Christine Brandstätt

• This thesis analyses pricing and market design to allocate network access and recover network cost in electricity distribution networks with distributed generation and flexible consumers. The challenge of coordinating new, flexible, and increasingly active network users is the overarching motivation for the analyses in the four different papers. First, an introduction gives an overview of the background, main contents and conclusions. This is followed by the four academic papers, each picking up a separate, topical aspect of coordinating new network users in distribution grids. The first paper contributes to the ongoing debate on integrating self-supply into the tariff structure of distribution grids and provides options to prevent a potentially inefficient, self-reinforcing dynamic. By analysing the evolution of self-supply shares in distribution grids depending on network charges, several options are revealed that adjust common charging parameters in order to maintain or restore financial stability. Paper 2 analyses the theoretical efficiency limits of the two-part tariff which is common in practice and trades-off economic efficiency with other requirements for the design of network charges. A formal comparison to the efficient benchmark of peak-load pricing reveals specific circumstances under which a two-part tariff simply cannot deliver fully efficient incentives. Paper 3 applies this to the practical challenge of steering investments into new technology for network users efficiently with network tariffs, thus broadening the perspective of the thesis from just self-supply and mere financial stability to efficient integration of active network users. The analysis shows how common uniform pricing distorts not only operation of existing assets, but also investments into new ones and thereby may lead to developing the distribution system inefficiently. The last paper focuses on access rights allocated by market mechanisms as an alternative or complement to regulated, listed access prices. Thus, it presents an account of different dimensions of access and the design of products and market rules for market-based allocation of access to electricity distribution grids. The paper finds that while differentiated access rights can theoretically be allocated efficiently by regulated, listed prices as well as in a market-based setting, pricing requires information on demand which network users ideally reveal in a market setting. A discussion of options for product and market design for access auctions carves out the potential benefits, as well as remaining challenges with market-based allocation.