objective measures and expert rankings.

1.2. The Link between Democracy and Civil Society

Since dissident East-European intellectuals have re-discovered the concept of civil society in the 1970s, it has played a prominent role in democratization discourses, both inspiring hope and causing skepticism concerning its ability to bring about and improve democracy. The perceived importance of civil society varies, from claims that it is a necessary pre-condition of a stable democracy to a more moderate view of civil society as a helpful tool for strengthening democracy. Still others see civil society as an outcome of democracy and not its driving force. Some arguments and examples of how and why civil society can contribute to democracy are presented below.

Before any democratic institutions are in place, civil society can try to undermine the authoritarian regime and “till the soil” for a democratic transition by providing alternative sources of information, raising consciousness, building social capital, establishing networks.

\footnote{For an overview of different approaches to measure democracy, see for example Vanhanen (2003).}
of trust and so on (Diamond 1999). Shortly before and during a democratic transition civil society organizations often play a prominent role by mobilizing the public, leading mass protests, pressuring the authorities and acting as representatives of ‘the people.’

Most of the evidence in support of the role of civil society in bringing about a democratic transition is derived from case studies of what Huntington (1991) has named the third wave of democratization. The case of Polish Workers’ Defense Committee and Solidarity movement has by now become almost an encyclopedia example of the role of civil society in resisting, weakening and initially overpowering an authoritarian state (Bernhard 1993; Geremek 1996). Analyzing the experience of four post-communist countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany) Bernhard (1993) comes to the conclusion that civil society has been a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for democratization.

One of the strongest supporters of the role of civil society in democratization is Larry Diamond. He argues that “in a number of prominent cases, civil society has played a crucial role, if not the leading role, in producing a transition to democracy” (Diamond 1999, 235). The cases described by Diamond (1999) include the Philippines in 1986, South Korea in 1987, Chile in 1988, and Poland in 1989. The following African countries are briefly mentioned as examples of civil society contributing strongly to democratic transitions: Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zaire. Diamond’s (1999) list can be extended to include three more countries: Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. Local civil society organizations and social movements of these three countries played a major role in the so-called ‘color revolutions’ (Beissinger 2005).

In addition to case studies of democratic transitions, there are a few comparative analyses with broader empirical bases. Recent studies of third wave democratization by Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) and Shin (2006) demonstrate that strong non-violent civic mobilization is one of the most important factors determining the successful transition to full liberal democracy. “The more vigorous, cohesive, and peaceful civil society is, the likelier the process toward full democracy; the less vigorous and cohesive and more violent civil society is, the more common is the reversal to non-democracy” (Shin 2006, 9). ‘Top-down’ transitions, on the contrary, have little positive effect on the increase of freedom in respective societies.

Civil society does not always contribute to democratization. Examples of failed democratic transitions despite strong mobilization of civil society include Burma in 1990 and Nigeria in 1993 (Diamond 1999). In a case study described by Hashemi (1996) one NGO’s
attempt to promote political change in Bangladesh by helping the poor to mobilize and contest local elections was crashed by terror. These examples show that mobilization of civil society does not guarantee a transition to democracy.

Despite the few reported cases of civil society failing to bring about a democratic transition, the conclusion that could be drawn from the current state of democratization research, is that civil society contributes significantly to the processes of democratic transition. The role of civil society in this case is relatively straightforward: it helps undermine the credibility of the regime and helps popular mobilization to force the regime to step down.

Is the link between civil society and democracy restricted to democratic breakthroughs? Or does it play an important, although much less visible role when there are no mass demonstrations or spectacular system transformations? The next section of this chapter presents an overview of the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of the relationship between civil society and democracy outside of transition periods. Unlike in cases of democratic transition, where a more-or-less clear picture of the impact of civil society has been established, the functioning of civil society in relatively stable regimes presents a puzzle worth researching, as will be demonstrated in the next sections of this thesis.

2. Civil Society and Democracy

Leaving the phase of democratic transitions and moving into the terrain of improving levels of existing democracy, the question of the impact of civil society becomes much more complex. Civil society is supposed to play a broad variety of roles in this area. This section lists the main theoretical arguments as to why and how civil society can be conducive to democracy, alongside the counter-arguments of skeptics of civil society. Following the theoretical discussion, the state of the empirical research concerning the effects of civil society on democracy is summarized; gaps and contradictions are identified in the existing knowledge of the relationship between civil society and democracy. Based on the theoretical debate and the inconclusive state of the available empirical analysis, the basic assumption is put forth that will be tested in the course of this research project. The three research questions derived from the basic assumption are formulated to be answered in the consecutive chapters of the thesis.
The functions of civil society in a democratic (or at least somewhat democratic) state can be divided into external effects that describe the impact of civil society organizations on the polity they are operating in, and internal effects that refer to impact of civil society on its members (Henderson 2002; Howard 2003; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994, 90). The former focus on organizations of civil society and their direct influence on political and economic developments and is closer to institutionalist tradition of political science. The latter is often related to the field of political culture; those interested in internal impacts of civil society argue that participation in civil society has positive effects on individual people, which in turn leads to strengthening of democratic culture.

Most of the research on the relationship between civil society and democracy focuses either on the internal or on the external effects of civil society. This PhD research project combines the two perspectives, in order to gain a better understanding of the role of civil society in promoting democracy outside of transition periods. The next two sections address both aspects of the relationship between civil society and democracy, starting from the external effects of civil society on the polity, followed by the discussion of the internal effects of civil society on individuals.

### 2.1. External Effects: Civil Society and the Polity

The discussion of external effects of civil society focuses on the ability of civil society organizations to serve as defense mechanisms protecting citizens’ interests, as well as influencing decision-making processes. This section gives an overview of the scope of possible pro-democratic effects civil society is expected to have on the polity, followed by the empirical evidence of the occurrences of these effects. It then presents counter-arguments and empirical evidence contradicting the notion of civil society’s impact on democracy. The theoretical debate on one hand and the contradicting empirical findings on the other hand point to a need for further research of the relationship between civil society and democracy, leading to the formulation of the basic assumption and the first research question, proposed at the end of the section.

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14 The earlier examples of this approach can be found in the pluralist theories of the 1960s that emphasized the role of interest groups in aggregating and voicing public demands, providing local solutions to community problems and promoting alternative mechanisms of governance. In the 1980s this approach was enriched by social movement theories (Norris 2002, 137).
2.1.1. Theoretical Summary of Pro-democratic External Effects

The spectrum of external impacts of civil society can be divided into four categories, though it is often hard to draw a clear line between these categories, as many activities of civil society actors are of a mixed nature:

- public sphere effects;
- resistance and representation;
- direct governance;
- other effects directly related to democracy.

**Public deliberation and public sphere effects** occur when associations contribute to the formation of public opinion and public judgment (Warren 2001). Cohen and (Arato 1994), Habermas (1996) and others have argued that facilitating public deliberation and influencing public opinion is one of the most important democratic functions of civil society. According to Habermas, bringing issues into the public sphere and facilitating public deliberation is the essence of civil society, its defining feature and, one could even say, the reason why civil society exists in the first place.

By voicing concerns, civil society actors bring these concerns into the public sphere for discussion, search for solutions and call for action. Warren (2001, 78) considers associations to be the central (“pivotal” as he calls them) players, able to draw attention to issues like human rights abuses, compliance with laws and treaties and so on.

**Resistance and Representation** are the two most widely recognized functions of civil society. The first one is somewhat more emphasized in the context of weak democracies; the latter receives more attention from scholars studying established democracies. The representational function of civil society is particularly prominent in the American pluralist theory, which “views associations as a primary means through which interests are represented to the state and the state is pressured to respond” (Warren 2001, 83). Assuming representation is one of the core elements of democracy, improving the quality of representation clearly improves the level of democracy.

Without associations, people are atomized and easier to control. Civil society organizations provide people with opportunities for collective action through which they may achieve something or resist something they do not like (Fung 2003; Warren 2001). One of the

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15 The classification of external effects of civil society is based mostly on Warren (2001) and Fung (2003) with a slight modification. I have grouped resistance and representation, because these are very often two sides of the same process. For example, it is hard to distinguish resistance to discrimination from representing the interests of the discriminated groups. I have also introduced the last category; other effects directly related to democracy, based on suggestions by Diamond (1999) in order to account for effects which seem of direct relevance, but do not easily fit into existing typologies of contributions of civil society to democracy.
democratic functions of civil society is to monitor and restrain the exercise of power by the state and to hold it accountable to the rule of law and to public expectations.

Civil society enhances representation in two ways. Firstly: it improves the quality of representation by providing additional channels of communication, which supply decision-makers with more detailed and nuanced information compared to clues transmitted via voting (Fung 2003; Warren 2001); secondly, civil society has (at least in theory) the potential to improve the equality of representation by counteracting the impact of money on the political system. Associations can help the poor, the disadvantaged and the marginalized to mobilize and voice their interests. “This means that, in principle, associations can help to level the playing field, organizing pressure and votes in ways that can compete with money” (Warren 2001, 84).

**Direct governance** effects occur when associations become directly involved in planning, negotiating or even implementing policies. This is a relatively new idea in the field of associations and governance, linked to a vision of participatory democracy in which associations are supposed to play a much more active role in the formulation and even implementation of policies (Fung 2003).

**Other effects directly related to democracy** encompass a variety of activities, undertaken by civil society organizations (CSOs) which often specifically focus on democracy-building. Education for democracy is an explicit project of some CSOs: training and teaching materials for participatory democracy, citizenship, rights, etc (Diamond 1999). Some CSOs consider large amounts of population as their target groups while others specialize on training political leaders and social activists. In newly established democracies in particular, civil society organizations often play an important role in strengthening democracy: CSOs monitor elections, keep track of human rights abuses and the treatment of prisoners. Some CSOs specialize in developing and offering techniques for conflict mediation and resolution (Diamond 1999).

Last but not least, civil society can provide citizens with positive experience with and, as a result, legitimation of the state in general or of particular policies (Diamond 1999; Warren 2001).

**2.1.2. Empirical Evidence of Pro-Democratic External Effects**

As the previous section has demonstrated, there is a broad variety of external effects civil society could have on the polity it operates in. What follows is by no means a comprehensive overview of all the empirical findings in the diverse fields of deliberation,
resistance, representation, direct participation and other civil society effects. Rather, the section provides examples of empirical studies of external effects of civil society within each of the categories identified in the theoretical discussion, in order to demonstrate the incoherence of outcomes and to justify the need for further research.

**Deliberative effects** of civil society manifest themselves when civil society groups raise issues of public concern and participate in their discussion. These effects are most often described in studies of mass media coverage of interest groups, citizen groups, voluntary associations etc. For example Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards and Rucht (2002) assess the quality of public discourse of abortion in the United States and Germany. They find a substantial difference in the impact of civil society elements on the public discourse in the two countries. While in Germany civil society organizations are almost invisible (constituting two percent of the “speakers”), in the United States civil society organizations make a substantial contribution to the public debate, making up approximately one quarter of all the speakers. In that particular case, it is clear that deliberative effects of civil society are country-specific.

Important factors in the empirical assessment of deliberative effects of civil society include not only the quantity of civil society actors participating in public discourses, but also the quality of their contribution, particularly in terms of fair representation. Are groups representing the interests of the poor and the disadvantaged as influential as the groups representing the interests of the rich? Danielian and Page (1994) demonstrate that corporations and business groups are more prominent in public discourse and get more positive coverage by the media, while citizen groups are underrepresented and often covered by the media in a way that creates negative connotations. A later study by Berry (1999), on the contrary, suggests a more favorable treatment of citizen groups by the media: they appear in the news more often and are treated more respectfully. In addition, citizen groups are able to produce some socially relevant research that gets media coverage, thus adding to the pool of publicly available information.

Case studies provide some empirical evidence of civil society effects, which can be listed under the **resistance and representation** category. For example Clemens (1999) argues that women’s associations in US in the late 19th and early 20th centuries effectively supported a wide range of welfare-related legislation. Carroll and Carroll (2004) describe the decisive role of women organizations in abolishing discriminatory laws in Botswana and ensuring women representation in legislation. Lelieveldt (1997) demonstrates that an intense

16 i.e. less often connected with demonstrations and strikes that project citizen groups as rebellious, unruly or alienating.
interplay exists between civil society organizations and local government in Netherlands\textsuperscript{17}. Berry (1999) looks at interest group participation in the legislative process in the US, more specifically whether they testify at congressional hearings and whether these testimonies are being covered by press. The author demonstrates that interest groups, particularly citizen groups, are actively involved with the legislators and emerge as visible players who are “at the center of debate in Washington over public policy” (Berry 1999, 379).

Nevertheless, some analysts conclude that resistance and representation effects of civil society hardly meet the expectations of democracy theorists. Warren (2001) notices that in the United States inequality in membership tends to mirror other inequalities present in the society at large, therefore the potential for representation as a ‘leveling of the ground’ (associations being able to represent the poor) mostly remains unrealized. Fung (2003, 524) presents a short review of literature pointing to the fact that “the notion that associations can equalize representation remains more a hope than reality.” Schlozman, Verba and Brady (1999, 451) demonstrate that the financially well-off are significantly more likely to be active members of organizations as compared to the poor; they claim “It is naïve to expect the institutions of civil society to be the magic remedy to overcome the class-based participatory deficit, for the purposed cure contains the seeds of the malady.”

**Direct participation and other democracy-related effects**

One of the few examples of direct participation is a case described by Bailey (2005) where a state-initiated attempt to increase the role of civil society organizations and local communities in urban re-generation programs in Britain has had moderate success at best. An interesting example of education for democracy as an external effect of civil society can be found in Beissinger (2005). The author describes how the Otpor movement (largely responsible for the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia in 2000) established a center for training of social activists where future leaders of mass mobilization in Georgia and Ukraine learned how to successfully organize and lead civic disobedience and non-violent protest campaigns.

The empirical evidence of the external impacts of civil society mentioned in this section can be summarized as follows: civil society organizations are able to enter public debate in some countries, if not in others. Case studies show some examples of resistance and representation, as well as other effects related to democracy, but there is a feeling among the

\textsuperscript{17} About three-quarters of organizations surveyed are politically active: they report being in touch with various governmental bodies or political parties, attending meetings, filing complains, organizing demonstrations, etc. Whether such a level of activity results in civil society influencing the local government is a question, not addressed in the study.
experts in the field that civil society performs worse than expected in these areas. Direct participation is a relatively new field where governments have an important role in initiating some of the processes.

All in all, it is difficult to get a clear picture of civil society succeeding or failing in producing external effects conducive to democratic consolidation. This lack of clarity could be attributed to the very broad scope of civil society activities, which makes it increasingly difficult to assess all the types and sub-types of external effects of civil society on the polity.

One could, however, approach this problem from a different perspective. If we ‘take a step back’ and try to look at the broader picture, it is logical to assume that if indeed civil society has some pro-democratic effects on the polity it belongs to, these effects should translate into an improved functioning of democracy. The more vibrant civil society is, the more impact it should have on its country’s democratic performance. Thus the basic assumption, put to an empirical test in this PhD thesis, is formulated as follows:

**There is a positive relationship between civil society and democracy.**

This relationship should manifest itself on the country level in the correlation between levels of civil society and performance of democracy as a form of governance. There are also other manifestations of the link between civil society and democracy, found on the individual level, as discussed later on in this chapter.

The discussion of pro-democratic impact of civil society on the polity addressed in this section is based on the logic of the causal arrow pointing from civil society organizations towards the polity. The idea that civil society influences the social and political institutions, however, is questioned in one of the two major lines of criticism of civil society’s relevance for democratic consolidation, as the next section demonstrates.

**2.1.3. The Institutional Critique of the Pro-Democratic External Effects**

The institutional school of thought presents puts forth one of the two major types of criticism of the relevance of civil society for democracy. Institutionalists generally maintain that ‘institutions come first’. In the relationship between civil society and democracy, this means that the institutions of democracy come first, and after those are in place, they enable

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18 There are few studies of that type, perhaps due to a lack of cross-country comparative data. One example of such an approach of analyzing the relationship between civil society and democracy can be found in the work by Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
civil society to flourish. The state has a great power to enable or block the development and the efficiency of civil society. In a polity where the state is either apathetic or hostile to civil society, voluntary associations and other elements of civil society might find it hard to operate. And vice versa, if the basic institutions of democracy are in place (such as the freedom of association, the representation mechanisms, the freedom of speech, etc.) civil society is capable of utilizing these mechanisms to its advantage. Thus, while the existence of the relationship between civil society and democracy is not denied, the direction of the impact between these two phenomena is reversed: it is the democratic institutions that influence civil society, rather than vice versa. In that sense, civil society is not very important for democracy.

 Particularly in young third wave democracies, institutionalists consider the creation of proper institutions the first and the most important task of democratization. Kumar (1993) finds the idea of civil society more misleading than helpful. In his view, politics precede civil society; therefore the establishment of a democratic polity and political activity, rather than civil society, should be of primary concern.

 The institutional critique of civil society’s importance for democracy is based on the argument that political institutions precede societal/cultural elements and contribute to their formation rather than vice-versa. To support this argument empirically institutionalists rely mainly on historical narratives and case studies. A few examples are presented below.

 Theda Skocpol (1999) examines the role of the state in the development of rich associational life in the United States. She argues that, “From the very beginning of the American nation, democratic governmental and political institutions encouraged the proliferation of voluntary groups” (Skocpol 1999, 33). Similarly Salamon (1990, 223) suggests that the American government played a noticeable role in the creation and expansion of nonprofit organizations in a number of fields. Another example of a governmental program that contributed significantly to increased levels of civic activities is documented by Mettler (2002).

 The role of the government in encouraging civil society is not unique to the US. Similar examples can be found elsewhere. Pestoff (1990) describes the Swedish approach to consumer policies, where the government has encouraged active participation of nonprofit organizations since the 1940s. “The government gave the nonprofit organizations access to official consumer agencies by providing them with seats on the governing bodies of

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19 Among other institutional factors, the absence of a church monopoly contributed to the proliferation of religious groups, while the federal post system made it easy for associations to become national.
consumer authorities, and thereby endowed them with official status and influence” (Pestoff 1990, 71). The government’s active role was very important in bringing about the current situation, in which nonprofit organizations have a real power in negotiations over consumer policies.

Examples from newly established democracies are at times even more telling than those derived from studies of long-term democracies. “In Nigeria, during periods of military authoritarianism, non-governmental organizations have served as mediating agents of repression. On the other hand, during periods of civilian rule, NGOs have served as mediating agents of stability” (Bradley 2005, 62). In the Nigerian example the state determines the role civil society plays, thus it is clearly more important and ‘comes first’.

Those who look at the relationship between the state and the civil society sometimes come to the more moderate conclusion of the importance of both. For example, Bernhard (1996) argues that both strong state and strong civil society are necessary for successful democratization. Carroll and Carroll (2004, 351) analyze the interactions between Botswana’s civil society and the state during the past decades of rapid development and conclude that “there is a reciprocal relationship between democratic institutions and civil society.”

The institutional critique of the impact of civil society on the polity highlights the problem of the causal direction. This issue is to be taken seriously if one hopes to make a case for the importance of civil society, as many policy makers and activists do. Does civil society promote democracy, or is it democracy that provides an environment for civil society to flourish? Is there a mutual influence, or does one of the two phenomena have stronger impact on the other? To address the issue of more likely direction of impact in the relationship between civil society and democracy, the following Research Question is formulated and analyzed as part of the PhD project:

**Research Question 1: Is civil society’s impact on democracy stronger than democracy’s impact on civil society?**

The basic assumption and the research question proposed in this section are formulated from the country-level perspective and require a country-level analysis, which is undertaken in Chapter III of this thesis. That, however, is only a part of the picture. There is a vivid theoretical discussion and a wealth of empirical findings dealing with the role of civil
society in creating and maintaining democratic political culture, thus taking the examination of the relationship between civil society and democracy to the individual level as opposed to the organizational or the country level of analysis. The next section of this chapter of the thesis looks at civil society’s impact on people.

2.2. Internal Effects: Civil Society and the Individual

The internal effects of civil society refer to what happens inside civil society, and whether such processes have any bearing on the members of CSOs. Scholars interested in the internal impact of civil society search for effects that participation in civil society has on individual people and, through the people, on the political culture of the society in general. This search starts with theoretical elaborations on types of effects and reasons why they should occur, and later translates into empirical research, as the next two sections of this chapter demonstrate. As the idea of pro-democratic internal impact of civil society does not stand unchallenged, some space is devoted to the main criticisms of civil society’s conduciveness to democratic political culture. The inconclusive empirical results from the supporters of civil society and empirically backed-up criticism from skeptics of civil society justify the need for further research and lead to the formulation of the next two research questions addressed in the PhD thesis.

2.2.1. The Internal Impact of Civil Society on Its Members: Theoretical Discussion

The scholarly tradition of interest in the possible internal effects of voluntary associations and civic involvement goes back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s (2000 [1864]) ideas on the importance of associational life in the American democracy at the time. Impressed by the scope of self-organized social activities he had observed during his visit to the United States, Tocqueville hypothesized that associations are ‘schools of democracy’ where people meet and decide on matters of common interest, thus developing habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness.

Tocqueville’s arguments have influenced much of the theoretical discussion of the role of civil society in strengthening democracy. The list of internal or “developmental” (Warren 2001) effects that civil society organizations are supposed to have on their members is impressive. Involvement in civil society organizations and activities is expected to influence a) knowledge and skills b) attitudes and values, and c) behavior of individuals.

Knowledge and skills enhanced by civil society include information made available to the members of CSOs as well as an improved deliberative capacity and other politically
relevant skills developed through participation in civil society. This is an important contribution of civil society to the consolidation of democracy, since the latter requires informed and sophisticated citizens.

Civil society organizations are expected to serve as additional sources of information. Some associations, such as advocacy organizations, specialize on collecting, organizing and transmitting information for the purpose of educating their constituency. Large associations often have their own experts, who process and restructure the information to make it available and understandable for a broader public; they “provide what might be called an epistemic division of labor, without which individuals would be more overwhelmed by the amount and complexity of information than they already are” (Warren 2001, 72).

In addition to educating their members, civil society organizations may contribute to the development of political skills that improve members’ performance as democratic citizens. According to Warren (2001, 72) any association that deals with problems of collective action is likely to cultivate political skills like “speaking and self-presentation, negotiation and bargaining, developing coalitions and creating new solutions to problems, learning when and how to compromise, as well as recognizing when one is being manipulated, pressured, or threatened.” Along the same lines Fung (2003, 520) argues that “associations are important schools of democracy, because they teach their members skills – how to organize themselves, run meetings, write letters, argue issues, and make speeches – that are necessary for all manner of political action.” Another skill that can be developed by participation in civil society is individual critical thinking (Fung 2003; Warren 2001), which is perhaps the one that is most important for a democratic political culture.

**Attitudes and values** allegedly cultivated by civil society are sometimes summarized under a general label of “civic virtues” that include “attention to the public good, habits of cooperation, toleration, respect for others, respect for the rule of law, willingness to participate in public life, self-confidence, and efficacy” (Fung 2003, 520). Warren (2001, 73) adds concerns for justice, trust and reciprocity to the list of civic virtues.

The reason rich and pluralistic civil society is believed to be well suited for the development of civic virtues is that it “tends to generate a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict” (Diamond 1999, 245). The assumption is that people join a variety of organizations where they associate with fellow members and are exposed to different political views and patterns of behavior. Through membership in associations, they have higher chances to meet, interact and cooperate with people from different races, socio-economic groups, ethnic backgrounds, sexual orientation,
etc. Due to these interactions, members of associations develop tolerance for diversity, respect for opposing viewpoints, and willingness to compromise (Diamond 1999).

**Behavioral** effects refer mostly to increased political participation as a result of involvement in civil society organizations (Diamond 1999) which is also, in theory, conducive to democracy, because an active citizenry is more desirable than a passive one.

To summarize the theoretical discussion of why and how civil society is conducive to a democratic political culture via its impact on individuals: people involved in civil society organizations are likely to possess higher levels of politically-relevant information and display certain attitudes and patterns of behavior that are conducive to democracy. The empirical evidence for this argument is presented in the next section.

2.2.2 Empirical Evidence of the Internal Effects of Civil Society

From the impressive package of potential civic virtues, skills and patterns of behavior, only a few have been empirically analyzed. When searching for internal effects of civil society, scholars almost exclusively focus on voluntary associations as the most visible and empirically ‘researchable’ entities of civil society. Some of the results are presented below.

There is little research done on the **knowledge and skills** dimension of the internal effects, but this is perhaps the least controversial type of impact of civil society on its members. The fact that membership in voluntary associations contributes to enhancement of civil skills has been demonstrated by Verba and Nie (1987) and later by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995)\(^{20}\).

The assumption that certain **attitudes and values** are enhanced by civil society has been extensively researched. One of the earliest studies of pro-democratic civic culture is the path-breaking work by Almond and Verba (1963). Among other institutions contributing to the formation of political culture, the role of voluntary associations is explored. The study demonstrates that membership in associations is indeed related to a higher sense of political efficacy and a wider range of political opinions. The authors conclude that voluntary associations, together with the family and the workplace, are important socializing agencies where people can develop and balance various roles and are exposed to different attitudes. This leads to increased civic competence and better democracy. Findings by Almond and

\(^{20}\) According to Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) about 40 percent of members of voluntary associations reported having written letters, participating in decision making, chairing meetings and giving public presentations in the context of their membership. Thus, these civic skills were being exercised, hence, hopefully improved.
Verba (1963) concerning political efficacy are replicated in more recent research. Dekker and van den Broek (1996) show that membership in voluntary associations fosters increased self-perception of political confidence and political interest.

An interesting study of whether voluntary associations serve as ‘schools of democracy’ was conducted by Moyser and Parry (1997, 35-36). The authors explored the political culture of voluntary associations by looking at how decision-making power is exercised within associations, and whether leaders are responsive to ordinary members. The authors came to the conclusion that: “if lessons are learned about democracy here, they must be disproportionately positive… Not only do most voluntary associations in this study have formal elective (albeit not always competitive) processes for leader selection, but also the leadership seems to be relatively in touch and responsive” to members of respective associations (Moyser and Parry 1997, 35). Political culture of voluntary associations is democratic, rather than oligarchic, with the exception of occupational organizations, where fewer members (32 percent as compared to a range of 64 to 78 percent in other types of organizations) feel that their leadership is responsive to their views (Moyser and Parry 1997, 36).

One of the most prominent recent works highlighting the role of associations in developing civic virtues (and in turn improving functioning of democracy) is the study by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1994). By comparing regions of northern and southern Italy, the authors demonstrate that different levels of civic activity make a difference in the quality of democracy. The vibrant associational life of Northern Italy dates back to medieval guilds, neighborhood “communes,” and prominent town councils. The tradition of self-organization and self-governance has flourished in Northern Italy for centuries. Nowadays it translates into norms and networks of trust and reciprocity, creating what Putnam and his co-authors call a “civic community,” which is more efficient in pressuring the government for services, transparency, accountability etc. due to higher levels of civic engagement and solidarity.

Following Putnam’s work, the issue of trust has received significant attention, with mixed results. Dekker and van den Broek (2005) demonstrate that membership in associations is related to social trust, although the direction of causality is unclear and the possibility of spurious relationship due to a third factor is not ruled out. Knack and Keefer (1997) on the contrary, demonstrate that membership in various groups and associations is not related to levels of trust in a society. Empirical evidence, presented by Newton (2001) suggests that members of voluntary associations are barely more likely to express attitudes of social and political trust than non-members.
The impact of membership in non-political organizations on political participation has been extensively researched. Among the few definitive findings is the conclusion that a clear positive and direct relationship exists between voter turnout and social participation (Deth 1997a). Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) find that voluntary associations enhance citizens’ political activity by providing exposure to political stimuli: members of voluntary associations may engage in political discussions, or be recruited to participate in political activities via personal contacts in the associations (Verba and Nie 1987). Dekker and van den Broek (1996) empirically demonstrate the existence of a relationship between involvement in the voluntary sector and in the political domain. Membership in voluntary associations fosters discussions of politics and political membership. People who are involved in associations are more inclined to engage in political protests.

Joye and Laurent (1997) on the contrary, find only a weak correlation between associative and political participation. Moyser and Parry (1997) find that in Britain voluntary associations are not very politicized. “The majority of members claim that political matters are ‘never’ discussed in their club or group” Moyser and Parry (1997, 31). Nevertheless 20 percent of members have used the club/group to raise a political need or issue in the past five years.

Almond and Verba (1963) as well as Dekker and van den Broek (1996) state that no causal inferences can be made from the studies confirming the link between participation in voluntary sector and political participation. It is plausible to assume that politically active people also actively engage in voluntary associations. People might be asked to participate in political activities because they are known to be politically active and hence likely to agree; they might regularly engage in political discussions with fellow members of association because they are interested in politics in the first place, and so on.

Some studies reviewed here focus on skills, sense of efficacy and internal political culture of civil society organizations. They show that members of voluntary associations have higher sense of political efficacy, are more interested in politics and have opportunities to develop civic skills. As the cases of Northern Italy (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994) and Britain (Moyser and Parry 1997) demonstrate, members of voluntary associations are often but not always exposed to democratic political culture of their respective associations, making the ‘schools of democracy’ argument plausible.

See Deth (1997a) for a comprehensive literature review on social and political participation.
Most empirical research on the internal effects of civil society focuses on voluntary associations on one hand and social trust or political participation on the other. It is established that voluntarism is related to higher levels of political participation though in the case of trust the outcomes are unclear. In both cases the direction of causality could run either way: membership in voluntary associations could make people more trusting and politically active, or, trusting and politically active people could be more likely to join voluntary associations. Thus, similar to the issue of external effects of civil society and the Research Question formulated above, the question of direction of impact remains unanswered.

As with the external effects of civil society on the polity, the basic assumptions of civil society as a ‘school of democracy’ are challenged, and empirical evidence is presented to support that challenge. Typically these criticisms are inspired by the critical perspective on civil society described earlier in the thesis. What follows is the summary of arguments and findings in the political culture critique of civil society.

2.2.3. The Critical Perspective on the Internal Effects of Civil Society

Those interested in civil society as an element of political culture do not always agree with Tocqueville. Skepticism about interest groups and their impact on the quality of democracy is as old as the enthusiasm about associational life. Where supporters of civil society start with Tocqueville’s famous quote about the “science of association” being the mother science, and the need to develop and perfect “the art of associating” for the sake of modern progress and civilization (Tocqueville 2000 [1864], 492) the skeptics of civil society mention the work of another classic of political thought. James Madison was among the first to speak against organized interests. In *Federalist Paper No 10* he warns against mischief of factions that, given the opportunity, will pursue their narrow interests, describing them as harmful for the common good and destabilizing the government in the long run (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 2000 [1788]). According to this skeptical view, organized support of specific interests undermines, rather than strengthens the general public-spiritedness of those involved.

As was mentioned earlier, the critical understanding of civil society pays special attention to tensions and conflicts within civil society and raises questions about the conduciveness of civil society for democracy. “Are all networks of voluntary organizations democratic? Does participation in narrowly defined organisations promote the kind of social trust that Putnam sees as so critical to a functioning democracy, or do they more often,
particularly in already divided societies, serve only to reinforce existing cleavages rather than help to cut across them?” (Dowley and Silver 2002, 505).

Enthusiasts of civil society expect it to serve as a ‘buffer’ to potential conflicts, yet in reality not all elements of civil society oppose violence and promote tolerance. Civil society is very diverse. Though some organizations are directly related to, and concerned with, democratization (human rights NGOs, election monitoring civic groups, etc.) many are neutral (sports and hobbies related groups, etc.) and yet others (such as Mafia and Ku Klux Klan) can be involved in activities incompatible with democracy and have anti-democratic effects on their members and on the society at large. Even if one excludes the groups belonging to the last category as elements of uncivil society, why should neutral organizations contribute to democracy? There is nothing inherently good or democratic about a vibrant associational life. One could also argue that there is nothing inherently good about skills of cooperation either, since violence is often performed by well-organized and cooperating groups.

Those who critically examine the interplay between civil society and political culture, point out that civil society can undermine, as much as strengthen democracy: it can fragment and polarize the society and even empower anti-democratic forces and processes. They also maintain that, simply, there is nothing intrinsically democratic about the propensity to associate.

The critique of civil society finds some empirical support. Kaldor, Kostovicova and Said (2007) argue that in Iraq, and former Yugoslavia various organized groups served either to counteract or to escalate the conflicts. Yugoslavian case is particularly interesting, because the authors mention the Serbian Association of Writers and Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts as active contributors to the shaping of nationalistic ideology, which portrayed Serbs as martyrs of history, and worsened the later bloody conflict. These are not the kind of radical or sectarian organizations that one could easily discard as ‘uncivil’ by their nature. Similarly, Bieber (2003, 23) provides some evidence that a significant number of individuals signing the founding memorandum of Yugoslav Helsinki Group\(^\text{22}\) committed to tolerance and non-violence in 1987, only to become “leading figures in the dismemberment of the country and in the propagation of hate speech and extreme nationalism” later on.

An interesting finding by Dowley and Silver (2002, 509) is that in post-communist countries “the mean levels of social trust and organisational membership are consistently

\(^{22}\) Which was, according to the author, an important step in the development of Yugoslav Civil Society.
negatively related to the levels of overall democratization” The authors suggest that this could be the case because high rates of participation in voluntary organizations in ethnically plural societies might signal the ethnic polarization of society, which could be a problem for democratization particularly in weakly consolidated democracies. Indeed, their study demonstrates that “being a member of voluntary organization is not correlated with support for democratic principles. In fact, among minority populations voluntary group membership is more often associated with lower support for democratic institutions and principles” (Dowley and Silver 2002, 522).

A telling account of the role of a vibrant civil society in undermining democracy is the study by Berman (1997). The author argues that German civil society during Weimar Republic was quite active, but disconnected from weak and inefficient political institutions thus undermining them even further. In addition the vibrant associational life was cleverly used by the Nazi party to gain broad political support.

Participation in organizations of civil society did link individuals together and help mobilize them for political participation (just as current neo-Tocquevillean scholars claim), but in the German case this served not to strengthen democracy but to weaken it... NSDAP rose to power not by attracting alienated, apolitical Germans, but rather by recruiting highly activist individuals and then exploiting their skills and associational affiliations to expand the party's appeal and consolidate its position (Berman 1997, 408).

Hence, according to the author, rich associational life should not be considered as something inherently positive and conducive to democracy, since the relationship can be reversed, as the Weimar Republic example clearly demonstrates. Instead, one should consider associationalism as a “politically neutral multiplier – neither inherently good nor inherently bad” (Berman 1997, 427).

Negative outcomes of civil society activism are not only found in young and fragile democracies. Fiorina (1999) uses a case study of a small town in the US to illustrate an argument that “extreme voices” of unrepresentative, narrowly-focused civic groups can significantly raise the costs of political bargaining and produce suboptimal outcomes.

The studies reviewed in this section demonstrate that inside of civil society there can be organizations that undermine rather than strengthen democracy. Hence, the propensity of civil society to create democratic political culture via its impact on individuals must be critically examined.

From the three dimensions outlined in Section 3.2.1 of this chapter, the knowledge and skills aspect is the least researched but also the least controversial one. The empirical
evidence available demonstrates that membership in associations does help acquire civic skills. Therefore, this type of potential pro-democratic internal effects of civil society is not examined in the course of this research project. Attitudes and behavior (mainly political participation) are the two aspects of political culture where the influence of civil society has yet to be convincingly established or disproved. This PhD project addresses both the attitudinal and the behavioral dimensions of political culture. It analyses the question of conduciveness of civil society for democracy via its influence of micro-foundations of democracy i.e. the individuals. The attitudinal and the behavioral manifestations of the relationship between civil society and democracy are thus added to the institutional manifestation formulated above.

To examine the impact of civil society on all kinds of attitudes and types of behavior relevant for democracy would be an enormous task. Since my interest is in the link between civil society and democracy, given the variety of pro-democratic attitudes, I have decided to focus on the one most directly related to the subject matter: i.e., people’s expressed support for democracy. The following research question concerning the attitudinal manifestation of the relationship between civil society and democracy is formulated:

**Research Question 2: Is people’s support for democracy influenced by the state of civil society in the country?**

Unlike the attitudinal dimension, in the domain of behavior the research is almost exclusively focused on political participation as an important element of individual democratic political culture. For the political participation aspect of civil society’s impact on the individual level, the following research question is formulated:

**Research Question 3: Is individual political participation influenced by the state of civil society in the country?**

There are many types of political participation. Due to time and data availability limitations, this thesis focuses on two types of unconventional political participation: signing petitions and joining boycotts.
Conclusion

Despite the variety of interpretations of civil society, social scientists have by now come up with several ways of defining, operationalizing and measuring civil society, as the first section of the chapter has demonstrated. The second section has introduced the concept of democracy and has opened up the discussion of the relationship between the two phenomena. The last section summarized the extensive theoretical discussion of various pro-democratic effects of civil society accompanied by empirical evidence both supporting and undermining the argument of importance of civil society for democracy.

The variety of hypothesized pro-democratic effects of civil society is impressive. The typology of effects is presented in Table 1 on the next page.

When looking at civil society as an institution or a set of institutions operating in a polity, the researchers have found some evidence of civil society organizations enriching the public debate on relevant policy issues and providing avenues of resistance and representation, as well as getting directly involved in governance and decision making. Two important questions emerge:

- Does the activity of civil society translate into higher levels of democracy on the societal level?
- What is a more plausible direction of impact: from civil society to democracy, or vice versa?

When looking at civil society as an element of political culture influencing the individual, the empirical evidence as of now provides no clear answer of whether civil society is indeed a ‘school of democracy.’ Civil society has the potential to both enhance and undermine democratic political culture. The attitudinal and the behavioral dimensions of political culture lead to the formulation of another pair of questions:

- Are democratic attitudes (more narrowly – support for democracy) enhanced by civil society?
- Is political participation enhanced by civil society?

The two sets of questions refer to two different levels of analysis: the societal one and the individual one. To be more precise, the second set of questions requires a two level analysis where the impact of civil society (a societal phenomenon) on the individual is tested. Chapter III of this thesis analyses the first pair of questions by looking at the relationship between civil society and democracy on the country level. Chapter IV includes the individual level into the analysis and addresses the second pair of questions.
Table 1: Hypothesized Pro-Democratic Effects of Civil Society23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>Knowledge and skills</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deliberative capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes and values</td>
<td>Attention to the public good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Respect for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Respect for the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Willingness to participate in public life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Willingness to compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Willingness to cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerns for justice</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Public sphere effects</td>
<td>Raising an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contributing to public deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance and representation</td>
<td>Resistance of unwanted actions, policies, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring state power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Holding the state accountable</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Representation of interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct governance</td>
<td>Policy formulation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Education for democracy (citizens and leaders)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Election monitoring</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Human rights monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimating</td>
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Most of the research on the relationship between civil society and democracy uses proxy measures of civil society (such as membership in associations or economic parameters of the third sector), case studies of success or failure of civil society organizations in particular areas, or historical narratives. Few researches have yet utilized generic measures of civil society, recently developed by various experts as a response to the increased interest in civil society. There are also few comparative studies or time-series analyses.

The PhD research seeks to contribute to the debate concerning the importance or irrelevance of civil society for democracy, by using new approaches to measuring civil society in a given country, and relating these new data to levels of democracy, instead of relying on proxy measures of civil society. Having comparable data available over a time

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23 The structure of this table is inspired by Warren (2001), who provides a comprehensive and systematic theoretical discussion of pro-democratic effects voluntary organizations can have on their members, on governments, or on the society in general.
period of at least 10 years allows me to go beyond correlations and make suggestions to the possible direction of causality in the relationship between civil society and democracy. Combining individual and country level data in a two-level analysis provides new insights on how civil society interacts with individual democratic attitudes and patterns of behavior.

Before presenting the results however, the data sources and the methodology used in this PhD research project are described in the next chapter.
Chapter II

Data Sources and Methodology

Conventional social science methodology has largely bypassed the field of civil society, as have statistical offices in most countries. As a result of this long neglect, civil society institutions and organizations are among the least studied, and frequently constitute the terra incognito of economic, social, political and cultural statistics.

Helmut K. Anheier (2004, 11)

How to measure democracy? How to measure civil society? The first task has been on political science agenda for some time now; researchers have come up with several ways of assessing levels of democracy, although no agreement has been reached as to which one is the best indicator of democracy. The second task has been but recently undertaken. The data that is available is relatively new and is not as broad in terms of country and year coverage as one could wish for. Also it has not yet been tested through empirical research. Nonetheless it does provide an opportunity for answering research questions proposed in this study, bearing in mind possible limitations of the data.

This chapter of the thesis provides information on the sources of data used to measure democracy and civil society. The timeframe of the study, derived from the availability of the data is identified. Since the data on civil society is relatively new, I make an assessment of its validity by looking at the amount of overlap between several measurements of civil society. The rationale for, and the procedure of combining measurements of democracy and civil society is presented as well. The chapter concludes with introducing World Values Survey (WVS) as the source of individual level data required in the multilevel analysis of impact of civil society on individual attitudes and behavior patterns.

1. Measurements of Democracy

As was mentioned above, contemporary political science provides researchers with various measurements of democracy to choose from. I prefer to rely on various indicators of democracy in order to minimize potential biases, each source taken separately may have. Also, including several sources into the analysis adds to the richness of the data since the five measures vary somewhat in their operationalization of democracy. Hence, by pooling together the information contained in the different indicators of democracy I include a range
of dimensions of democracy into my analysis. It allows me to explore possible nuances in the relationship between civil society and various aspects of democracy.

The following five measurements of democracy are used in this PhD research:

1. Polity IV Project (Polity IV)
2. Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (Vanhanen ID)
3. World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators: Voice and Accountability
5. Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project:

Each of the five sources is briefly discussed here; more detailed information is presented in the Appendix A of this thesis.

**Polity IV Project** contains coded annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all independent states (with greater than 500,000 total populations) in the global state system and covers the years 1800 to 2004. It focuses on basic institutions and procedures of democracy, such as the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Polity IV reflects the classical understanding of democracy as a system that enables popular control of and constitutional constrains on state power. For the purpose of my research I use the measurement of Institutionalized Democracy: a score from zero (no democracy) to ten (maximum democracy).

**Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy** covers 187 countries over the period 1810 to 2000. It combines two aspects of democracy: competition (measured by the percentage of votes won by the largest party) and participation (the percentage of population that voted in a given election). The index varies from zero to 40+ (at the moment 43 is the highest score). The higher the number - the more democratic the regime (Vanhanen 2003). Vanhanen’s ID has a heavy emphasis on elections, thus adding a new element of democracy in addition to the institutional one, covered by Polity IV.

**World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators** reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international

24 The information about the project and the data is available from the website: [http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).
25 The data is available from the website: [http://www.prio.no](http://www.prio.no).
organizations (World Bank Group 2007a)\textsuperscript{26}. The list of sources that provide the data for the Governance Indicators and other methodological details can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzii (2006). I am using the Voice and Accountability (VA) index, which varies from -2.5 to 2.5, the latter meaning better governance. This index reflects “the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzii 2006, 4). Hence World Bank Voice and Accountability Index combines the electoral aspect of democracy with some elements of liberal democracy.

\textbf{Freedom House} is a US-based non-governmental organization that is, according to its mission statement, committed to support and expansion of freedom in the world. \textit{Freedom in the World} is an annual comparative assessment of the state of political rights and civil liberties in 192 countries and 14 related/disputed territories. It is being carried out and published since 1972\textsuperscript{27}. Each country and territory is assigned a numerical rating between one and seven for political rights, and an analogous rating for civil liberties. A rating of one indicates the highest degree of freedom.

The data produced by Freedom House is widely used by political scientists interested in measuring liberal democracy. Some authors go as far as to claim its superiority to other available measurements of democracy. According to Diamond (1999, 12) “The “free” rating in the Freedom House survey is the best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy.” (Bollen and Paxton 2000), on the contrary, caution against judge-specific measurement errors that could influence the country ratings produced by Freedom House. I hope to avoid measurement errors by combining FH democracy scores with four other sources.

For my research I use the combined average of political rights and civil liberties. To improve the readability of the results I reverse the scores\textsuperscript{28} so that the lower scores signify less democracy (i.e. countries with authoritarian regime receive the score of one) and higher scores signify more democracy respectively, with the score of seven meaning maximum democracy.

\textbf{CIRI Human Rights Data Project} provides quantitative information on government respect for 13 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually for the years 1981-2004\textsuperscript{29}. This approach of using core political rights and civil liberties to assess the level of democracy in a given country is similar to that of Freedom House. Unlike FH data

\begin{itemize}
  \item The data is available from the website: \url{http://web.worldbank.org/}.
  \item The data is available from the Freedom House website: \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org}.
  \item Reversed FH score = \([8 – FH score]\).
  \item The data is available from the website: \url{http://ciri.binghamton.edu/}.
\end{itemize}
however, CIRI output is based not on expert assessment, but on the count of occurrences of human rights violations. In a way one could consider CIRI as a ‘reality check’ of FH scores.

For my research I use two additive indices: the Physical Integrity Rights Index and the Empowerment Rights Index. The first one is constructed from indicators of occurrences of torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and disappearances instigated by government officials. It varies from zero to eight, with eight signifying full government respect for physical integrity rights. Details on the construction of the Physical Integrity Rights Index can be found in Cingranelli and Richards (1999).

The Empowerment Rights index is constructed from the following five indicators: 1) openness and freedom of political participation, 2) government control of media, 3) freedom to unionize, 4) freedom to travel and 5) freedom of religion. It varies from zero (no government respect for these rights and liberties) to ten (full government respect for these rights and liberties). Details on the construction of the Empowerment Rights Index can be found in Richards, Gelleny and Sacko (2001).

Taken together FH and CIRI represent the school of thought that defines democracy via rights and liberties exercised by its citizens, thus adding another important dimension of democracy to those captured by Polity IV, Vanhanen ID and World Bank Voice and Accountability scores. Table 2 lists the different foci of the five sources of democracy used in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>1800-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhanen ID</td>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>1810-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank VA</td>
<td>Electoral and liberal</td>
<td>1996-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI</td>
<td>Rights and liberties</td>
<td>1981-2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The treatment of democracy scores for three units of analysis: namely Hong Kong, Serbia and Montenegro, merits a special mention. Democracy scores for Hong Kong are available from FH and World Bank; for the other sources the data is coded as missing. The general score for Serbia and Montenegro is used for these two countries for the years preceding their split up, where available.

30 The time period covered by the data as of November 2007. By the time of publishing the thesis, new data for more recent years has become available as well.
The five measures of democracy used in this PhD thesis capture various aspects of democracy and are based on primary data as well as on expert assessment. After re-coding Freedom House scores, in all five cases higher numbers represent higher levels of democracy. Utilizing all the five measures improves the richness of the data and works as a safeguard against potential biases. As will be demonstrated latter in this chapter, all five sources are strongly inter-related although not overlapping completely. To tap into these differences, the measurements of democracy are used separately where possible. In addition to that a combined index of democracy for each year of analysis is created, as explained in the subsequent section of this chapter.

Next section of the thesis describes the sources of data on civil society used in this research.

2. Measurements of Civil Society

As stated in the previous chapter, most of the research on civil society relies on proxy measures. The generic measures of civil society have recently been developed and have yet to be put to extensive empirical testing. This PhD thesis aims to contribute to the body of research on civil society by utilizing the new measures of civil society and applying them to the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy. Similarly to the case of measurements of democracy, instead of relying on one measurement only I include several measurements of civil society into my analysis. Unfortunately if one decides not to rely on proxy measures, the choice of data sources is restricted to a few options available in the field of civil society research. An additional limitation is that these sources cover relatively few countries and have been recently implemented, covering at best several years of civil society development.

The following data sources are used for measuring civil society:

1. Global Civil Society Index (GCSI)
2. CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI)
3. USAID NGO Sustainability Index (NGO SI)
4. Freedom House Nations in Transit civil society scores (FH CS)

The **Global Civil Society Index** was developed by Anheier and Stares (2002). It is based on primary data and combines two levels of measurement: the individual and the organizational. The individual level consists of the participation aspect (political participation

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31 Used only in the analysis of validity of civil society data, not in the analysis of the link between civil society and democracy due to reasons stated in the respective section of the thesis.
and membership in associations concerned with common good) and “civility” measured by levels of tolerance in the population of a given country. The organizational level refers to the density of International NGOs and associations over a given population. The data on civil society scores for 33 countries for the year 2000, as well as the detailed account of the construction of the GCSI is presented in Anheier and Stares (2002)\textsuperscript{32}.

Following the authors’ recommendation, I used re-normalized scores of GCSI for my analysis. The score varies from zero (weak or non-existent civil society) to one (strong civil society). I have re-calculated the GCSI to exclude political participation, because it could artificially inflate correlations with democracy and distort individual level analysis. I have decided to keep tolerance as an element of GCSI, although this decision is not entirely unproblematic. Using indicators of tolerance as a component of civil society index can be questioned. As was demonstrated in the literature review section of this thesis, civility or civic virtues like tolerance, are often considered outcomes of civil society, rather than its components. Nevertheless, as my focus of research is the relationship between civil society and democracy I think it is acceptable to use tolerance as a proxy measure combined with other data to construct a measurement of civil society.

The Civil Society Index (CSI) Program is one of the projects, implemented by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, an international alliance of over 1000 organizations and individuals from 105 countries. Its goal is to assess the state of civil society in countries around the world (CIVICUS 2006).

CSI is composed of four dimensions of civil society: structure, impact, values and environment. Each dimension has a score varying from zero (weak civil society) to three (strong or well developed civil society). These four scores are the outcome of expert assessment of 24 measurements with some 70+ sub-dimensions that capture various aspects of civil society. CSI does not produce one final score for civil society. Instead the four dimensions: structure, impact, values and environment, are plotted in a form of a diamond\textsuperscript{33}. See Figure 1 on the next page for the illustration of the final output of CSI. See Appendix C for the list of CSI sub-dimensions.

\textsuperscript{32} Available online: \url{www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/yearbook02chapters.htm#part4}.
\textsuperscript{33} The Civil Society Diamond is an analytical framework developed for CIVICUS by Dr. Anheier, one of the leading specialists in the field of empirical research on civil society (Heinrich 2004).
After the pilot phase in the year 2000 followed by a revision and refinement of its methodology, the CIVICUS CSI project was implemented in 2003-2005 in 54 countries and regions around the world. As of October 2007 the data for 39 countries and regions was available online and was used in this research.

To avoid overlap with the measures of democracy I excluded two measurements: “political context” and “basic freedoms and rights,” and re-calculated the environment dimension of CSI without these two sub-categories. After that I created four aggregated measures: 1) the sum of the four dimensions of CSI, 2) the average of the four dimensions, 3) the sum of the 22 scores that form these four dimensions, 4) the factor score of the four dimensions (since they load on one factor: eigenvalue = 2.8; 69.1 percent of variance explained). All four aggregated measures of CSI behave similarly during empirical analysis, therefore in order to simplify the presentation of results and to avoid repetitiveness, only the outcomes of the analyses obtained using the second type of the aggregate CSI measure i.e. the average of the four dimensions of CSI is reported in this thesis.

The next measurement used in the study is the USAID NGO Sustainability Index. It focuses on post-communist countries only. The data is available for 29 countries and regions for the years 1998-2006. The method of data generation is similar to that of CIVICUS CSI but less detailed. Experts assign scores to seven dimensions of civil society, these are then averaged to produce a score from seven (low or poor level of development) to one (very advanced NGO sector) (USAID 2006). I reversed the scores, so that one means low levels of development and seven means high levels of development of an NGO sector.

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34 Country reports containing the scores on all the dimensions of civil society can be downloaded from www.civicus.org.
35 These dimensions are: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure and public image.
A possible drawback to the use of this data source as a measurement of civil society is that the concept of civil society is broader than that of the NGO sector. Nevertheless voluntary associations are the ‘backbone’ of civil society; hence NGO Sustainability Index provides valuable information on the state of civil society in a given country.

**Freedom House Nations in Transit civil society scores** are available for 29 post-communist countries and territories for the years 1997-2007. The information about Freedom House is provided in the previous section of this chapter that discusses the sources of democracy measurements. *Nations in Transit* is another program by FH, which uses the same methodology as the *Freedom in the World* project to produce several indicators, including scores of civil society that vary from one to seven. For the purpose of coherence and readability of results I reversed the scores, so that one means weak civil society and seven means strong civil society.

I use Nations in Transit civil society scores only for the analysis of validity of civil society data. This source is not used in the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy because it strongly correlates with FH democracy scores. Due to the fact that both data sets are produced by the same organization while applying similar techniques, the strong correlations could be artificial and reflect organizational and methodological biases. Therefore, the decision was made to use it for the purpose of testing the quality of other civil society data, and exclude it from the main analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy.

One important source of data for civil society is not utilized in this research. Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) provide data on strength of non-violent civic coalitions for 67 countries in their respective years of transition (or an attempt at transition) from authoritarian rule to democracy. The reason why I have decided against using this data is that it does not fit into my research design, which focuses on a relatively recent state of affairs. The Karatnycky and Ackerman data assesses the strength of civic non-violent coalitions at different points in time, whenever the country in question underwent the transition. The dates vary from 1973 (Greece) to 1999 (Ghana). Most of the data comes from late 80es, which is about 20 years ago – a time span long enough for civil society to develop or deteriorate in a given country. Hence, in my opinion, Karatnycky and Ackerman data should not be included in a comparative analysis of the current state of civil society in various countries.

Based on the availability of data on civil society from the three sources: CSI, GCSI and NGO SI, 69 countries and regions were selected. The table with all the countries and the
information on the availability of the data from each source utilized in this project is included in the Appendix B.

3. The Choice of the Years based on the Availability of the Data

The availability of the data on democracy, and particularly on civil society, dictates the choice of the years of analysis. While most data sources cover a time period of at least a decade, others have a shorter time span or provide information for one year only, making that particular year a natural focus of the PhD project.

Two of the sources of the data on civil society: the Global Civil Society Index and the CIVICUS Civil Society Index provide information for years 2000 and 2004 respectively. Therefore, these two years are best suited for a cross-sectional analysis of the link between civil society and democracy. These are the starting points for the testing of the basic assumption of this research project: the data for the years 2000 and 2004 is used to analyze the relationship between civil society and democracy using the outcomes of a set of correlations between various measurements of the two variables.\(^{36}\)

The time span between the two points of measurement also makes it possible to add a longitudinal dimension to the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy. The research project is not restricted to cross-sectional analysis but attempts at exploring the direction of impact between civil society and democracy, which could be either reciprocal, or run predominantly from one phenomenon to the other. In order to conduct an assessment of the relative strength of impact of one variable on the other, it is necessary to introduce more measurement points so that a proposed ‘cause’ would precede the effect in time.

In addition to the years 2000 and 2004 for which the data both on civil society and democracy is available, two more years were selected for measuring democracy: the year of 1996\(^{37}\) as the year of ‘democracy before’ civil society, and the year 2002 as the year of ‘democracy in between’ the two points in time for which the data on civil society is available. These multiple points of observation made it possible to construct two path models in order to assess which direction of causal influence between the two variables is the more likely one\(^{38}\).

\(^{36}\) See Chapter III, section 2.1. for the presentation of results of the cross-sectional analysis.

\(^{37}\) Choosing 1996 makes it possible to include the maximum number of measurements of democracy (since World Bank indicators appear starting from that year) at the same time allowing four and eight years distance to the measurements of civil society.

\(^{38}\) The models and the results are presented in section 2.2 of Chapter III.
The logic of the choice of the years based on the availability of the data is illustrated in Table 3 and summarized as following:

- 1996 for measuring ‘democracy before;’
- 2000 for cross-sectional analysis of civil society and democracy;
- 2002 for measuring ‘democracy in between’ civil society 2000 and civil society 2004
- 2004 for cross-sectional analysis of civil society and democracy, and for measuring ‘democracy after’ civil society (in respect to civil society 2000 data);

Table 3: The Choice of the Years of Analysis Based on the Availability of the Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FH Civil Society Score</th>
<th>USAID NGO SI</th>
<th>GCSI</th>
<th>CIVICUS CSI</th>
<th>FH Freedom in the World</th>
<th>CIRI</th>
<th>World Bank VA</th>
<th>Polity IV</th>
<th>Vanhanen ID</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Having only four and two years in between the measurement points is a limitation of the study that has to be acknowledged but cannot be remedied due to the fact that civil society data is only available for years 2000 and 2004. Going further back in time would be possible for measurements of democracy, but that would distort the symmetry of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ measurements (since one cannot go far into the future).

### 4. Creating Combined Indicators of Democracy and Civil Society

Conducting an analysis with several separate measurements of the same phenomenon has both advantages and disadvantages. Including the five measurements of democracy and the three measurements of civil society in the analysis has the advantage of reducing potential biases, and improving the quality of the data. When analyzed separately, there is also an interesting possibility of exploring the nuances of individual measurements, should such relevant nuances and differences exist. The disadvantage of using several measurements for democracy and civil society is that it complicates the analysis and the presentation of results. In addition to that, not every country is covered by every source, so when countries are
divided into groups to be compared\textsuperscript{39}, the N of cases in each subgroup often drops below the minimum required for a meaningful statistical test. To address these problems, I have created combined indicators of democracy and civil society for the respective years to be used in addition to the separate measurements where appropriate.

\section*{4.1. Combined Indicators of Democracy}

For the years 1996 and 2000 the data on democracy from all the five sources is available. For the years 2002 and 2004 there are four sources, as shown in the Table 3 above. For each year the relationship between all the available measures of democracy was analyzed by means of correlations and a factor analysis. For all the years a similar pattern occurs: the measures of democracy correlate strongly with each other and load on one factor. The correlation matrix for the year 2000 is presented in Table 4. The results of the factor analysis for the year 2000 are presented in Table 5.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Correlates of the Five Measures of Democracy for the Year 2000}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
World Bank VA & & .965 (N 66) & & & \\
CIRI Phys. Int. Rights & .657 (N 63) & & .710 (N 63) & & \\
CIRI Empower. Rights & .875 (N 63) & .877 (N 63) & & .658 (N 63) & \\
Polity IV & .924 (N 61) & .921 (N 61) & .507 (N 61) & .845 (N 61) & \\
Vanhanen ID & .786 (N66) & .828 (N 66) & .593 (N 63) & .744 (N 63) & .842 (N 61) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Entries are Pearson correlations. All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\textsuperscript{39} As, for example, it is done in the first section of Chapter III of this thesis.
Table 5: Factor Analysis of the Measures of Democracy for the Year 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Democracy</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank VA</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI Phys. Integrity Rights</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI Empowerment Rights</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhanen ID</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. One component extracted. Eigenvalue 4.9; 82.3 percent of variance explained.

Since the measures of democracy are strongly related to each other, it makes sense to create a unified index to be used in cases where a simplified presentation of results is preferable to detailed information on various aspects of democracy. Three measures of democracy: Freedom House, CIRI and Polity IV, were used to create such unified indexes for each year under study. Vanhanen ID was not used, due to the lack of data after year 2000. World Bank VA measurement was not used, because it already is a combination of various sources (including FH). The combined measurements of democracy are sums of normalized FH, CIRI PIR, CIRI ER and Polity IV scores for each respective year, producing a combined measure on the scale of one (no democracy) to four.

4.2 The Analysis of the Civil Society Data

Unlike the data on democracy, the sources of data on civil society used in this PhD research are relatively new and barely used for comparative research so far. Hence, there is a need to devote some space to explore the validity of these measurements.

Are GCSI, CSI and NGO SI good measures of civil society? Scrutinizing the methodology used by these programs to produce civil society scores is the first step in assessing the quality of the data\(^{40}\). The next step is to explore how these sources relate to each other and possibly to other sources of information on civil society as well. The assumption is that if these measurements are valid estimates of civil society in a given country, they should be converging, as they capture the same phenomenon by different means. This is a type of validity test that (Johnson, Joslyn and Reynolds 2001) call “interim association” i.e. a way to

---

\(^{40}\) Some information about the data sources is reported in the beginning of the chapter, additional information is available in the Appendix A.
demonstrate the validity of the system of measurements of a given concept that produce similar outcomes, as expected.

I add FH Nations in Transit civil society scores to the analysis of the validity of civil society data, to increase the number of sources tested against each other. One sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms the normality assumption of the data on civil society from the four sources: GCSI, CIVICUS CSI, USAID NGO SI and FH Civil Society scores. Hence, the data can be used for statistical analysis.

USAID NGO SI and FH SC scores are available over longer time period, while GCSI and CSI measure civil society in the years 2000 and 2004 respectively. Shifting the focus of the analysis between these two points in time provides an interesting insight into the apparent volatility of civil society. As it is demonstrated below, the measurements of civil society within the same year are strongly related. If, however, measurements from different years are included in the same analysis, the relationships are significantly weakened.

For the year 2004 (which is the year for which CIVICUS CSI data is available) the three measures of civil society: CIVICUS CSI, USAID NGO SI and FH Civil Society scores, correlate with each other, while GCSI correlates with CSI only, which sets this measure of civil society somewhat apart from the other three. The relationship between the four measures of civil society is presented in Figure 2.

![Figure 2: The Relationship between the Measurements of Civil Society](image)

**Pearson correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**

*Pearson correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
If USAID NGO SI and FH CS data for 2000 is used, the correlations with CSI drop below significance levels\textsuperscript{41}, so that the diagram above would look like a set of two interrelated pairs of measurements, disconnected from each other. Apparently, civil society data is sensitive to the time change of four years.

Factor analyses of the four measurements of civil society produce somewhat different results that nevertheless point to the same pattern of interrelation of the four measurements and sensitivity to time shifts. When FH CS and NGO SI data for the year 2000 is used, all four measures of civil society load on one factor, with the results presented in Table 6. When FH CS and NGO SI data for the year 2004 is used, the three measurements of civil society load on one factor, while GSCI (which belongs to the year 2000 and stands somewhat apart in the correlation analysis mapped above) loads on the second factor, as demonstrated in Table 7.

Table 6: Factor Analysis of the Measures of Civil Society for the year 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Civil Society</th>
<th>Factor loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID NGO Sustainability Index (2000)</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Civil Society Index (2000)</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI (2004)</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH Nations in Transit civil society score (2000)</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. One component extracted, Eigenvalue 2.7; 67.7 percent of variance explained.

Table 7: Factor Analysis of the Measures of Civil Society for the year 2004\textsuperscript{42}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Civil Society</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID NGO Sustainability Index (2004)</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Civil Society Index (2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI (2004)</td>
<td>.894</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH Nations in Transit civil society score (2004)</td>
<td>.941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Two components extracted, Eigenvalues 2.47 and 1.17; total of 90.9 percent of variance explained.

Based on this analysis of the interrelations between the four measurements of civil society two things can be stated:

a) Although GSCI behaves somewhat different from other measures, the correlations and the factor analysis demonstrate considerable amount of overlap of the four sources one could hardly hope for given the low N. It is plausible to assume that four measurements of

\textsuperscript{41} This fact is visually represented in the figure by linking the variables with dashed, rather than solid arrows.

\textsuperscript{42} Presented in this table are the results of an un-rotated solution. A Varimax rotation did not change the essence of the outcome.
civil society capture the same phenomenon; hence the interim association type of validity is established.

b) The data on civil society is time-sensitive: measurements from the same year are closely related to each other, while introducing a time difference of four years weakens the links. Civil society seems to be quite volatile, which is an interesting observation that would need to be further tested if data on more countries covering larger time span was available.

4.3. Indicators of Civil Society for Years 2000 and 2004

The previous section has demonstrated that the three measurements of civil society that are to be used in the further analysis are closely related to each other, but do not overlap completely, probably capturing somewhat different aspects of civil society.

Each of the civil society measurements is used separately in the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy where possible. Combining the measurements, on the other hand, increases the N and allows for a parsimonious presentation of the research outcomes. For the sake of simplicity of analysis and improved readability of results I combined these measurements into aggregate indexes of civil society for years 2000 and 2004 respectively. Whenever it was appropriate or necessary for the analysis, I used these combined measurements of civil society in addition to, or instead of the separate measurements. Because the pool of countries covered by various data on civil society overlaps only partially, I used CSI and NGO SI data to predict the values for the countries not covered by GCSI, and GCSI and NGO SI data to predict the values for the countries not covered by CSI. This was done by means of regression analysis, saving the unstandartized predicted values for the countries in question. All the details of the procedure and the statistics of creating the combined measurements of civil society are listed in the Appendix C.

5. Measurements of the Individual Level Data

To answer the Research Question 2 and the Research Question 3 of this study it is necessary to add the individual level of analysis to the societal level on which democracy and civil society are measured. Data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS) is used for measuring individual attitudes towards democracy, political participation, as well as a number of other individual level variables used in two-level analysis of the attitudinal and the behavioral manifestations of the relationship between civil society and democracy.
WVS and EVS are surveys that include a broad range of socio-cultural and political topics and have been periodically conducted by a worldwide network of social scientists. A total of five waves has been carried out since 1981, consisting of nationally representative samples of the public of more than 80 societies. The data from the fourth wave covering the time period of 1999 to 2004 is used in this PhD thesis.

A number of variables was either directly taken from the WVS/EVS (further on referred to as WVS) dataset, or combined to create measurements of support for democracy, membership in associations, etc. All the measurements used in the analysis are listed in the first section of Chapter IV, which introduces the individual level models to be tested in the two-level analysis. Detailed information on the wording of the questions, the construction of the measurements, recoding, etc. of all the individual level variables is presented in the Appendix C.

The treatment of the data in the following cases warrants a special notice:

- In Spain and Turkey both WVS and EVS were conducted during the period of study. I use WVS data.
- Thanks to split-ups, it is possible to analyze Serbia and Montenegro as two distinct regions, although when the surveys were carried out it was still one country. They are treated as two separate entities in the analysis.

**Conclusion**

To test the basic assumption and to answer the research questions formulated in this PhD thesis, data on both societal and individual level is required. On the societal level the analysis focuses on the interplay between democracy and civil society measured on the country level. In addition to that the relationship between democracy and civil society supposedly manifests itself on the individual level, affecting individual support for democracy and political participation, hence measurements of these variables are necessary to complete the analysis.

This chapter has presented the sources of data used to analyze the relationship between civil society and democracy and the impact of civil society on democratic attitudes and patterns of behavior. It has argued that including various sources enriches the analysis but has to be compensated by creating combined measurements and using them in addition to all the separate measurements of democracy and civil society.

---

The validity of civil society data was assessed by comparing different sources to each other, including a source that is not used in the main analysis. The four measurements of civil society overlap to a large extent, although not entirely, which leads me to the conclusion that they measure a common objective reality, although most likely from somewhat different angles. Hence I assume that the measurements used in this study are valid indicators of civil society.

The availability of the country level data dictates a certain timeframe, as well as the choice of methods of analysis. The existence of several points of measurement in time makes it possible to go beyond cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy. In order to make any inferences about the more likely direction of causality, one has to compare the strength of impact of the two variables on each other, while alternating the order of occurrence in time. If democracy precedes civil society, is it able to predict levels of civil society in a latter year? What happens if the sequence is reversed and earlier civil society is used to predict levels of later democracy? Which one is more successful in explaining the other?

The results of the cross-sectional analysis of the relationship of civil society and democracy, as well as the longitudinal study with an assessment of a more plausible direction of impact between these two phenomena are presented in the next chapter. The two level analysis of impact of civil society on individual political culture is presented in Chapter IV.
Chapter III

Civil Society and Democracy: Country Level Analysis

A vibrant civil society is often seen as the key ingredient in the success of advanced democracies in the West, as well as a panacea for developing countries elsewhere in the world.

Marc Morjè Howard (2003, 32)

The central problems in both East and West relate not to the institutions of civil society but to the institutions of the state... To rediscover civil society, to retrieve an archaic concept, may be an interesting exercise in intellectual history, but it evades the real political challenges at the end of the twentieth century.

Krishan Kumar (1993, 391-392)

Is there a relationship between civil society and democracy on the country level? If so, can we identify a more plausible direction of causality? Is it civil society that contributes to the consolidation of democracy, or is it rather the democratic system that facilitates the development of civil society? This chapter of the thesis focuses on the interplay between civil society and democracy on the country level. It tests the basic assumption of the research project concerning the positive relationship between these two phenomena. After demonstrating the link between civil society and democracy on the country level, the analysis presented in this chapter proceeds to answering the Research Question 1, which addresses the issue of the most plausible direction of the impact.

The first part of the chapter presents a descriptive summary of the data on democracy and civil society used in this research, and takes a closer look at the variation of levels of civil society across geographic regions, in relation to economic performance and post-communist legacy of the countries included in the analysis. The second part of the chapter looks at the relationship between civil society and democracy, testing the basic assumption and answering the first research question. The main findings of the country level analysis are that civil society and democracy are strongly interrelated, with democracy having a relatively stronger impact on civil society rather than vise versa, although no definitive conclusions can be drawn.
1. Mapping the Main Variables: Descriptive Information on Democracy and Civil Society

The descriptive part of this chapter is composed of two sections: one for each main variable of country level analysis. The first section traces the levels of democracy over the time period covered in this PhD thesis and takes a closer look at democracy across countries in one particular year, in order to estimate the amount of cross-time and regime variation. The analysis is not taken beyond the descriptive level, because it is civil society, rather than democracy, that is the main focus of this PhD project. The second section maps the levels of civil society in relation to geographic regions, stages of economic development and post-communist legacy. It demonstrates that civil society is unevenly distributed over the Globe, with a significant gap between a vibrant North West European region and the rest of the World. Civil society is also closely tied with economic performance and is still influenced by the communist past.

1.1. Democracy

The 69 countries included in the analysis display different levels of democracy: from well established Western democracies like Denmark and Sweden, to countries still in the process of consolidation and overcoming setbacks (Albania and Ukraine for example) to authoritarian regimes such as China and Turkmenistan. The time span of the study is nine years: from 1996 to 2004. As the next two sections of this chapter demonstrate, the pool of the countries is quite diverse in terms of regimes, but the time trends are fairly stable.

1.1.1. Democracy 1996-2004

The line chart in Figure 3 presents the trends in the levels of democracy overtime according to four measures of democracy, used in this study. To improve the compatibility of results, normalized values are plotted in the graph.

World Bank “Voice and Accountability” Index, Freedom House and Polity IV indicators show a slight increase in the mean value of democracy for the 69 countries, while the two types of rights measured by CIRI show an increase in year 2002 followed by a drop that shifts the year 2004 below the starting point of 1996. Vanhanen Index of Democracy is not included in the graph; it is available only for a short period of 1996-2000 and shows a slight decline from the mean value of 23.5 to 22.6.

44 The mean values of democracy for 69 countries for each year.
Based on the data included in this study, it seems that the third wave of democratization has lost its momentum. For example, Freedom House scores show that from the 69 countries included in the analysis only three (Croatia, Ghana and Indonesia) have gained two points or more and two countries (Nepal and Russia) lost two points between 1996 and 2005. In the rest of the countries the changes in levels of democracy occur as gradual shifts of 1 or 1.5 points in either direction.

Is the lack of changes in the levels of democracy a disadvantage? I think it is not. As was argued in Chapter I, there is enough evidence of importance of civil society during periods of democratic transitions. To prove the importance of civil society for democracy outside of such periods of dramatic regime changes (if indeed it is important), is a task that is more challenging and would add to existing knowledge of impact of civil society on democracy. Therefore having a pool of countries where only a few dramatic changes have occurred during the period under study fits well with the main focus of this PhD project. Should impact of civil society on democracy be established, it cannot be attributed to peaks of civil society activity often occurring during transition periods.

Of course without at least some variation a meaningful analysis cannot be conducted. Although time trends in levels of democracy are fairly stable, the picture changes if one year is taken as an example and levels of democracy across countries are compared.

Figure 3: Levels of Democracy over Time

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Of course without at least some variation a meaningful analysis cannot be conducted. Although time trends in levels of democracy are fairly stable, the picture changes if one year is taken as an example and levels of democracy across countries are compared.

There is not much variation in the levels of democracy even if the established North-Western democracies are excluded.
1.1.2. Cross-Sectional Variation of Levels of Democracy

To facilitate the representation of the data I have grouped the 69 countries included in this analysis into regions, in accordance with the United Nations Statistics Division classification (United Nations Statistics Division 2008). Europe is the only group large enough to be split into sub-regions. North America is represented by the US only; hence I have combined the US with North-Western Europe due to the cultural proximity. Unfortunately only a small number of countries from Africa and the Latin America are included in the analysis, but grouping these countries with other regions does not make sense conceptually, since they are distinct areas in many respects. Hence, Africa and the Latin America are treated as separate geographic regions; the descriptive information on these two regions has to be regarded with caution. See Table 8 for the list of countries included in each region.

Table 8: Regional Distribution of the Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Southern and Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Northern and Western Europe and the US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>U.K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>U.S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to small N these two regions are excluded from statistical analysis of regional differences further on in the thesis.
The bar chart in Figure 4 shows the variations in the levels of democracy across regions according to the five measures of democracy used in this study. The year 2000 is chosen as an example since all the five measurements are available for that year.

![Levels of Democracy](image)

**Figure 4: Levels of Democracy across Regions in 2000**

Not surprisingly, North-Western Europe appears to be the most democratic region, followed by the South-Eastern Europe and the Latin America, while Africa and Asia display low levels of democracy. The graph demonstrates that there is enough variation in levels of democracy across regions, making the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy possible at least as far as the variation in democracy data is concerned. Although no dramatic changes have occurred in the overall levels of democracy in the 69 countries
included in the analysis during the nine year period under study, the pool of countries is quite
diverse in terms of democratic performance.

The next section of the thesis presents the descriptive statistics of the civil society
data. In addition to mapping the variations in the levels of civil society across the geographic
regions, two additional grouping categories are introduced: the economic performance and
the post-communist legacy.

1.2 Civil Society

Unlike democracy, civil society is measured only twice: in years 2000 and 2004. USAID NGO Sustainability Index is the only source that provides longitudinal data on civil society, but it covers only post-communist countries, which are a peculiar sub-set of cases as far as civil society is concerned, as previous research (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Howard 2003) has demonstrated and as it will be pointed out later in this chapter.

The next three sections of this chapter examine the variations of civil society across
different groups of countries, starting with the geographic regions, followed by a comparison
of countries with different economic performance, and a closer look at the post-communist
region as compared to the rest of the countries. Due to a low N number in the sub-
categories\footnote{See Appendix B for the table with N of countries in each sub-category of economy and regions by measurements of civil society.}, the separate sources of the data on civil society (GCSI, CIVICUS CSI and USAID NGO SI) cannot be meaningfully used for the comparison of the geographic regions and different economies. Only the combined data for civil society, generated from the separate measures, as explained in the Chapter II, is used, labeled as “Civil Society 2000” and “Civil Society 2004”.

1.2.1 Civil Society: The Regional Distribution

Figure 5 presents the levels of civil society in years 2000 and 2004 according to the
geographic regions. The bars represent mean values of civil society for each region. The
higher the number, the more developed civil society is.

For both years 2000 and 2004 North-Western Europe has the strongest civil society,
followed by South-Eastern Europe. Asia seems to be doing slightly better than Africa, while
the Latin America scores the lowest in the year 2000 but overtakes both Africa and Asia by
the year 2004. As was mentioned earlier, the numbers for Africa and the Latin America have
to be interpreted with a great caution because of the very low N.
Are the differences between the regions statistically significant? Due to the low N, the Latin America (seven countries) and Africa (four countries) are excluded from the analysis. Levene's test of homogeneity of variance rejects the homogeneity of variance assumption for the year 2000, therefore Dunnet's T3 test is used to compare the mean values of civil society within the three regions. For the year 2004 the homogeneity of variance assumption is supported, making it possible to compare the means with ANOVA.

Both tests confirm that North-Western Europe has distinctively higher levels of civil society as compared to the two other regions. For the year 2004 ANOVA confirms significant differences in the levels of civil society in the three regions: $F(2, 55) = 29.385; p<0.001$. The post-hoc Tukey test shows that the North-Western region of Europe differs both from the South East Europe and from Asia (the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level). The difference between South-Eastern Europe and Asia is not significant. For the year 2000 Dunnet’s T3 test similarly demonstrates statistically significant ($p<0.001$) difference between...
the North-Western Europe and the two other regions, while showing no significant difference between South-Eastern Europe and Asia.

Thus, the data confirms that at least one region - mainly North-Western Europe - differs from the rest of the Word in that it is a home to a more developed civil society.

1.2.2. Civil Society and Economy

An alternative way to group countries is the one based on economic performance. One would expect civil society to be related to economy either because in societies where a large percentage of the population is below the poverty line, the people who have to struggle financially are unlikely to join organizations or engage in civic activities, or because the part of civil society that is often referred to as the third sector, contributes positively to the country’s economy (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003).

I have adopted the World Bank classification of countries as low, middle and high income economies (World Bank Group 2007b) to be used as a measurement of countries’ economic performance. Table 9 on the next page lists the countries grouped under each category.
Table 9: Distribution of the Countries according to their Economic Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Income</th>
<th>Middle Income</th>
<th>High Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6: Civil Society in Low (1), Middle (2) and High (3) Income Economies

The box plots in Figure 6 show the levels of civil society in high, middle and low level economies for years 2000 and 2004. By examining the graphs one can see that in both years the high income countries score higher on civil society, while the difference between the low and the middle level economies is not that pronounced.

Are the differences, captured by the graphical representation of the data, statistically significant? To answer this question the mean values of civil society across the three groups are compared by means of statistical analysis: ANOVA for the year 2004 and Dunnett’s T3 for the year 2000, since for that year ANOVA cannot be used, due to the lack of homogeneity of variance (Levene’s test).

For the year 2004 Levene’s test supports the homogeneity of variance assumption, making it possible to compare the means with ANOVA, which shows statistically significant differences in the levels of civil society in countries with different economic performance: \( F(2, 65) = 37.081; p<0.001 \). The post hoc test (Tukey) shows that the difference is between the high income counties and the other two groups. Civil society in the countries with high income is significantly more developed than civil society in the countries with middle and low income economies (the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level). There is no significant difference between the levels of civil society in the middle and the low income countries. Dunnett’s T3 replicates these results for the year 2000: the difference between the mean values of civil society in the high and the middle income economies is significant \( (p<0.001) \) as well as the difference between the high and the low income economies.
(p<0.001), while no statistically significant difference can be found between the middle and the low income economies.

These statistical analyses confirm the intuitive reading of the charts: in the countries characterized by high income economies civil society is significantly stronger\textsuperscript{48}. It is interesting to see that in the middle income countries civil society is barely more developed than in those with low income; the major improvement in levels of civil society comes with achieving high levels of income. These findings suggest that a vibrant civil society is not simply linked to economic performance; it rather requires a certain level of prosperity to be achieved for civil society to take on a new quality.

\textit{1.2.3. Peculiarities of the Post-Communist Region}

Previous studies (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Howard 2003) have demonstrated that the post-communist region is distinct in terms of civil society. After a decade since the collapse of socialism post-communist civil society remains weak. Is the peculiarity of the post-communist civil society suggested in the literature reflected in the data used in this study?

To test the imprint of the communist legacy on civil society, I have introduced a dummy variable to identify the 28 post-communist countries included in the analysis. The levels of civil society in the post-communist as opposed to the other countries for the years 2000 and 2004 are presented in Figure 7. The mean values of civil society in the post-communist as compared to the other countries are presented in Table 10. The data based on the separate measures of civil society is presented alongside with the combined measurements, since in this case the N is above 10 in each sub-category\textsuperscript{49}.

\textsuperscript{48} The reported results are obtained by using the combined measurements of civil society. From the separate measurements of civil society CIVICUS CSI is the only measure that has enough countries in each group to make the statistical analysis possible. The results obtained when using CSI duplicate those obtained when using the combined civil society measurements: the difference between the high income countries and the middle income countries, as well as the difference between the high and the low income countries is statistically significant. The difference between the middle and the low income countries is not.

\textsuperscript{49} USAID NGO SI is not reported because that program focuses exclusively on post-communist countries, leaving the other category empty.
Figure 7: Civil Society in the Post-Communist Countries

Table 10: Civil Society in the Post-Communist Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Civil Society 2000</th>
<th>Civil Society 2004</th>
<th>GCSI</th>
<th>CIVICUS CSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist</td>
<td>-.34 (N 28)</td>
<td>-.28 (N 28)</td>
<td>.27 (N 13)</td>
<td>1.61 (N 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.23 (N 41)</td>
<td>.16 (N 41)</td>
<td>.53 (N 20)</td>
<td>1.59 (N 27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are mean values of civil society.

As the box plots and the table demonstrate, the mean values of civil society for the post-communist countries are indeed somewhat lower, except for the CIVICUS CSI measurements.

An independent samples t-test has been conducted to check whether the differences in the levels of civil society in the two groups of countries are statistically significant. Levene’s Test demonstrates that equal variance can be assumed only for the CIVICUS data. Nonetheless I think it is possible to use the t-test, because the unequal variance is expected, due to the fact that the post-communist countries have lower levels of civil society, hence they have less variance in the scores. Again, with the exception of CIVICUS CSI, the difference between the post-communist and non-post-communist levels of civil society is significant\(^\text{50}\). See Table 11 for the summary of the results of the comparison of levels of civil society in the post-communists as opposed to other countries.

\(^{50}\text{Since the results of T-Test could be questioned due to the lack of equal variance a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted as well and it confirms these results.}\)
Table 11: T-Test Results for the Difference between Post-Communist and Other Civil Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurements of Civil Society</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Sig. (1-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society 2000</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society 2004</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSCI</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVICUS CSI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Equal variance not assumed.

It appears that despite the time passed since the collapse of communism, and the fact that the post-communist countries are developing along very different paths both in terms of economy and democracy (some countries being accepted into the EU while other countries recessing into authoritarianism or poor economic performance) the legacy of the communist regimes is still visible in the realm of civil society. Post-communist civil society is significantly weaker than civil society in countries that did not experience periods of communist rule.

The countries included in the analysis display various levels of civil society. The patterns of civil society in relation to the geographic regions, the economic performance and the post-communist legacy of the countries were explored. North-Western Europe and the US have significantly higher levels of civil society as compared to South Eastern Europe and Asia. The difference between the countries with high, as opposed to middle and low income economies is quite pronounced. The impact of communist legacy is still visible in the post-communist block, despite different levels of democratization and economic development. These observations conclude the descriptive section of the chapter, which has treated the data on democracy and civil society separately, looked at variations between the different groups and subsets and provided some insights into the time trends, some regional and economic differences and the legacies of the past. The next section focuses on the main task of this chapter: the analysis of the relationship between civil society and democracy.

2. Civil Society and Democracy: The Country Level Analysis

As the first chapter of this thesis has demonstrated, a significant body of previous research suggests that civil society has a range of effects on the polity it operates in. On the country level, these effects should translate into higher levels of democracy, which led me to hypothesize that a strong relationship should be detectable between civil society and
democracy. Trivial as it sounds, such analysis has been done seldom (not at all with the new measures of democracy). In addition to that there is an interesting nuance to the argument about the relationship between civil society and democracy. Some scholars, who, in principle, state that civil society is conducive to democracy, suggest that the relationship between civil society and democracy is not necessarily linear. They are of the opinion that extreme pluralism, with multiple groups competing to represent same narrow interests, is fragmenting and hence disempowering (Diamond 1999). Some authors point out that “In the short run, strengthening civil society is as likely to increase social tensions as to reduce them because more voices are better able to stake their claim to public resources and policies” (Fowler 1997, 8). Hence, it is possible that the relationship is not linear but rather a reversed U shape-like.

Another important and interesting issue with respect to civil society and democracy is the debate about the direction of the impact between these two phenomena, presented in the literature review under the rubric of the institutional critique of civil society. Is civil society conducive to democracy or does the establishment and functioning of democratic institutions foster civil society? Critics of civil society argue that civil society is an outcome, rather than the promoter of democracy.

This section of the thesis addresses the two aspects of the problem, starting with the simpler question of the existence and the nature of the relationship between civil society and democracy, followed by the exploration of a more likely direction of influence between these two variables.

2.1. Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Relationship between Civil Society and Democracy

The basic assumption of this research project, formulated in Chapter I of the thesis states that there is a positive relationship between civil society and democracy. The results of statistical analyses testing this basic assumption are presented below.

Since civil society data is available only for years 2000 and 2004, these two points in time are chosen for the cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between the two variables. A scatter plot for the year 2004 (Figure 8) shows the levels of civil society and democracy for the counties included in the analysis.
The distribution of the countries on the scatter plot suggests that there is a positive relationship between civil society and democracy since those countries scoring high on one of the measures tend to score high on the other one as well and vice versa: those scoring low on democracy appear to do poorly in terms of civil society as well. There is no evidence to support the concerns that civil society that is ‘too strong’ or ‘hyperactive’ has a negative impact on democracy by overburdening the system or fragmenting and consequently disempowering the society.

A number of correlation analyses, using combined measures of civil society and democracy, as well as all the separate data sources on civil society and democracy, confirm the existence of a statistically significant positive relationship between civil society and democracy. From all the possible combinations, only one pair of measurements, namely the Polity IV measure of democracy and the Global Civil Society Index, produce a weak and
insignificant positive correlation. For the rest of the measurements the correlations are fairly strong and significant. See Tables 12, 13 and 14 for the correlation coefficients.

Table 12: Correlates of the General Measures of Democracy and Civil Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civil Society 2000</th>
<th>Civil Society 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 2000</td>
<td>.503 (N 61)</td>
<td>.696 (N 61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 2004</td>
<td>.510 (N 64)</td>
<td>.715 (N 64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are Pearson correlations. All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 13: Correlates of the Separate Measures of Democracy and Civil Society 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Global Civil Society Index</th>
<th>USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Combined Average 2000</td>
<td>.463** (N 33)</td>
<td>.819** (N 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Voice and Accountability 2000</td>
<td>.560** (N 33)</td>
<td>.836** (N 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI 2000 Physical Integrity Rights</td>
<td>.567** (N 33)</td>
<td>.617** (N 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI 2000 Empowerment Rights</td>
<td>.438* (N 33)</td>
<td>.596** (N 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized Democracy Score 2000 (Polity IV)</td>
<td>.329 (N 31)</td>
<td>.776** (N 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhanen Index of Democracy 2000</td>
<td>.498** (N 33)</td>
<td>.701** (N 25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are Pearson correlations.  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 14: Correlates of the Separate Measures of Democracy and Civil Society 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>CIVICUS CSI</th>
<th>USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Combined Average 2004 reversed</td>
<td>.571** (N 39)</td>
<td>.865** (N 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Voice and Accountability 2004</td>
<td>.643** (N 39)</td>
<td>.887** (N 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI 04 Physical Integrity Rights</td>
<td>.524** (N 38)</td>
<td>.711** (N 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI 04 Empowerment Rights</td>
<td>.441** (N 38)</td>
<td>.753** (N 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized Democracy Score (Polity IV 2004)</td>
<td>.455** (N 37)</td>
<td>.779** (N 27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are Pearson correlations.  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Clearly, a strong positive link exists between civil society and democracy. The countries that score high on democracy have a vibrant civil society and vice versa: in
undemocratic countries civil society is poorly developed. The results of the analysis support
the basic assumption put forth in this PhD research project.

It is interesting to notice that from the three measurements of civil society used in this
study, the USAID NGO SI is the one that shows the strongest correlations with all the
measurements of democracy. USAID NGO SI covers only post-communist countries. The
results of the correlation analysis suggest that in posts-communist countries civil society is
particularly strongly linked with democracy, which goes in line with the argument of the
peculiarities of the post-communist region.

Now that the link between civil society and democracy is demonstrated, the next and
the more intriguing question can be asked. Is civil society conducive to democracy, or is
democracy fostering civil society? A definitive answer to the question of the causal
relationship between the two phenomena would require a highly demanding research design
controlling for all potentially relevant variables: a task beyond this PhD thesis. Nevertheless,
an estimate of a comparatively stronger direction of impact can serve as a clue to the
predominant direction of causality. Next section of the thesis explores the possible direction
of the causal arrow in the relationship between democracy and civil society.

2.2. The Longitudinal Analysis of the Direction of the Impact

Taking into account the institutional critique of civil society, the following research
question was formulated at the end of Chapter I of this thesis:

Research Question 1: Is civil society’s impact on democracy stronger than
democracy’s impact on civil society?

Since the cause has to precede the effect, the analysis has to include several points in
time. In addition to the year 2000\textsuperscript{51} for which measurements of civil society are available,
years 1996 and 2004 are included as the measurement points of ‘democracy before’ and
‘democracy after’ civil society.

As the first step in gathering clues for a more plausible direction of impact, one can
look at comparative strength of correlations. Is civil society more related to the level of
‘democracy before’ or to the level of ‘democracy after’? If the correlation with ‘democracy

\textsuperscript{51} The measurements of civil society for the year 2004 are not used in the longitudinal analysis, since no
measurement of ‘democracy after’ is available.
before’ is stronger than the correlation with ‘democracy after,’ one can assume that civil society is influenced by democracy more than it influences democracy, suggesting the direction of causal arrow from democracy to civil society. And vice versa: if civil society correlates stronger with ‘democracy after,’ it is more likely to cause democracy rather than be caused by it.

The Civil Society 2000 measurement as well as the separate sources of civil society data were used to compare the strength of the correlations with democracy before and democracy after the year 2000. The results are presented in Table 15.

Table 15: Correlations: Civil Society and Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy 96</th>
<th>Democracy 2000</th>
<th>Democracy 04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society 2000</td>
<td>.513** (N 61)</td>
<td>.503** (N 61)</td>
<td>.512** (N 64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSI</td>
<td>.558** (N 31)</td>
<td>.495** (N 31)</td>
<td>.489** (N 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID 2000</td>
<td>.720** (N 24)</td>
<td>.784** (N 24)</td>
<td>.772** (N 24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are Pearson correlations. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

For the general measure of civil society in the year 2000, the correlation with ‘democracy before’ is only slightly stronger than the correlation with ‘democracy after’ the point of measurement of civil society. When we look at separate measurements of civil society for that year, the picture is unclear, since for GCSI the correlation with ‘democracy before’ is also stronger than the correlation with ‘democracy after’ while for USAID NGO SI the reverse is true: the correlation with ‘democracy before’ is weaker than the correlation with ‘democracy after.’ It is interesting to notice that except for the USAID NGO SI, the two other measurements of civil society are related to earlier democracy stronger than to democracy measured in the year 2000 i.e. the year when civil society is measured. Since USAID NGO SI covers only post-communist countries, the results obtained when using this measure should be interpreted with caution, bearing in mind the specificities of post-communist region, mentioned in the literature and touched upon in one of the previous sections of this thesis.

The correlation analysis demonstrates that the impact of previous democracy on civil society is stronger than the impact of civil society on consecutive democracy in two out of three cases. These outcomes place relatively more importance on democracy, but the evidence is not very clear and does not allow to come to any definite conclusions.

The assessment of the strength and the direction of the relationship between civil society and democracy is also done via a comparison of two alternative path models
constructed from a set of regressions. Following the same logic as with the set of correlations, one can assume that:

1. If democracy is relatively successful in predicting latter civil society, while civil society is relatively unsuccessful in predicting latter democracy, the causal arrow runs from democracy to civil society.
2. If civil society is relatively successful in predicting latter democracy, while democracy is relatively unsuccessful in predicting latter civil society, the causal arrow runs from civil society to democracy.

To check these assumptions, two path models are constructed based on four regressions with the following results:

**Path Model 1:**

Regression [A1]: Democracy 1996 predicting Civil Society 2000 (N=62; R Square = 0.27; F(1,60) = 21.62, p<0.001) is represented with an arrow labeled $a_1$.

Regression [B1]: Democracy 1996 and Civil Society 2000 predicting Democracy 2004 (N=62; R Square = 0.84; F(2,59) = 154.28, p<0.001) is represented with arrows $b_1$ and $c_1$.

**Path Model 2:**

Regression [A2]: Civil Society 2000 predicting Democracy 2002 (N=62 R Square = 0.23; F(1,60) = 18.62, p<0.001) is represented with an arrow labeled $a_2$.

Regression [B2]: Civil Society 2000 and Democracy 2002 predicting Civil Society 2004 (N= 62; R Square = 0.74; F(2,59) = 82.37, p<0.001) is represented with arrows $b_2$ and $c_2$.

The Path Models are presented in Figures 9 and 10 on the next page; the entries are Standardized Beta Coefficients.
Firstly, it is clear that early democracy is an excellent predictor of later democracy (b₁) while early civil society is a fairly good predictor of later civil society, but there is some room left for other predictors (b₂). Secondly, as the only predictor in a linear regression, the two phenomena are almost equally good at predicting each other, since the Standardized Beta Coefficients for the arrows a₁ and a₂ differ only slightly. However, when controlled for the previous civil society, democracy still contributes to the model that explains the later civil society (c₂), while when controlled for the early democracy, the effect of civil society on the later democracy all but disappears (c₁). Hence, the regression analysis supports the first assumption: democracy is relatively successful in predicting the level of later civil society, while civil society is relatively unsuccessful in predicting later democracy.

The two models taken together suggest that the direction of causality runs from democracy to civil society, rather than the other way around, confirming the earlier findings of the correlation analysis. The answer to the Research Question 2 is negative: the impact of civil society on democracy is not stronger than that of democracy on civil society. On the contrary, although the pair seems to influence each other quite strongly, it is the democracy
that emerges as the one having more influence on its counterpart. This conclusion, however, has to be treated with caution due to the lack of variation over time in levels of democracy.

**Conclusion**

In the period under study the level of democracy on average has changed only marginally, but the pool of countries includes the whole spectrum of political regimes. Civil society, measured in two points in time, differs significantly across regions, with North-Western Europe having distinctively higher levels of civil society. Civil society is stronger in high income economies, while the difference between middle and low income economies is not that pronounced. The post-communist legacy can still be detected in the low levels of civil society in the respective countries.

There is a strong positive linear relationship between civil society and democracy, evident across all measurements for both years 2000 and 2004, except for one pair of measurements: Polity IV measurement of democracy is not related to GSCI measurement of civil society. The lack of correlation between Polity IV and GCSI data could result from the fact that Polity IV is the most ‘minimalist’ measurement of democracy, capturing only the basic institutional characteristics of a regime in question. Civil society seems to be more related to liberal, rather than institutional aspects of democracy. Apart from that, the picture is clear: the more democratic the country is, the more vibrant is its civil society.

Although civil society and democracy are closely linked and possibly influence each other, the impact of democracy on civil society is stronger than that of civil society on democracy. It is hard to say anything conclusive at this point, due to technical problems with the data (very little variation in levels democracy over time) but the tentative suggestion is that on the country level the direction of causality from democracy to civil society is the more likely one.

If civil society does not have much of an impact on democracy on societal level, does the picture change if the analysis is taken to the individual level? Do levels of civil society in a given country influence democracy related attitudes and actions of people? The next chapter of the thesis addresses these questions by adding the individual level to the analysis of conduciveness of civil society for democracy. From looking at how civil society influences, or is influenced by the polity it operates in, the research focus shifts to exploring how civil society interacts with personal characteristics, producing democratic political culture.
Chapter IV

Impact of Civil Society on Support for Democracy and Political Participation

*If social networks can be employed for purposes that are positive (the Red Cross) or negative (the Ku Klux Klan) for society as a whole, as they obviously can, then it is even more important to analyze the cultural norms and values associated with membership.*

_Pippa Norris (2002, 166)_

Unlike other political systems, democracy is based on the consent and the input of those being governed: the people. The importance of the individual for democracy cannot be overestimated as s/he impersonates a political culture and initiates political actions that sustain or jeopardize democracy. Does civil society play any role in shaping individual political culture, thus strengthening or weakening the micro-foundations of democracy?

The research questions formulated in Chapter I reflect the two dimensions flagged as important in current research on democratic culture and performance of democracy: the attitudinal and the behavioral (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007). Both dimensions are, of course, very broad. I have chosen the following foci for my research on internal effects of civil society:

Given the broad range of democratic attitudes, the study focuses on one directly related to democracy i.e. support for democracy. The following question is asked:

**Research Question 2: Is people’s support for democracy influenced by the state of civil society in the country?**

As for the behavioral dimension of democratic culture, the study focuses on political participation and examines the following question:

**Research Question 3: Is individual political participation influenced by the state of civil society in the country?**

This chapter of the PhD thesis presents the results of the analysis of civil society’s internal impact and demonstrates that civil society does influence individual support for democracy and some, if not other, types of political participation.
As the first step of the analysis, the dependent variables are operationalized and a descriptive overview of the data on support for democracy and political participation is presented. After that individual level models predicting support for democracy and political participation are formulated based on the main approaches identified in the literature and on outcomes of previous research. The third section of the chapter tests the individual level models, adds the country level variables, and looks at interaction effects between the two levels. The outcomes of the analysis of support for democracy are presented first, followed by the analysis of signing petitions and joining boycotts: the two types of political participation identified as important in the literature (Norris 1999a; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) and available via WVS data. The chapter concludes with a general overview of the results.

1. The Dependent Variables: Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics

Although the two research questions are analyzed in this chapter, there are a total of three dependent variables, since the two types of political participation – signing petitions and joining boycotts – are analyzed separately. The rationale for the separate analysis is that since the study is mostly exploratory, I was interested to see if civil society has different impact on different types of political participation.

Following the approach used by Klingemann (1999) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) Support for Democracy is measured by combining respondents approval of democracy (“democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” and an approval of “having a democratic political system”) with rejection of alternative forms of government (such as strong leaders, experts and army rule).

Signing Petitions and Joining in Boycotts are relatively uncomplicated variables to operationalize and measure, since the WVS data contains information on whether the respondent has ever participated in each of these activities. Detailed information on the WVS question wordings, original coding schemes, recoding for the purpose of this study, etc. for all the variables can be found in the Appendix C of this thesis.

From the initial pool of 69 countries, individual level WVS data for 48 countries is available for the years 1999-2004 (total of about 65,000 cases). Unfortunately even for these 48 countries not all questions were asked in all cases. Individual level N varies from 27 to 32 thousands. The exact numbers are reported in tables 16, 17 and 18 below.

---

52 The initial research project also included attending demonstrations, but the analysis did not produce meaningful results, probably due to the fact that the individual level political participation model specified below is poorly suited to explain participation in demonstrations.
Levels of support for democracy and the percentage of people signing petitions and joining in boycotts in each country are presented in the next three graphs (Figures 11, 12 and 13).

As it is evident from Figure 11, levels of support for democracy generally correspond to the levels of democracy in the respective countries: well-established and consolidated democracies are at the top of the graph; their population is on average quite supportive of the idea of democracy while simultaneously rejecting the alternative types of regimes, such as a strong leader or an army rule. The lowest levels of support for democracy are found in Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia and Vietnam.

The descriptive statistics on signing petitions (Figure 12) and joining in boycotts (Figure 13) provides the first evidence that these two types of political participation display somewhat different patterns. The case of signing petitions is similar to that of support for democracy: it seems to more or less reflect the level of democratic consolidation of the country in question. The situation is quite different in the case of boycotts. For instance, Egypt emerges as the top boycott active country, an old democracy Spain is somewhere in the middle while an EU member Romania is second from below. The impression created by the graph is that joining in boycotts is not related to levels of democracy.
Figure 11: Mean Levels of Individual Support for Democracy
Value range: -9 (rejection of democracy and support of the authoritarian regime) to 6
Figure 12: Percentage of Respondents who have signed Petitions
Figure 13: Percentage of Respondents who have joined Boycotts

30 20 10 0

Joined in Boycotts: Yes (%)

Egypt
Sweden
United States
Denmark
Netherlands
Serbia
Iceland
Great Britain
Montenegro
Finland
Macedonia
India
France
Uganda
Belgium
Italy
South Korea
Austria
Luxembourg
Czech Republic
Ireland
Germany
Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia
Turkey
Spain
Albania
Lithuania
Chile
Ukraine
Greece
Poland
Slovakia
Belarus
Moldova
Bulgaria
Latvia
Estonia
Indonesia
Hungary
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Mexico
Argentina
Romania
Viet Nam

250 300 350 400

Figure 13: Percentage of Respondents who have joined Boycotts
Individual support for democracy and willingness to engage in the two types of political participation considered in this study can be conditioned by a number of personal characteristics, as well as country level factors. The goal of this chapter of the thesis is to establish whether civil society is a good predictor of support for democracy, signing petitions and joining in boycotts.

2. Defining the Models

The analysis of the impact of civil society (a societal phenomenon measured on the country level) on people’s support for democracy and their political participation patterns (personal characteristics measured on the individual level) is a two-level analysis, done by means of hierarchical linear modeling. In order to perform this analysis, the individual level models must first be specified.

To create an individual level model that predicts support for democracy (Model 1) I rely mostly on the work of Norris (1999b) and co-authors. More specifically, I use the part of the framework that focuses on the role of cultural norms and values as predictors of support for a democratic regime as an idea. To construct a model explaining individual political participation (Models 2&3) I rely mostly on the findings of Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). Other relevant empirical studies explaining support for democracy and political participation have also contributed to the construction of the models, as explained in the next section of the thesis.

Based on the previous research and the availability of the data I have selected a total of nine predictors of support for democracy and political participation. The variables, as well as the justifications for including them in the models and predictions of the direction of impact (if any such predictions can be made) are presented below.

2.1. Individual Level Independent Variables

The following variables are used as predictors of the support for democracy and the two types of political participation:

Post-materialist Values’ influence on individual support for democracy as a type of political regime has been empirically demonstrated (Inglehart 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2005); I expect to replicate these results by including Post-materialism in Model 1: it should have a positive effect on support for democracy. Post-materialist values also promote protest (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007), which is one of the increasingly important types of political
participation. Therefore, I include Post-materialism as a predictor of political participation and expect it to be positively related to signing petitions (Model 2) and joining in boycotts (Model 3).

**Membership in Associations** is linked with higher levels of political efficacy (Almond and Verba 1963; Dekker and van den Broek 1996) and political participation (Dekker and van den Broek 1996; Deth 1997b; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). I expect membership in associations to have a positive effect on signing petitions (Model 2) and joining in boycotts (Model 3).

The effects of associational membership on support for democracy are more difficult to predict. From both the theoretical and the empirical point of view it is important to distinguish between two types of associations: those that serve primarily the interests of their members (utilitarian or ‘Olson-groups’) and those that address universal goals (sociotropic or ‘Putnam-groups’) (Beugelsdijk and van Schalk 2001; Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005). Members of utilitarian associations could be supportive of democracy, because they perceive it as an instrument for achieving the goals of the organization (such as the trade union for example). Sociotropic associations are often concerned with issues related to democracy (human rights issues for example), so one could expect members of sociotropic associations to be supportive of democracy as a system that corresponds to their ideas of personal and societal development. On the other hand there are plenty of sociotropic associations that have nothing to do with democracy or governance as such (recreational, cultural, religious, charity, etc.) and their members might or might not be supportive of democracy. Thus, no predictions are made concerning the direction of the impact of associational membership on individual support for democracy and on political participation.

**Political Interest** and **Political Information** constitute an important component of the Civic Voluntarism model by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). The authors have demonstrated that political interest and political information are linked to higher levels of political participation. I expect these two variables to have a positive effect on both types of political participation.

In addition to these predictors, four social and demographic background variables, which have often been found to be associated with variations in political attitudes and patterns of participation, are also included in the analysis.

**Income Level** has been previously found to influence political participation: those well off are more likely to vote, participate in a protest or contact an official (Bernhard and
Karakoç 2007; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1999). Hence, it should have some positive effects on signing petitions and joining in boycotts as well.

*Education* is an important predictor of political participation; together with the income level it represents the resources element of the Civic Voluntarism Model by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). According to the authors, those with resources are more likely to participate. Also Bernhard and Karakoç (2007) show that higher levels of education promote protest.

*Gender* should be checked as one of the predictors of participation, since the previous research has demonstrated that men are somewhat more likely to participate actively even in developed democracies like the US (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The gender gap in participation probably increases, as more conservative countries are included in the analysis.

*Age* is the last of the socio-demographic background variables to be included in the analysis, following the common practice and since it has been often found to be related to political support and participation (Norris 1999c).

### 2.2. Individual Level Models

Based on the selection of the variables presented above the *individual level model of support for democracy* is constructed as follows:

\[
\text{Support for Democracy} = b_0 + b_1(\text{Political Interest}) + b_2(\text{Political Information}) + b_3(\text{Post-materialism}) + b_4(\text{Membership in Sociotropic Associations}) + b_5(\text{Membership in Utilitarian Associations}) + b_6(\text{Age}) + b_7(\text{Income}) + b_8(\text{Education}) + b_9(\text{Gender}) + r_1
\]

The *individual level model for political participation* is constructed as follows:

\[
\text{Political Participation} = c_0 + c_1(\text{Political Interest}) + c_2(\text{Political Information}) + c_3(\text{Post-materialism}) + c_4(\text{Membership in Sociotropic Associations}) + c_5(\text{Membership in Utilitarian Associations}) + c_6(\text{Income}) + c_7(\text{Education}) + c_8(\text{Gender}) + c_9(\text{Age}) + r_2
\]

### 2.3. Country Level Variables

The impact of *civil society* on the individual level models is tested, in order to establish whether civil society has a significant influence on support for democracy and
political participation. In addition to that, democracy is the second country level variable to enter the multi-level analysis, since the interplay between these two phenomena is the main focus of the study. The previous chapter has demonstrated that civil society and democracy are closely interconnected, and that on the societal level it is democracy that influences civil society rather than vice versa. Therefore it is important to control for possible effects of democracy when exploring the impact of civil society on the individual support for democracy and political participation. Including both variables in the multi-level analysis can provide new insights into the nature of the interrelationship between civil society and democracy.

Since the WVS data covering the period from 1999 to 2004 is used for the individual level measurements, civil society and democracy data from the same time period has to be used. For democracy I have decided to use Democracy 2002 scores as the middle point between the years 1999 and 2004. For civil society I calculated an average of Civil Society 2000 and Civil Society 2004 scores.

The impact of both variables on the intercepts $b_0$ and $c_0$, as well as cross-level interaction effects between civil society and post-materialism, the two types of membership, political interest and political information was calculated in the course of the multi-level analysis; the results are presented in the next section of the chapter. While looking for interaction effects, I focus on post-materialist values, membership patterns, interest in politics and information about politics, since it seems intuitively plausible that civil society could influence these individual level characteristics, while it is hard to imagine that it would interact with age, gender, income and levels of formal education.

3. The Results

A total of three sets of models have been analyzed by means of hierarchical linear modeling: the set of Models 1-X analyzes support for democracy, Models 2-X explain signing petitions, and finally Models 3-X examine joining in boycotts. For each of the three sets, Model X-0 is the basic intercept or the ‘null’ model that estimates the total amount of variance in the dependent variable, Model X-1 refers to the individual level model as formulated above, Model X-2 adds country level variables (civil society and democracy) and finally Model X-3 includes cross-level interaction effects of some variables with civil society. The models are grand mean centered. No logistic model specifications were used for
dichotomous dependent variables. The software used in the course of the analysis is HLM 6.01.

3.1. Support for Democracy

The results of the analysis of the four models explaining individual support for democracy are presented in Table 16.

The individual level Model 1-1 has a weak explanatory power. It shows, however, that from those individual level variables included in the model, education is the most important one when predicting support for democracy, followed by the post-materialist values. Not surprisingly, both variables have positive coefficients, meaning that respondents with higher education levels are more likely to express support for democracy; post-materialist are more supportive of democracy than materialist. Interest in politics, information about politics, membership in utilitarian associations, income, and age all have weak but significant positive effects on support for democracy. Gender and membership in sociotropic associations have no significant effects on individual support for democracy.

Model 1-2 includes the two country level variables into the analysis. It explains 46% of the between-country component of the total variance. The impact of civil society is significant and shows the strongest positive effect on support for democracy; compared with other variables it has the highest coefficient. In countries with well developed civil society people are more supportive of democracy. The country level of democracy does not influence individual support for democracy. According to these results people’s support for democracy is not conditioned by what kind of government regime they currently have.
Table 16: Predictors of Support for Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects:</th>
<th>Model 1-0</th>
<th>Model 1-1</th>
<th>Model 1-2</th>
<th>Model 1-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Intercept (constant)</td>
<td>1.18*** (5.43)</td>
<td>1.12*** (4.32)</td>
<td>1.11*** (6.01)</td>
<td>1.11*** (6.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level Effects (general slope):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
<td>.36*** (8.22)</td>
<td>.36*** (8.18)</td>
<td>.34*** (8.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(-.29)</td>
<td>(-.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic membership</td>
<td>-.01 (-.29)</td>
<td>-.01 (-.29)</td>
<td>-.01 (-.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarian membership</td>
<td>.06* (2.31)</td>
<td>.06* (2.31)</td>
<td>.06* (4.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>.17*** (5.08)</td>
<td>.17*** (5.10)</td>
<td>.16*** (5.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about Politics</td>
<td>.08*** (3.87)</td>
<td>.08*** (3.86)</td>
<td>.07*** (4.31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.44*** (9.57)</td>
<td>.44*** (9.59)</td>
<td>.43*** (9.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.07*** (6.27)</td>
<td>.07*** (6.27)</td>
<td>.07*** (6.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01* (2.56)</td>
<td>.01* (2.54)</td>
<td>.01* (2.45)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.04 (1.14)</td>
<td>.04 (1.13)</td>
<td>.04 (1.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level Effects (intercept variation)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>.56 (1.64)</td>
<td>.56 (1.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>.64* (2.42)</td>
<td>.60* (2.24)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-level Interactions (slope variation)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*post-materialism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.09 (1.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Civil society*sociotropic.membership</td>
<td></td>
<td>.03* (2.47)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*utilitarian membership</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01 (-.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*interest in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>.09** (3.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*information about politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07*** (3.75)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexplained Level 1 Variance (% of error reduction)</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>4.96 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexplained Level 2 Variance, intercepts (% of error reduction)</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17 (48%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=27182 (individuals) and 32 (countries); *p< .05; **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Entries are likelihood coefficients (T-ratios in parenthesis) with robust standard errors estimated with HLM 6.01.
Does civil society influence individual support for democracy through any of the factors included in the analysis? To answer this question Model 1-3 looks at the cross-level interaction effects. Civil society interacts strongly with interest in politics and political information. Both coefficients are positive, meaning that in countries with higher levels of civil societies, the people are more interested in, as well as better informed about politics. The model also shows that there is a positive interaction with post-materialism, meaning that in countries with well-developed civil society post-materialists are more likely to support democracy. Not surprisingly, there is a strong interaction effect between civil society and membership in sociotropic associations. These, however, do not affect individual support for democracy. On the other hand, the type of associations that do affect support for democracy - the utilitarian associations, seem to be unaffected by the general level of civil society. Members of utilitarian associations support democracy irrespective of strength or weakness of civil society in their country.

### 3.2. Political Participation

This section presents the evidence of the impact of civil society, as well as the number of other predictors, on the two types of political participation. First, the case of signing petitions is discussed (the HLM output is presented in Table 17), followed by the presentation and the discussion of the results for joining in boycotts (Table 18).

The individual level Model 2-1 explains only six percent of the variance. With the exception of age and gender, all the individual level variables are to some extend related to signing petitions. Interest in politics and level of education have the strongest effect: those more interested in politics and those with higher levels of education are more likely to sign petitions. Post-materialism and utilitarian membership are the next in importance. Sociotropic membership is less influential, while income and information about politics have only slight effects on increasing the likelihood of signing petitions.

The country level variables (Model 2-2) account for 68 percent of the between-country component of the variation in the data. Democracy and civil society both have significant positive effects on individual likelihood of signing petitions. Democracy and civil society are almost equally important, with democracy having a slightly stronger effect in predicting whether respondents ever signed a petition. Both country level variables are better predictors than any of the individual level variables, judging by the corresponding T-ratios.
Interestingly, civil society has no interaction effects (Model 2-3) with the individual level variables, except for post-materialism. Post-materialists are more likely than materialist to sign petitions and this difference becomes even more pronounced in countries with vibrant civil society.
Table 17: Predictors of Signing Petitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects:</th>
<th>Model 2-0</th>
<th>Model 2-1</th>
<th>Model 2-2</th>
<th>Model 2-3</th>
</tr>
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<td>General Intercept (constant)</td>
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<td>.35***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.94)</td>
<td>(9.44)</td>
<td>(17.11)</td>
<td>(16.91)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Individual-level Effects (general slope):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
<td>.04***</td>
<td>.04***</td>
<td>.04***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.07)</td>
<td>(7.05)</td>
<td>(7.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic membership</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.04)</td>
<td>(3.08)</td>
<td>(3.16)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarian membership</td>
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<td>.04***</td>
<td>.04***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.32)</td>
<td>(6.36)</td>
<td>(6.69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
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<td>.06***</td>
<td>.06***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.39)</td>
<td>(12.44)</td>
<td>(13.27)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Information about politics</td>
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<td>.01***</td>
<td>.01***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.03)</td>
<td>(5.01)</td>
<td>(5.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.06***</td>
<td>.06***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(9.73)</td>
<td>(9.75)</td>
<td>(9.47)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.01***</td>
<td>.01***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.40)</td>
<td>(4.38)</td>
<td>(4.43)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-1.83)</td>
<td>(-1.84)</td>
<td>(-1.89)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>(1.95)</td>
<td>(1.94)</td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country-level Effects (intercept variation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.107***</td>
<td>.11***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.07)</td>
<td>(6.17)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>.10***</td>
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<td>(4.24)</td>
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<td>Cross-level Interactions (slope variation)</td>
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<td>Civil society*post-materialism</td>
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<td>(3.56)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*utilitarian membership</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>(-.37)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.88)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*information about politics</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexplained Level 1 Variance (% of error reduction)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexplained Level 2 Variance, intercepts (% of error reduction)</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>(68%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=32118 (individuals) and 31 (countries); *p<.05; **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Entries are likelihood coefficients (T-ratios in parenthesis) with robust standard errors estimated with HLM 6.01.
The results of the political participation model when looking at joining boycotts as the dependent variable are presented in Table 18.

The individual level Model 3-1 for joining boycotts accounts for ten percent of the variance in the data. Interest in politics is the strongest of the individual level predictors, followed by education, post-materialist values and membership in utilitarian associations. All these characteristics make respondents more likely to join in a boycott. The impact of membership of sociotropic organizations is much weaker. Unlike the previous sets of models, in this case gender appears to have at least some significance: males are more likely to join in boycotts than females. The level of income and the level of information about politics are only very weakly related to the likelihood of joining boycotts, while age is entirely insignificant.

Model 3-2 includes civil society and democracy into the analysis. It accounts for 54 percent of the variance between countries. Just like the previous two examples, this case demonstrates the importance of country level conditions. Civil society is has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of joining in boycotts. Democracy, on the other hand, has no significant effect. Like in previous two cases of support for democracy and signing petitions, civil society has the highest coefficient as compared to any of the individual level variables.

An interesting detail of the Model 3-2 is that as the country level variables are included in the analysis, income looses its significance. A plausible explanation for that would be that income conflates with either democracy or civil society (or both); in a way its effect on joining boycotts on the individual level is artificial.

Cross-level interactions (Model 3-3) are evident between civil society on one hand and post-materialist values, sociotropic membership and interest in politics on the other hand. Just like post-materialists from countries with higher levels of civil society are more supportive of democracy and more inclined to sign petitions, they are also more likely to join in boycotts. In countries with a vibrant civil society, members of sociotropic associations are more likely to join in boycotts as compared to their colleagues from countries with less developed civil society. Civil society also facilitates the link between interest in politics and joining in boycotts.

No interaction effects are to be observed between civil society and utilitarian membership patterns, neither between civil society and information about politics. Members of utilitarian associations, and those politically well informed, join in boycotts irrespective of strength or weakness of civil society in the given country.
Table 18: Predictors of Joining in Boycotts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects:</th>
<th>Model 3-0</th>
<th>Model 3-1</th>
<th>Model 3-2</th>
<th>Model 3-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Intercept (constant)</td>
<td>.09*** (7.32)</td>
<td>.08*** (8.48)</td>
<td>.08*** (11.75)</td>
<td>.08*** (12.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level Effects (general slope):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
<td>.02*** (3.90)</td>
<td>.02*** (3.83)</td>
<td>.02*** (4.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic membership</td>
<td>.01** (3.22)</td>
<td>.01** (3.22)</td>
<td>.01** (3.50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarian membership</td>
<td>.02*** (4.47)</td>
<td>.02*** (4.48)</td>
<td>.02*** (4.89)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>.03*** (7.26)</td>
<td>.03*** (7.26)</td>
<td>.03*** (9.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about politics</td>
<td>.001* (2.11)</td>
<td>.003* (2.07)</td>
<td>.002* (2.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.02*** (5.61)</td>
<td>.02*** (5.66)</td>
<td>.02*** (5.50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.002* (2.03)</td>
<td>.002 (1.94)</td>
<td>.001 (1.67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.0002 (-1.31)</td>
<td>-.0002 (-1.35)</td>
<td>-.0003 (-1.51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.01** (-2.98)</td>
<td>-.01** (-2.96)</td>
<td>-.02** (-3.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-level Effects (intercept variation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>.01 (1.37)</td>
<td>.01 (1.71)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04** (3.61)</td>
<td>.03** (3.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-level Interactions (slope variation):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*post-materialism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.03*** (6.69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*sociotropic.membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.01*** (4.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*utilitarian membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.005 (0.77)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*interest in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.02*** (3.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society*information about politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.002 (1.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unexplained Level 1 Variance (% of error reduction):</strong></td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.074 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unexplained Level 2 Variance, intercepts (% of error reduction):</strong></td>
<td>.0035</td>
<td>.0018</td>
<td>.0016 (54%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=32118 (individuals) and 31 (countries); *p<.05; **p<.01 ***p<.001

Entries are likelihood coefficients (T-ratios in parenthesis) with robust standard errors estimated with HLM 6.01
3.3. Summing Up the Multi-Level Analysis Results

On the individual level, education appears to be the most important condition of support for democracy and political participation, followed by post-materialist values: an outcome that replicates the previous research findings, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. As expected, post-materialists and those with higher levels of education are politically more active and more supportive of democracy while simultaneously rejecting non-democratic alternatives to governance.

Both interest in politics and amount of information about it are important predictors of individual support for democracy and political participation. Interest in politics seems more prominent than information about politics; both, however, increase the likelihood of participation, fitting well with the Civic Voluntarism Model of Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). In addition to being politically more active, people interested in and relatively well informed about politics are more supportive of democracy, simultaneously rejecting authoritarian alternatives to a democratic form of government.

Membership in utilitarian associations appears as an important predictor in all three sets of models, while membership in sociotropic associations is less important for political participation and is irrelevant for democratic support. The evidence of the various effects of the two types of membership supports the arguments about the importance of distinguishing between different types of associations when analyzing the impact of associational life on democratic culture, instead of ‘bundling’ them together.

After testing the impact of the two country level variables, it becomes clear that civil society is an important predictor of democratic support and political participation. It has the highest coefficients across the models, except for the impact of democracy on signing petitions and the interaction model (3-3) where it is matched by the impact of interest in politics. Democracy, on the other hand, is the most important predictor of petition signing likelihood. These results make sense, because without democracy it would be useless and could be risky to sign petitions. Democracy as a country level measure does not influence individual support for democracy, neither the frequency of boycotts. Hence, in multi-level analysis, civil society emerges as a factor that is more important than democracy in shaping certain democratic attitudes and patterns of behavior. In countries with higher levels of civil society, people are more supportive of democracy and are more likely to sign petitions and join in boycotts.

Civil society interacts with post-materialist values in two out of three models. Post-materialists are likely to engage in the two types of political participation in general, but even
more so in countries where civil society is well developed. Information about politics interacts with civil society only in the case of support for democracy, meaning that in countries with higher levels of civil society those better informed about politics are more supportive of democracy. They, however, are as likely to participate, as the well-informed of the countries with low levels of civil society: there is no interaction between civil society and information about politics in the political participation models. Although civil society does not interact with political information in predicting political participation, it does increase the chances of those interested in politics to join in boycotts. Members of utilitarian associations are unaffected by civil society, while members of sociotropic associations are more likely to join in boycotts in countries where civil society is stronger.

Conclusion
This chapter has taken the examination of the relationship between civil society and democracy from the country level to the two-level analysis, and has brought the individual into the picture. The data on support for democracy and the two types of political participation was analyzed in order to address the Research Questions 2 and 3, proposed in the beginning of this work. The answers to both questions are positive. People’s support for democracy is influenced by the state of civil society in the country. The same is true for the two types of political participation analyzed in this study.

In addition to answering the two research questions, a few other interesting points have emerged in the course of the analysis.

First one concerns the relationship between civil society and democracy. The previous chapter provided evidence of close interconnectedness and mutual impact of the two phenomena, with the balance being somewhat tilted in favor of democracy as an influential factor. This chapter provides a new insight into the relationship between these two variables. The outcome of the multi-level analysis is that civil society emerges as a more important factor in comparison to democracy. On the societal level civil society may be strongly influenced by existing democracy, but on the individual level civil society contributes to attitudes and actions that are vital for democracy to sustain itself where it exists, and serve as impulses to bring about democracy where it does not exist.

The second interesting point is the interaction between civil society and post-materialist values in the two sets of models describing political participation. This could be a hint to how exactly does civil society contribute to democratic political culture. It is plausible to assume that it does so by ‘activating’ and perhaps empowering post-materialists.
The third point I would like to highlight again is the difference between the impact of the two types of associational membership on support for democracy and political participation. Sociotropic associations appear as irrelevant for support for democracy, which adds a drop of skepticism to the general conclusion of importance of civil society. There is nothing inherently democratic about associational life. Some types of associations contribute to democratic political culture while others do not, and it is important to make distinctions and pay attention to differences in a rich and diverse fabric of associational life.

The forth important point that emerges in the course of the multi-level analysis is the scope of the impact of civil society as a country level measure as compared to the impact of individual membership. Membership in sociotropic associations is not important for democratic political culture, while civil society, measured on the country level, is. These findings suggest that it is not the membership as such that matters. What matters, is that people live in a society with a vibrant associational life, which either provides them with opportunities to participate, or influences them in some other ways. In any case civil society makes them supportive of democracy and more politically active, irrespective of the individual membership.
Conclusion and Discussion

This PhD thesis has examined the relationship between civil society and democracy. In doing so it has utilized the new generic measurements of civil society instead of relying on proxy measures. It has looked into both external and internal effects of civil society and has combined country and individual levels of analysis.

The following basic assumption and the three research questions were formulated and examined in the course of the PhD research project:

*The Basic Assumption: There is a positive relationship between civil society and democracy on the country level.*

*Research Question 1: Is civil society’s impact on democracy stronger than democracy’s impact on civil society?*

*Research Question 2: Is people’s support for democracy influenced by the state of civil society in the country?*

*Research Question 3: Is individual political participation influenced by the state of civil society in the country?*

The basic assumption of the PhD thesis is supported: section 2.1 in Chapter III provides the evidence of a strong positive linear relationship between civil society and democracy. The findings indicate that the higher the level of democracy in a given country, the more vibrant its civil society, and vice versa.

The answer to the Research Question 1 is inconclusive due to the lack of clear evidence, although the findings of section 2.2 in Chapter III point in the direction of democracy as the one influencing civil society rather than vice versa.

Taken together, the results of Chapter III fail to support the arguments concerning the external effects of civil society on the polity. Civil society institutions and organizations might have various types and degrees of impact on the polity they operate in (as suggested in the literature reviewed in sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2 of Chapter I) but this impact does not translate into higher levels of democracy on the country level, at least not according to the
outcomes of this PhD research project. A major shortcoming of this part of the analysis is that no other control variables were included. Further research is needed, with more relevant country level variables and more points of measurement in time to provide a clear answer to the question of causal direction of the impact between civil society and democracy.

The results of the multi-level analysis (Chapter IV) demonstrate that the answers to both Research Questions 2 and 3 are positive: civil society influences individual support for democracy and the two types of political participation analyzed in this study. Thus, in contrast to the case of external effects of civil society, the results of this PhD research support the argument concerning the internal effects of civil society on the individual political culture.

How do these two main findings add together?

On the country level democracy is a better predictor of civil society rather than vice versa, implying that institutional settings, civil society operates in, are of a great importance. This might be a disheartening finding for enthusiasts of civil society, but it does make sense. Under an authoritarian regime civil society most likely has difficulties in developing as an independent sphere of social activity, acquiring a decisive voice of its own, or being able to influence its respective polity. On the other hand, if a country is a democracy, civil society has a good ground to flourish on. This is a classical institutionalist argument. The picture, however, is not complete without taking the individual into account.

Civil society has an impact on individual support for democracy and political participation, thus influencing the micro-foundations of democracy. It does so in general, but also via ‘activating’ post-materialists who become even more pro-democratic than they otherwise are. Therefore civil society contributes to the creation of a public that is supportive of the idea of democracy and is politically active. What are the chances that this public will demand higher levels of democracy, especially if post-materialists are an active core of it? Given the fact at all the three components: support for democracy, political participation and post-materialism were found to be conducive to democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005) one can assume that the chances are quite high.

Although the role of the individual in bringing about and sustaining democracy was not an explicit part of this research project, I think it is the individual that links the findings of the two chapters together. Following the logic of explanation proposed by Coleman (1990, 5-10) known as the ‘bath-tub’ model, the argument concerning the relationship between civil society and democracy, put forth as the conclusion of the PhD research, starts at the aggregate level of civil society, dips to the level of the individual values and behavior
patterns, and then returns to the aggregate level of democracy as a system of government. The results of the two chapters taken together suggest that civil society creates a positive impact on democracy through individuals. At the end of the day, it is the individuals who push for democracy. The relationship between civil society and democracy is indeed a virtuous circle as some (Bernhard 1996; Dekker, Koopmans and van den Broek 1997; Keane 1988) have suggested, but the circle includes the individual. It can be presented by the following diagram (Figure 14), where the gray arrows represent the two aspects examined in the course of this research:

![Diagram of Democracy, Civil Society and the Individual - The Flow of Influence]

Although this picture greatly simplifies the actual process of the interaction, I think it reflects the direction of the main flow of influence between democracy, civil society and the individual.

Another important finding of this PhD project is the difference between civil society measured as a societal phenomenon and the individual membership in civil society organizations. Most of the research on the effects of civil society on democracy focuses on membership. However, as it has become obvious from this study, it is not the membership as such that matters. Living in a society with a vibrant associational life (taken as a whole, as a characteristic of the given society) makes people more supportive of democracy and more politically engaged, irrespective of their individual involvement in associations. The influence of civil society on the micro-foundations of democracy is a positive externality
rather than a selective benefit restricted to members of associations, which is a major aspect of the relationship between civil society and democracy, overlooked in the previous research.

The fact that civil society influences individual support for democracy and enhances chances of political participation opens up a new set of questions. How is this influence accomplished?

The issue of participation is relatively easy to speculate upon, as civil society probably provides the ‘infrastructure’ for activities traditionally associated with political participation, such as signing petitions and joining in boycotts. It is known from previous research that voluntary associations serve as political recruitment networks (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). In addition to influencing its own members, civil society organizations often launch petitions or boycott campaigns to address a broader public. Therefore, as demonstrated in this PhD research, well developed and active civil society provides more opportunities for people to sign petitions and join in boycotts.

How does civil society influence support for democracy? Does it indeed serve as a ‘school of democracy,’ providing its members with some positive experiences with basic ideas of democratic self-governance, leader accountability, transparency of decision-making and so on? Is it successful in its democratic education and awareness campaigns, teaching people to know and appreciate their rights? Is it successful in drawing attention to injustices and harsh conditions in many parts of the world, making people value democracy as a relatively peaceful and prosperous social system? More research is needed if the mechanism of impact of civil society on individual support for democracy is to be uncovered.

In addition to the main question of the relationship between civil society and democracy, a few secondary findings of this PhD project can be mentioned.

Firstly, the study has assessed the new measurements of civil society, establishing their validity. The fact that the measurements were used through the PhD project and produced meaningful results, in some cases replicating earlier findings (the peculiarity of the post-communist region and the link between civil society and the economy) adds some credit to these measurements and speaks in favor of using them more extensively for the purpose of academic research.

A serious shortcoming of the new measurements of civil society used in this study is the relatively small N of counties covered by each of the separate measurements. If more countries would be covered by each of the measurements this would lead to a larger pool of overlapping measures and improve the overall quality of civil society data.
As far as the time trends in civil society are concerned, it seems to be more volatile than one would think while reading Putnam’s account of 300 years of tradition of civic culture in the North Italy. For example, if one looks at the post-communist region, Poland was considered to have the most advanced civil society in the late 1980es. Now it has the lowest levels of trust\textsuperscript{53} in the region (Pichler and Wallace 2007). An indication of the volatility of civil society over time was found in the course of this PhD project, when comparing the two points in time for which civil society data is available, as mentioned in section 4.3 of Chapter II. Of course, this is a hint rather than a clear result. It would be an interesting research task to look at longer time trends with large numbers of countries, should such data become available.

The PhD project has briefly mapped the descriptive statistics of civil society data according to the geographic regions and the levels of economic performance. It has demonstrated that North-West Europe is distinct in terms of vibrant civil society as compared to the rest of the World. From the economic point of view, civil society is linked with a high level of personal income, which is perhaps the explanation of the peculiarity of West-North Europe – a region where most of well-developed economies are found. The study has also replicated previous findings of the persisting weakness of post-communist civil society (Howard 2003).

The last finding of this PhD research project discussed here, is the difference between various types of civil society organizations. The multi-level analysis has demonstrated that though civil society (as a country level measurement) generally contributes to higher levels of support for democracy and political activism, individual membership in two different types of associations produces different outcomes. Membership in utilitarian associations is linked with higher support for democracy and political activism, while membership in sociotropic associations is related to political activism but not to support for democracy.

The issue of non-homogeneity of civil society has been repeatedly pointed out in the literature, be it a broad variety of civil society organizations resulting in a range of potential democratic outcomes (Fung 2003; Warren 2001) or a discussion of ‘civil’ vs. ‘uncivil’ elements of civil society (Kopecký and Mudde 2003). In principle anyone would agree that different organizations are likely to produce different effects. For example, Amnesty International and Ku-Klux-Klan both classify as voluntary associations, but one would hardly

\textsuperscript{53} Trust is often used as a proxy measure of civil society; alternatively trust is considered to be the outcome of civil society, hence low levels of trust signal the fact that civil society fails to produce its most common ‘output’.
expect them to have similar impact on their members or on the society in general. In practice, however, little is still known about the variations in effects as a result of variations in type of civil society organizations. The distinction between sociotropic and utilitarian associations, adopted in this research, is only one of the possible typologies of associations. Other examples include service function associations vs. expressive function associations (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003), goal-oriented associations vs. cultural vs. sports associations (Joye and Laurent 1997) and social vs. traditional political vs. new political organizations (Wessels 1997). A systematic study of civil society, while controlling for the difference in types of organizations and associations, could provide valuable insights into the question of how exactly does civil society foster (or hinder) the development of a democratic political culture.

This PhD research project has analyzed the relationship between civil society and democracy on the country level and the impact of these two variables on the individual level. The outcomes of the research can be summarized as follows:

The original contribution of the research project:
- The use of the new measurements of civil society;
- The combination of research on the external and the internal impact of civil society, reflected in the combination of country and individual levels of analysis.

The findings of the country level analysis:
- North-Western Europe has distinctively higher levels of civil society;
- Civil society in high income countries is significantly stronger than civil society in middle and low income countries;
- Post-communist civil society remains weak as compared to the rest of the World;
- Civil society and democracy are strongly inter-related;
- Democracy is a somewhat better predictor of civil society, although no final conclusions can be made, due to a lack of variation in the data.

The findings of the multi-level analysis:
- Civil society is an important predictor of individual support for democracy and political activism;
- Civil society is a more important predictor of individual support for democracy and political activism than democracy, except for the case of signing petitions where both democracy and civil society are equally important;

- Civil society as a country level phenomenon is more important than individual membership in civil society associations in shaping individual support for democracy and political participation. One may or may not him/herself be a member of association, but living in a country with more vibrant civil society makes one more politically active and supportive of democracy.

- Civil society interacts with post-materialist values, making post-materialists more politically active;

- The difference between various types of voluntary organizations is an important factor, when analyzing individual support for democracy and political activism.

General conclusion: **on the country level there is no clear evidence of civil society’s impact on democracy; however civil society has a positive influence on individual elements of a democratic political culture.**

What do these findings mean in practical terms? If a policy advice should be given based on this PhD project, it would caution against an unsound enthusiasm of civil society. Institutions do matter. It is unrealistic to expect civil society to flourish and enhance democracy where basic institutional preconditions for it are lacking. In authoritarian regimes civil society probably will not be able to achieve much, even if it is financially supported by international donors and development programs. The focus, instead, should be on creating a proper environment (associational rights, freedom of expression, delegation of certain tasks to local communities, etc.) that allows civil society to expand and deepen its roots in a society. A vibrant civil society will then be able to work its ‘magic’ through individual political culture, thus indirectly contributing to democracy.
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES

The data used in the research project is obtained from the following sources:

1. Individual Level Data

   European Values Study (EVS) is a cross-national longitudinal survey research program on basic human values. It was initiated in late 1970s by a group of academics called the European Value Systems Study Group (EVSSG). “Now, it is carried on in the setting of a foundation, using the (abbreviated) name of the group: European Values Study (EVS)” (European Values Study Foundation 2008). First interviews were conducted in 1981 in ten European countries. The research project received significant attention and has undergone impressive development. Various groups used the same questionnaire to replicate the study in other parts of the World, and agreements for exchange of data were negotiated, leading to the establishment of World Values Survey. Within the framework of the EVS proper, two more waves of surveys were conducted (in 1990 and in 1999/2000) and the fieldwork for the current wave 2008 is under way.

   Website: [http://www.europeanvalues.nl/](http://www.europeanvalues.nl/)

   World Values Survey (WVS) is a global network of social scientists coordinated by a central body, the World Values Survey Association: a non-profit association seated in Stockholm, Sweden. The network includes social scientists representing a wide variety of disciplines. Five waves of surveys were conducted up to now, covering more than 80 societies on all six inhabited continents, focusing on basic values and beliefs of people around the world and allowing for both cross-cultural and time series analysis (World Values Survey 2008).

   The waves as referred to in the dataset (The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. 2006a):

   1 = 1981-1984
   2 = 1989 – 1993
   3 = 1994 – 1999
   4 = 1999 – 2004
   5 = 2005-2006

   Website: [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/)
2. Country Level Data

Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800 – 2004

Polity IV is a continuation of “Polity” research tradition. It focuses on authority characteristics of states and produces quantitative data suitable for comparative analysis. Informed by foundational, collaborative work with (Eckstein 1975), the original conceptual scheme was formulated by Ted Robert Gurr who also directed the collection of the Polity I data. The project has evolved through several research phases. The current Polity IV project is under the direction of Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University. The dataset covers all major, independent states in the global system (i.e., states with total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year; currently 162 countries) over the period 1800-2006. The data on 2007 is to be released shortly (Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research INSCR 2006).

Website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy also known as the Polyarchy dataset, is compiled by Tatu Vanhanen, emeritus professor at the University of Tampere and at the University of Helsinki, and covers 187 countries over the period 1810 to 2000 (Vanhanen 2003).

Website: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/

Freedom House is a US-based non-governmental organization founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie and others with a mission of supporting and expansion of freedom in the world. The organization conducts advocacy, education and training that promote human rights, democracy, free market economy, the rule of law, independent media and US engagement in international affairs. Annual publications by Freedom House (Freedom in the World, Freedom of the Press, Nations in Transit and Countries at the Crossroads) aim at describing global trends in democracy and are widely used in academia as a source of data suitable for cross-country comparison and longitudinal analysis. The Board of Trustees is composed of business and labor leaders, former senior government officials, scholars, writers, and journalists Freedom House 2007

Freedom in the World is an annual comparative assessment of the state of political rights and civil liberties in 192 countries and 14 related/disputed territories, published since
Each country and territory is assigned a numerical rating between one and seven for political rights and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a rating of one indicates the highest degree of freedom and seven the least amount of freedom. These ratings are assigned based on “individual survey author’s responses to a series of checklist questions and the judgments of the survey team at Freedom House” (Karatnycky 2002, 723).

* Nations in Transit* follows the same methodology, but focuses in more detail on the 29 post-communist states and administrative areas.

Website: [http://www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

*The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project* contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 13 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981-2004. This first version of the dataset was made possible because of a grant from the National Science Foundation’s Political Science Division and additional financial support from the World Bank. The list of academic publications using CIRI dataset contains about 30 titles as of now (CIRI 2007).

Website: [http://ciri.binghamton.edu/](http://ciri.binghamton.edu/)

*CIVICUS Civil Society Index*

CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of over 1000 members organizations, donor organizations and individuals from 105 countries, with more than ten years of history of existence. Its mission is to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. Current headquarters is located in Johannesburg, South Africa (CIVICUS 2007).

The Civil Society Index (CSI) Program is one of the projects, implemented by CIVICUS. Its goal is to assess the state of civil society in countries around the world (CIVICUS 2006). Helmut K. Anheier, one of the leading specialists in the field was involved in developing the concepts and the methodology for the program. Volkhart Finn Heinrich is the project manager Heinrich 2004.

The CSI was launched by CIVICUS as a pilot project in 2000. After that the methodology was revised and re-fined to make it more unified and comparable across countries. The research consists of three steps:

1. Data collection with various methods, based on which a country report is prepared;
2. Experts assign scores on 72 measurements, based on the report; aggregate score for the diamond is produced;

3. The country report and the scores are verified by a national workshop with civil society actors and external stakeholders from the government, media, academic institutions and the business sector.

The following data collection methods are used:

1. Regional stakeholder consultations: individual questionnaires and group discussions.
2. Community surveys: value dispositions, activities within and attitudes towards civil society.
3. Media review: information on civil society activities, attitudes and values expressed by civil society and other public actors, to establish media image of civil society

Website: [http://www.civicus.org](http://www.civicus.org)

**USAID NGO Sustainability Index**

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent federal government agency. Its history goes back to the Marshall Plan reconstruction of Europe after World War Two. “Europe and Eurasia” is one of the five regions where USAID provides assistance. NGO Sustainability Index is an analytical tool developed by USAID in order to assess the progress of post-communist European and Eurasian NGO sector since the fall of communism (USAID 2008a).

The index is composed of seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, NGO infrastructure and public image. The scores are assigned based on background information collected by USAID staff and implementers, and are adjusted after focus group discussions with resident experts and NGOs (USAID 2008b).


**Global Civil Society Index** was developed by (Anheier and Stares 2002) and published in the *Global Civil Society 2002 Yearbook*.

Website: [http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchgcspub.htm](http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchgcspub.htm)
The World Bank is an umbrella name for two development institutions owned by 185 member countries aimed at global poverty reduction and improvement of living standards. The World Bank conducts various development research programs and provides wealth of statistical information. The two measurements utilized in this PhD thesis are the level of economic development and voice and accountability index from the Worldwide Governance Indicators Project.

Webpage (economy): http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0

United Nations Statistics Division provides classification of countries into geographic regions that is used in this PhD thesis.
Website: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm
### Appendix B: Countries and Availability of Data

#### Table 19: Availability of the Data for Each Country and Source

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Appendix C: Variables

1. Individual Level Variables

All the data on individual level variables is taken from World Values Survey 2000 (WVS2000) and European Values Study 1999 (EVS1999). Question numbers from the integrated questionnaire (The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. 2006b) are provided for each variable; in addition question numbers from corresponding WVS and EVS questionnaires are provided as well. The dataset (The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. 2006a) and the questionnaires are available online http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

Support for Democracy is the democracy/autocracy preference (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Klingemann 1999) measured using the following questions:

Approval of Democracy

Question E123 (V172[WVS2000]/V220[EVS1999])

Wording: I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.

Original coding of responses:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly disagree

Recoding: the data is recoded into 0-to-3 scale with larger numbers indicating stronger agreement with the statement.

Political System Preference


Wording: I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
- Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
- Having the army rule
- Having a democratic political system

Original coding of responses:

1 Very good
2 Fairly good
3 Fairly bad
4 Very bad

Recoding: the data is recoded into 0-to-3 scale with larger numbers indicating stronger agreement with the statement.

To calculate the final support for democracy, first approval of democracy and a choice of democracy as a political system are summed up to establish the respondent’s ‘democracy preference.’ The higher the value the more supportive the respondent is of the democratic regime. The range is from 0 to 6. Similarly, ‘autocracy preference’ is measured by summing up the evaluations given to the three non-democratic regimes: strong leader, experts and the army rule. The higher the value the more supportive the respondent is of undemocratic forms of governments. The range is from 0 to 9. The formulas for calculating democracy and autocracy preferences are presented below:

\[
\text{Democracy preference} = \text{approval of democracy} + \text{having a democratic political system.}
\]

\[
\text{Autocracy preference} = \text{having a strong leader} + \text{having experts make decisions} + \text{having the army rule.}
\]

As the last step support for democracy (or democracy/autocracy preference) is calculated according to the following formula:

\[
\text{Support of Democracy} = \text{Democracy Preference} - \text{Autocracy Preference}
\]
Support of Democracy has a value range from -9 to 6; the higher the number, the stronger is the individual’s commitment to democracy combined with a simultaneous rejection of alternative types of government.

**Political Participation: Signing a petition and joining in boycotts**


Wording: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.

- Signing a petition
- Joining in boycotts

Original coding:

1 Have done
2 Might do
3 Would never do

Recoding: the data is recoded into a 1/0 dummy variable, 1 meaning that the responded have done the activity in question.

**Post-materialism**

Variable Y002 is a 4-item post-materialist index (Inglehart 1977) based on a set of four questions.

Wording: If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important?

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Give people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

Respondents who emphasized maintaining order and rising prices scored high on materialist values. Respondents who opted for more say in government decisions and freedom of speech scored high on post-materialist dimension.

Coding:

1 Materialist
2 Mixed
3 Postmaterialist

**Interest in politics**

Question E023 (V133[WVS2000]/o17[EVS1999])

Wording: *How interested would you say you are in politics?*

Original Coding:

1 Very interested  
2 Somewhat interested  
3 Not very interested  
4 Not at all interested

Recoding: the data is recoded into 0 to 3 scale, where 3 means ‘very interested.’

**Political information**

Question E150 (V217[WVS2000]/V263[EVS1999])

Wording: *How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?*

Original Coding:

1 Every day  
2 Several times a week  
3 Once or twice a week  
4 Less often  
5 Never

Recoding: the data is recoded into 0 to 4 scale, where 4 means every day

**Membership in Sociotropic Associations**

Following (Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005) membership in three types of associations (social welfare, cultural and environmental) is used. In addition, doing unpaid work for these three types of organizations adds to the indicator, thus producing a measurement of membership in sociotropic associations from zero (not a member neither doing unpaid work for any of the three types) to six.

**Membership in Utilitarian Associations**

Similarly to the membership in sociotropic associations described above, this indicator is calculated using reported membership in and doing unpaid work for the following
three types of organizations: labor unions, political groups/parties and professional associations.


Wording: Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say...which, if any, do you belong to? And for which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work?

- Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people
- Education, arts, music or cultural activities
- Labor unions
- Political parties or groups
- Conservation, environmental, animal rights groups
- Professional associations

Coding:
0 – not mentioned
1 - member/do voluntary work

Education
Variable X025R is a three level index recoded from the variable Highest educational level attained X025 (V226[WVS2000]/V304[EVS1999]) on a country basis.

Wording: What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

Coding:
1 Lower
2 Middle
3 Upper

Income
Question X047 (V236[WVS2000]/V320[EVS1999])

Wording: Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

Coding:
1 Lower step
2 Second step
3 Third step
4 Fourth step
5 Fifth step
6 Sixth step
7 Seventh step
8 Eighth step
9 Ninth step
10 Tenth step

Age
Question X003 (V225[WVS2000]/AGE199[EVS1999])

Gender
Question X001 (V223[WVS2000]/V291[EVS1999])
Coding:
1 Male
2 Female

2. Country Level Variables

2.1. Civil Society Measures

The Global Civil Society Index (GCSI)

Original Variable: GCSI Re-normalized score

Source: (Anheier and Stares 2002), also available online:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/yearbook02

Original Content: The original index is constructed by combining the following indicators:

- Political participation – **excluded from the analysis in this PhD thesis**
- Membership of civil society groups
- Membership density of INGOs
- Tolerance towards immigrants as neighbors
- Encourage tolerance in children

**Range**: 0 – 1 (well developed civil society)

**Modifications**: the index was re-calculated to exclude political participation, following the procedures specified by the authors.

**The Civil Society Index (CSI)**

**Original Variables**: four dimensions of CSI: Structure, Impact, Values and the Environment.

**Source**: country reports available online [http://www.civicus.org/csi/phase-one/csi-country-reports](http://www.civicus.org/csi/phase-one/csi-country-reports)

**Original Content**:

1. **Structure**
   1) Breadth of citizen participation
   2) Depth of citizen participation
   3) Diversity within civil society
   4) Level of organization
   5) Inter-relations
   6) Resources

2. **Environment**
   1) Political context – **excluded from the analysis in this PhD thesis**
   2) Basic freedoms and rights - **excluded from the analysis in this PhD thesis**
   3) Socio-economic context
   4) Socio-cultural context
   5) Legal environment
   6) State-civil society relations
   7) Private sector-civil society relations

3. **Values**
   1) Democracy
   2) Transparency
   3) Non-violence
   4) Gender equality
5) Poverty eradication

6) Environmental sustainability

4. Impact

1) Influencing public policy

2) Holding state and private corporations accountable

3) Responding to social interests

4) Empowering citizens

5) Meeting social needs

Original Range: 0 – 3 (strong civil society) for each of the four dimensions

Modifications: to avoid overlap with the measures of democracy two measurements: “political context” and “basic freedoms and rights,” were excluded and a new value for the Environment dimension was calculated for each country, replicating the CSI methodology of averaging the scores of sub-dimensions. After that the average of the four dimensions was calculated and used in this thesis as a unified CSI with a range of 0 to 3 (strong civil society).

USAID NGO Sustainability Index (USAID NGO SI)

Variable: The NGO Sustainability Index

Source: available online

Content: the average of seven dimensions of NGO sustainability

- Legal environment
- Organizational capacity
- Financial viability
- Advocacy
- Service provision
- Infrastructure
- Public Image

Original Range: 7 – 1 (advanced NGO sector).

Modification: the scores were reversed to the range of 1 – 7 (advanced NGO sector)

Freedom House Nations in Transit Civil Society Scores (FH CS)

Original Variable: Civil Society Rating
Source: Available online http://www.freedomhouse.org

**Original Range** 7 – 1 (well developed civil society)

**Modification:** the scores were reversed to the range of 1 – 7 (well developed civil society).

### 2.2. Civil Society Aggregate Measures

**Civil Society 2000** consists of:

a) GCSI scores for 33 countries\(^{54}\);

b) Predicted values for five countries\(^{55}\) based on a regression where NGO SI (2000) and CSI are the independent variables, GCSI is the depended variable (N=6, R Square = 0.37, Sig. 0.51);

c) Predicted values for 21 countries\(^{56}\) based on a regression where CSI is the independent variable and GCSI is the dependent variable (N=13, R Square 0.33, Sig. 0.04);

d) Predicted values for ten countries\(^{57}\) based on a regression where NGO SI (2000) is the independent variable and GCSI is the dependent variable (N=12, R Square 0.02, Sig. 0.70).

**Range:** -1.58 – 3.24 (strong civil society)

**Civil Society 2004** consists of:

a) CSI scores for 39 countries\(^{58}\);

b) Predicted values for six countries\(^{59}\) based on a regression where NGO SI (2004) and GCSI are the independent variables; CSI is the dependent variable (N=7, R Square 0.64, Sig. 0.13);

c) Predicted values for 14 countries\(^{60}\) based on a regression where GCSI is the independent variable and CSI is the dependent variable (N=13, R Square 0.33, Sig. 0.04);

---

\(^{54}\) Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K, U.S and Ukraine.

\(^{55}\) Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia.

\(^{56}\) Bolivia, China, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Taiwan, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay and Vietnam.

\(^{57}\) Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

\(^{58}\) Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Korea, Taiwan, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay and Vietnam.

\(^{59}\) Belarus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia.
d) Predicted values for 10\textsuperscript{61} countries based on a regression where NGO SI(2004) is
the independent variable and CSI is the dependent variable (N=12, R Square 0.37, Sig. 0.04).
Range: -2.39 – 2.15 (strong civil society)

The produced Civil Society 2000 measurement is relatively more influenced by the
GCSI which ranges from zero to one, while Civil Society 2004 measure is relatively more
influenced by CSI which ranges from zero to three. To compensate for this, both scores were
standardized\textsuperscript{62}.

**Civil Society Average** (Civil Society) is the average of Civil Society 2000 and Civil
Society 2004 (see above).
Range: -1.99 – 2.70 (strong civil society)

### 2.3. Democracy Measures

**Polity IV Project (Polity IV)**

- **Variable:** Institutionalized Democracy (DEMOC)
- **Source:** dataset (Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research INSCR 2007)
available from [http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)
- **Content:** Detailed information on the construction of this measurement is available
  from (Marshall and Jaggers 2005)
  Range: 0 (no democracy) -10 (maximum democracy)

**Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy.**

- **Variable:** ID
- **Source:** dataset available from
- **Content:** detailed information on the content and the construction of the index is
  available from (Vanhanen 2003).

\textsuperscript{60} Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK and US.
\textsuperscript{61} Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan.
\textsuperscript{62} The formula for the computation of the standard (z) score is \( z = (x - \text{mean}) / \text{standard deviation}. \)
Range: 0 – 43 (maximum democracy).

**World Bank Worldwide Voice and Accountability (VA)**

Variable: Voice and Accountability Est.

Source: dataset available from [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm)

Content: The list of sources that provide data for the Governance Indicators and other methodological details can be found in (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzii 2006).

Range: -2.5 (bad governance) – 2.5 (good governance)

**Freedom House**

Original Variable: [Freedom in the World] Combined Average Rating


Original Content: for the detailed description of the composition of the variables see (Freedom House 2006).

Original Range: 7 – 1 (maximum freedom)

Modification: the scores are reversed to 1 – 7 (maximum freedom)

**CIRI Human Rights Data Project**

**Physical Integrity Rights Index**

Variable: PHYSINT

Source: Dataset available from [http://ciri.binghamton.edu/](http://ciri.binghamton.edu/)

Content: Details on the construction of the Physical Integrity Rights Index can be found in (Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

Range: 0 – 8 (full respect of rights)

**Empowerment Rights Index**

Variable: EMPINX
Source: Dataset available from http://ciri.binghamton.edu/

Content: 1) openness and freedom of political participation, 2) government control of media, 3) freedom to unionize, 4) freedom to travel and 5) freedom of religion. Details on the construction of Empowerment Rights Index can be found in (Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001).

Range: 0 – 10 (full respect of rights)

2.4 Aggregate Measures of Democracy

For each year of analysis the aggregate measures of democracy are constructed by adding re-normalized\textsuperscript{63} FH, Polity IV, CIRI Physical Integrity Rights and CIRI Empowerment rights for the respective year.

Range: 0 – 4 (maximum democracy)


Range: low, middle and high income economies


\textbf{Post-Communist} is a 0/1 dummy variable, 1 meaning the country had communist regime.

\textsuperscript{63} The formula for the computation of normalized scores is \( x_{\text{normalized}} = (x - \text{minimum score})/(\text{maximum score} - \text{minimum score}) \).
### 3. Descriptive Statistics Summary

#### Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Level Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
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</thead>
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</table>

#### Table 22: Descriptive Statistics of Country Level Variables

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